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Major Cultural Commemorations 







My thesis asks whether cultural commemorations helped the GDR to build a distinct national 
identity, and examines the role of political and cultural actors involved in them. Covering 
different strands of German cultural heritage, the aims, implementations and outcomes of 
anniversary commemorations are investigated as a longitudinal series of case-studies: Schiller 
(1959); Kollwitz (1967); Beethoven (1970); and Luther (1983).  
Substantial evidence from largely unpublished sources exposes recurring gaps between the 
theory and practice of these commemorations, essentially attributable to manifest examples of 
agency by commemoration stakeholders. Each commemoration produced some positive 
legacies. But driven mainly by demarcation motives versus West Germany, the appropriation 
of these German cultural icons as socialist role-models to promote national identity was 
mostly unsuccessful in three commemorations. Kollwitz was the exception as the GDRˈs 
claimed linkage to her political life was already undisputed in both German states. 
These research results are new and important. They address a gap in both memory studies and 
GDR history scholarship regarding the relationship between commemorations and national 
identity. Furthermore, the findings of agency offer an original contribution to 
historiographical debates, by enhancing a ‘consensus’ or ‘participatory’ dictatorship model of 
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Since the unification of Germany in 1990, the GDR has become an intensively researched 
period of contemporary European history. A quantitative analysis of GDR historiography 
produced in 2010 notes some 16,000 books, articles and other research output to-date, 
peaking in the late 1990s at more than one thousand new items per year (Jessen, 2010). Ralph 
Jessen adds that over 350 PhD projects on GDR history had been submitted since 2001 in 
Germany alone (Jessen, 2010, p.1056); the relative quantities of publications by sometimes 
arbitrary distinctions of history disciplines vary over the years, with a growing trend in 
social-, cultural- and public-history works.  
Within this wide-ranging arena of research, a fundamental historiographical debate has 
continued to develop about the most appropriate model to describe the GDR. Superficially 
the debate seems to be polarised between bad and good. On the one side of the debate is a 
negative, arguably simplistic concentration on the repressive and authoritarian facets of the 
GDR, influenced by the Cold War. This perspective can be attributed to earlier scholars such 
as Childs (1983) and Krisch (1985). In contrast, more recent scholars such as Fulbrook, 
(1995; 2005), Bessel (1996), Kocka (1994; 1999), Jarausch (1999), Sabrow (1999; 2000), and 
Bollinger and Vilmar (2002), adopt a differentiated and more positive focus on GDR 
achievements, despite coming from different perspectives. 
As will be seen, one approach that merits further research is the construction of national 
identity in the GDR. The research presented in this thesis addresses a notable gap in 
scholarship on the phenomenon of commemorations generally as well as with specific 
reference to the GDR. The thesis investigates and compares how anniversaries of four major 
cultural figures, Friedrich Schiller, Käthe Kollwitz, Ludwig van Beethoven and Martin 
Luther, commemorated individually over a period of more than twenty years, were planned 
and implemented. The primary research question asks whether, and if so how, the 
commemorations may have contributed to the construction of national identity within GDR 
society. Evidence will show recurring gaps between the theory and practice of these 
commemorations, essentially attributable to manifest examples of agency by commemoration 
stakeholders. Driven mainly by demarcation motives versus West Germany, the appropriation 
of these German cultural icons as socialist role-models to promote national identity was 
mostly unsuccessful in three commemorations. Kollwitz was the exception as the GDRˈs 
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claimed linkage to her political life was already undisputed in both German states. These 
research results are both new and important. They address a gap in both memory studies and 
GDR history scholarship regarding the relationship between commemorations and national 
identity. Furthermore, the findings of agency offer an original contribution to 
historiographical debates, by enhancing a ‘consensus’ or ‘participatory’ dictatorship model of 
the GDR in preference to a top-down totalitarian system. 
This first chapter introduces the two main strands and related literature forming the overall 
theoretical framework of the thesis and will illustrate the contextual importance of the study. 
Firstly, selected theories within the overarching field of memory studies – foremost national 
identity together with nationalism and patriotism – are recognised and compared, before 
considering national identity in the context of collective memory and cultural memory. 
Against this theoretical background, the nature and role of public commemorations within 
collective constructions of the past and their significance for the construction of national 
identity will be examined. The chapter then asks what the study of national identity and 
commemoration can contribute to conceptualisation of the GDR as the second main strand of 
the framework. The chapter closes with a synopsis of the four case studies.  
1.1. SELECTED CONCEPTS IN MEMORY STUDIES 
1.1.1. The many dimensions of national identity 
The research seeks to explore if and how commemorations assisted in the construction of a 
specific GDR national identity. The terms nationalism, national identity and patriotism are 
often treated interchangeably in everyday usage. The definition and distinctiveness of these 
‘social-psychological dimensions’ (Kelman, 1997) should be explored both in a general sense 
as well as in relation to pre-1945 Germany, and post-1949 GDR. 
Anthony Smith gives a lucid introduction to the multi-dimensional complexities of identity 
and roles, including national identity (Smith, 1991, pp.4-5). Tailoring a definition of identity, 
in other words ‘self’, to the characteristics of GDR society creates a helpful pointer to the 
significance of individuals’ identity in the context of that state’s national identity. As a 
construct which underpins the state, Smith notes that national identity builds on individual 
identities. As will be seen, his observations that ‘…the [political] appeal to national identity 
has become the main legitimation for social order and solidarity’ and that ‘[…] today the 
nation is also called upon to provide a social bond between individuals and classes by 
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providing repertoires of shared values, symbols and traditions’ is certainly applicable to the 
GDR. Smith mentions various symbols, including monuments and ceremonies, by which 
citizens are ‘reminded of their common heritage and cultural kinship’ (ibid., pp.16-17). In so 
doing he confirms the pertinent connection between commemorations and national identity 
which is central to the research question in this thesis. 
Eric Hobsbawm’s concept of ‘invented tradition’ is especially relevant in this regard. 
Hobsbawm refers to two types of ‘invented tradition’ since the industrial revolution that 
suggest a link to national identity, particularly in the case of new nation-states such as the 
GDR: ‘…those establishing or legitimising institutions, status or relations of authority and 
those whose main purpose was socialisation, the inculcation of beliefs and values systems 
and conventions of behaviour’ (Hobsbawm, 1997, pp.1-9). He describes ‘inventing traditions’ 
as a ‘process of formalisation and rich utilisation, characterised by reference to the past, if 
only by imposing repetition’. The three functions of invented traditions listed by Hobsbawm 
provide reference points all of which will be shown to be relevant for this thesis as 
identifiable motives for the authorities when designing commemorations: (1) ‘establishing or 
symbolising social cohesion’; (2) ‘establishing or legitimising institutions, status or relations 
of authority’; and (3) ‘the inculcation of beliefs, values systems and conventions of 
behaviour’ (ibid., p.50). At the same time Hobsbawm concedes that the process of creating 
[my italics] such traditions has not been properly studied by historians. It is one of the 
purposes of this thesis to explore four examples of such processes of creation with reference 
to the GDR. 
Important in this context is Hobsbawm’s assertion that the link between invented tradition 
and national identity rests on ‘exercises in social engineering that are often deliberate’ 
(Hobsbawm, 1997, p.13). Similarly positing deliberate intent, Benedict Anderson proposes 
the concept of a more proactive ‘official nationalism’, characterised as a ‘conscious, self-
protective policy’, intimately linked in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries to the 
preservation of imperial-domestic interests (Anderson, 2006, p.159). In contrast to Smith, 
Anderson highlights mass media, the educational system and administrative regulations as 
ways in which states ‘instil nationalist ideology’ instead of symbols such as memorials, 
museums and commemorations. Anderson’s focus on these instruments, reinforced by 
adjectives such as ‘systematic, even Machiavellian’ therefore defines national identity as 
being imposed by the state in a deliberate, top-down strategy (Anderson, 2006, p.163). Later 
chapters will offer new evidence that calls into doubt an intentionalist interpretation of 
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nationalism as being a relevant theoretical background for cultural commemorations in the 
GDR. This thesis considers whether cultural commemorations may be regarded as an 
analogous example of ‘cultural engineering’ that is a type of transmission inherent in marking 
repetitive cultural anniversaries. As I will argue, close analysis of the ‘process of creation’ in 
the GDR indicates that ‘invented tradition’, in the sense of a pro-active practice, may be seen 
not always to apply – all the more so when consistent and deliberate intent fails to manifest 
itself in the subsequent planning and execution of major cultural commemorations. 
The use of the term ‘national identity’ (as opposed to nationalism) preferred in this thesis 
takes into account that the underlying concept of the ‘nation’ can be both ethnic as well as 
territorial. This is a useful distinction with reference to the two German states between 1949 
and 1989, separated geographically but sharing a common language and cultural heritage. A 
further important distinction within national identity needs to be drawn between a cultural 
and a political identity. In the case of Germany, this was already noted by Friedrich Meinecke 
in 1908, when it was a single (relatively new) political entity. He differentiated the 
Kulturnation, the largely passive cultural community from the Staatsnation, the active, self-
determining political nation (Smith, 1991, pp.8, 99). As will be seen in the Luther 
quincentenary chapter of this thesis, this important distinction formed the basis of GDR 
cultural policy under Honecker emphasising a corresponding terminology of ‘Erbe’ and 
‘Tradition’.  
Turning to look specifically at national identity in the GDR, this has been shown to be 
centred on the idea of a ‘socialist Germany’. This conceptualisation of the GDR, articulated 
as early as 1949, was not new: ‘…many specifically German traditions went into the 
reinvention of Socialist Germany, especially traditions of the German labour movement and 
of the interwar Communist Party’ (Berger, 2004, pp.206-207). In this context, Berger divides 
the development of GDR national identity into two phases; initially, this constituted a unified 
socialist Germany which excluded National Socialism as part of its own history. Berger notes 
that this omission is all the more telling considering that conformity to authoritarianism, 
supported by a heavily bureaucratic system, emphasizing control and mobilisation – through 
propaganda – had a long tradition in Germany, including Imperial Germany before the First 
World War (ibid., pp.209-210). Berger’s first phase, 1949-1965, marking the height of the 
Cold War, has also been described as the ‘war of the magnets’; each of the two German states 
expected their economic and moral model of society to draw in the other side as a magnet. 
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The unified Germany would be ‘…liberal and Western or, "socialist", depending on which 
magnet proved stronger’ (Orlow, 2006, p.544). 
This ‘socialist nation’ was officially founded on the twin pillars of antifascism and friendship 
with the Soviet Union. Antifascism was ‘one of the most important building blocks of official 
GDR identity’ (ibid., pp.200-202). Reaching beyond this ideological contribution to the 
GDR’s foundation, Joanne Sayner positions antifascism as a ‘cornerstone of SED ideology’ 
that dominates and permeates GDR society throughout its lifetime (Sayner, 2013, pp.18-19). 
This observation justifies including an analysis of antifascism as a core component of GDR 
national identity, although explicit reference to it may be seen to have diminished in later 
years as an ‘aversion to GDR history’ began to emerge amongst young people in the GDR 
(Saunders, 2007).  
In the second phase identified by Berger, after the mid-1960s, and the advent of Ostpolitik, 
the national identity of two separate German nations emerged, promoted in all areas of GDR 
society through a distinct official policy of Abgrenzung (Berger, 2004).1 The common, all-
German national identity was abandoned in favour of a two-nation model (Dennis, 2000, 
pp.172-174). This was confirmed in the 1971 SED Congress, ‘which decreed that the socio-
economic system of the country was the determining aspect of its national identity’ (Orlow, 
2006). 
The changing nature of GDR national identity was reflected in shifting outlooks on German 
history. The official SED line was predominantly negative in the early years in the sense that 
German history was characterised as a chain of major calamities. This followed an influential 
publication by Alexander Abusch, later to become Minister of Culture (‘Der Irrweg der 
Nation’, Berger, 2004, p.217). But in 1952, Albert Norden, a leading member of the 
Politbüro, effectively repealed this ‘Miseretheorie’. He proposed a binary model contrasting 
the ‘progressive’ and the ‘reactionary’ in German history (‘Kampf um die Nation’, cited in 
Berger, 2004, p.217). The ‘progressive’ theme went from Thomas Müntzer and the Peasants 
War of 1524-25 which he led, through to the 1848 revolutionaries, Marx, the KPD and 
eventually the foundation of the GDR. The ‘reactionary’ theme incorporated (at that time) 
Luther, feudalism, Prussian militarism, capitalism, the Nazis and finally the foundations of 
West Germany. 
At this time, the SED instructed the GDR’s historians to ‘administer the past’ in order to 
legitimise the GDR’s approach to national identity (‘Die Verbesserung der Forschung und 
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Lehre in der DDR’, cited in Orlow, p.545). The party directed historians to provide evidence 
that would support the concept that GDR national identity was following Marxist-Leninist 
laws of history. By the mid-1970s, the historians Walter Schmidt and Alfred Kosing 
proposed a model that became the theoretical and historiographic basis for socialist national 
identity (Orlow, 2006, p.548). German history was divided into two overlapping categories: 
Erbe and Tradition. Erbe was history in its entirety; its importance could be neutral or 
negative depending on how it related to the tenets of Marxist-Leninist principles. Tradition 
on the other hand was positive. Historical elements, based on socio-economic factors and 
thus classified as Tradition, became in turn the building blocks of a socialist national identity. 
Given its prevalence in GDR propaganda, Anna Saunders proposes adding a further 
significant dimension to the concept of national identity in the GDR by highlighting 
‘patriotism’ as a central theme (Saunders, 2007, p.26). By appealing to the ‘loyalty of citizens 
to the civic institutions of the state’, […], ‘it [patriotism] does not demand the unity of the 
state and nation’ (ibid., p.28). The perspective of patriotism therefore adds the vital emotion 
of a personal response, that is to say pride, to the more abstract notion of national identity. As 
evidence of the GDR citizens’ reception of various aspects of the commemorations will 
reveal in the case studies below, ‘patriotism’ thus provides an additional, conceptual 
dimension when evaluating the relevance of the research conclusions to ongoing debates on 
the most appropriate conceptualisation of the GDR.  
Orlow generalises that the approach taken by the GDR authorities as outlined above was the 
fatal flaw of the whole concept of a GDR national identity. He contends that the theory had 
always depended on the GDR’s population agreeing to the political, economic, and moral 
superiority of the socialist system, which in turn was supposed to create a ‘socialist 
patriotism’ (Orlow, 2006, p.551). Orlow concludes that as the GDRˈs population envied the 
societal system of the West Germans, they were never convinced of the superiority of their 
socialist system; any efforts to form such an identity were therefore inherently doomed. 
Elements of Orlow’s hypothesis may be valid as regards an ambivalence within all ages and 
sectors of GDR society towards apparent pros and cons of the two German societal systems. 
However, given the development of GDR national identity discussed above, it seems highly 
unlikely that this ambivalence was static, and as binary as implied by Orlow. Instead I argue 
that it is more plausible that national pride, and ultimately national identity, evolved and 
fluctuated over the forty year duration of the GDR, in response to both negative and positive 
socio-economic, cultural and external political developments. It follows that the GDR 
15 
 
authorities adapted their efforts over much of this period, in order to continue trying to 
influence a positive formation of national identity.  
From this perspective, Berger points the way to the research topic in this thesis: the GDR 
started creating its own ‘…pantheon of national heroes […] The official reading of national 
history, which was supposed to contribute to the construction of a positive socialist national 
identity was put on display in a dense network of commemorations’ (Berger, 2004, p.218). 
As the historian Dan Healy comments with regard to researching certain Russian and Polish 
anniversaries: ‘[…] against the grain readings and oblique archival strategies are required to 
illuminate many issues not directly addressed. By engaging in these scoping and evaluation 
exercises, piggy-backed on anniversary celebrations, scholars can identify new themes and 
methods, and agendas, for further study’ (cited in Brady, 2014b). This approach is 
fundamentally relevant for my thesis; it informs my empirical research methodology and its 
original approach of analysing the organisational detail and chronology of commemorations, 
in order to illuminate their potential impact on the central issue of national identity in the 
GDR.  
1.1.2. National Identity and Commemoration 
Given this focus, it is necessary to explore in more detail what the extant literature has to say 
about the relationship between national identity and commemoration. The research question 
posed in this thesis focuses particularly on the commemoration of famous German cultural 
personalities. These commemorations all share a connection to how national German heritage 
may be approached and understood. How then has this connection been understood and 
described by other scholars? 
Viewed from an American perspective, the historian William Johnston offers a succinct 
introduction to anniversaries and why they are commemorated: 
In Europe anniversaries have become one of the chief means by which officials 
mobilise intellectuals to address matters of national and regional concern. […] 
whereas in America past creators command minimal allegiance, in Europe all 
educated people acknowledge that certain figures encapsulate national tradition in 
such a way as to illuminate the present. Anniversaries provide a device by which this 
roster of canonical figures gets repackaged […] (Johnston, 1991, p.23). 
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A number of scholars have connected commemorations to mass societal upheavals 
necessitating a reconstruction of identities, a link that certainly applies to post-1945 
Germany. John Gillis points to an early appearance of ‘invented tradition’: the precedent of 
the French and American revolutions. These two cases illustrate an ‘ideologically driven 
desire to break with the past, to construct as great a distance as possible between the new age 
and the old’ (Gillis, 1994, p.8). This is relevant for the case of the GDR which shared the 
same motivation to create an entirely new Germanness, distinct from that which was 
emerging in post-War West Germany. In this context, Peter Burke points the way to the 
origins of German identity creation and discusses the ‘social history of remembering’, and 
asks why some cultures seem more concerned with recording their past than others. He links 
Hobsbawm’s ‘invention of tradition’ to examples of new nation states that were formed in the 
nineteenth century, such as Germany and Italy, which discovered a need to legitimate their 
existence through multiple and repetitive public commemorations (Burke, 2011, pp.188-192). 
Finally, Yael Zerubavel proposes the example of the modern state of Israel: ‘When a society 
undergoes rapid developments that shatter its social and political order, its need to restructure 
the past is as great as its desire to set its future agenda’. While newly constructed 
commemorations may succeed when they ‘manage to project a cultural representation of the 
past’, there is a risk that such ‘invented traditions’ might only succeed partially or fail ‘when 
members of the society become aware of their fabricated character’ (Zerubavel, 1994, p.105). 
The case studies in the following chapters address this central issue and how the formation of 
national identity may have been impacted by the ways in which the ‘invented tradition’ was 
communicated and received by GDR citizens. However, I suggest that Zerubavelˈs term, 
‘fabricated’, is too blunt, even exaggerated, as it could imply a deliberate, hard to prove 
untruth, as far as GDR commemorations are concerned. Instead, the detailed analysis in the 
case studies of how commemoration aims were developed and articulated will demonstrate 
that ˈideological interpretationˈ instead of ˈfabricationˈ was a common feature of how these 
cultural anniversaries were celebrated.  
Connerton draws attention to a further important aspect of commemorations which is 
especially relevant to the research question, namely performativity. He distinguishes 
‘incorporating memory’ from ‘inscribed memory’. The first involves messages imparted 
bodily, for example, handshakes or smiles; but the second is more relevant in the analysis of 
cultural remembrances. He points to the ‘memorisation of culturally specific postures, 
appropriate for ceremonial occasions, particularly acts of remembrance’ (Connerton, 2011, 
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p.339). Restated, commemorations can be thus linked to national identity as a ‘performative 
identity-building process’ (Gudewitz, 2008, p.587). Performativity also has a political 
rationale: ‘Commemorative ceremonies are preserved through their performance […] they are 
not easily susceptible to critical scrutiny and evaluation by those habituated to their 
performance. Both commemorative ceremonies and bodily practices therefore contain a 
measure of insurance against the process of cumulative questioning entailed in all discursive 
practices’ (Connerton, 2011, p.342). Connerton uses the term ˈhabituationˈ here from the 
perspective of reception. In contrast, the case studies will use the related term ˈrepetitiveness’ 
to single out a common feature of all four commemorations that was arguably counter-
productive in its impact on national identity.  
The tradition of the German Festakt which existed before and after Germany was split into 
two states is an excellent example of the often repetitive characteristics of commemorations. 
The performativity of commemorations that can be observed in ritualistic acts of 
remembrances such as the Festakt will be seen to be a core component of all 
commemorations in this thesis. This typically high-profile ceremony underscores the public 
ritual characteristic of most major commemorations in the GDR. The Austrian sociologist, 
Elfie Miklautz, examines the concept of the Fest as umbrella term for the Festakt ceremony 
and similar activities commemorating an anniversary. Building on Jan Assmann’s assertion 
that ‘the collective identity needs ceremony’ (Assmann, 2011, p.38), she contends that the 
central purpose of the Fest is to objectivise collective identity through rituelle Inszenierungen 
(Miklautz, 1999, p.193). Miklautz goes on to refer to a useful angle which, in the case 
studies, may suggest an additional impact of commemorating cultural anniversaries in the 
GDR: ‘Nahezu alle Theorien des Festes basieren auf der Annahme, daß Feste den 
Sinnhorizont des Alltags transzendieren und sein anderes - das in modernisierten Abläufen 
ausgeblendete - veranschaulichen’ (ibid., p.194). She explains this by highlighting the 
contrast between Alltag and Fest and explicitly emphasises a one-dimensional aspect of 
Alltag. If Alltag in the GDR is therefore interpreted in the English sense of a grey, 
monotonous ‘daily grind’ rather than ‘everyday life’, then Miklautz’s theory as a rationale for 
the relative frequency and scale of GDR cultural commemorations may arguably have some 
justification.  
The usage of the term ‘performative acts’ appears in recent gender studies, notably the works 
of Judith Butler. She contends that ‘gender is in no way a stable identity’ […] ‘rather, it is an 
identity tenuously constituted in time – an identity instituted through a stylised repetition of 
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acts.’ As such ‘gender identity is a performative accomplishment compelled by social 
sanction’ (Butler, 1988, pp.519-520). The analogous relationship of performative acts to 
gender identity and commemorations to national identity becomes even clearer when 
considering Butler’s description of the theatricality of the repeated acts: ‘As a given temporal 
duration within the entire performance ‘‘acts’’ are a shared experience and collective action’ 
(ibid., p.525). The repetitive nature of these acts as ‘ritual social drama’, explained by Butler 
when citing the anthropologist Victor Turner, further enhances the analogy to 
commemorations and national identity: ‘this repetition is at once a re-enactment and re-
experiencing of a set of meanings already socially established; it is the mundane and 
ritualised form of legitimation’ (ibid., p.526). Sule Toktas, however, correctly points out – as 
will be seen in subsequent case-study chapters – that ‘the transformation of the national 
identity as performativity into theatricality is executed by nationalism subject to politics and 
political manoeuvre’ (Toktas, 2002, pp.29-30). Without referring to commemorations, Toktas 
provides a useful confirmation of the potential to link the way that gender and national 
identities are established:  
Nationalism, with which the nation articulates itself, enables the political imagination 
of the past, appropriated for the project of the future that privileges certain groups. 
[…] Identities are to be considered not as pre-given but as described and recognised 
through performance. In this sense it is clear that there are many similarities in the 
construction of national and gender identities (ibid., pp.39-40).  
This comparative approach by gender studies to performativity and national identity adds a 
noteworthy contribution to the multi-disciplinary approach with which this thesis aims to 
respond to the research question.  
The link between the predictability and repetitiveness of commemorations on the one hand 
and the occurrence of anniversaries on the other is a final facet worth registering. The 
calendar-driven certainty of anniversaries becomes a bonus for all the stakeholders involved 
in initiating and planning commemorations, in terms of preparation time and opportunity. As 
Johnston argues, ‘the cult of anniversaries introduces an element of the foreseeable into 
cultural programming’ (Johnston, 1991, p.25). In the environment of an authoritarian state 
such as the GDR the same predictability presents a political and logistical advantage for a 
regime needing to instigate, plan and coordinate commemoration preparations on a 
comprehensive scale. However, Johnston also correctly notes the challenges of calendar-
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driven programming; the arbitrariness of anniversaries can result in prioritisation issues 
(ibid., p.26). This will be seen in the 1967 Kollwitz centenary that clashed with the fiftieth 
anniversary of the October Revolution, the 1970 Beethoven bicentenary that occurred in the 
same year as Leninˈs birth centenary, and the 1983 Luther quincentenary that clashed with 
the centenary of the death of Karl Marx. Aleida Assmann argues for a further dimension to be 
added to the usual linear measurement of history and to the cyclical dimension of nature or 
myth. She points to the repetitive nature of commemorative anniversaries as amplifying and 
cementing the inherent unreliability of collective memory (Assmann, 2005, pp.305-314). 
Also in the German perspective this ‘repetitive nature’ began in the century-old rituals of 
commemorating church and university anniversaries with a notable expansion over the past 
120 years in public and private commemorations of cultural and business anniversaries. How 
the GDR authorities reacted to anniversary opportunities in the sense of inconsistent 
approaches to timelines, that is allowing sufficient time for planning, will be revealed as 
another of the original research findings in the four case studies.  
A few cultural and political commemorations in the GDR have been researched individually, 
and a larger number briefly referenced within existing literature. Matthias Tischer (2008), 
Julia Roßberg (2009), Peter Maser (2013) and Yvonne Schymura (2014) have each written 
more specifically but within a wider context about the Beethoven bicentenary in 1970, the 
Schiller bicentenary in 1959, the Martin Luther quincentenary in 1983, and the Kollwitz 
centenary in 1967 respectively. Among the more important scholars who have also touched 
on these anniversaries are: Maximilan Nutz (1992), Nicholas Martin (2006), and Joerg 
Bernhard Bilke (2007), on Schiller; David Dennis (1996) and Elaine Kelly (2014), on 
Beethoven; Catherine Krahmer (1981) and Ulrike Goeschen (2001), on Kollwitz; and Horst 
Dähn (1986), Martin Roy (2000), Raina Zimmering (2000) and Jon Berndt Olsen (2015) on 
Luther. Their contributions will be positioned more closely in the respective case studies. 
What is missing in the existing scholarship to date is a detailed analysis of the aims, 
implementation and outcomes of these major commemorations, together with an assessment 
of the resulting impact on the formation of national identity. The originality of my approach 
may also be derived from the longitudinal selection of its case studies examined against the 
background of a theoretical framework, and using empirical research methodology. A sample 
of four major commemorations has been selected to represent different strands of culture, 
namely literature, music, fine art and religion/philosophy. The events span a twenty-four-year 
time-frame, chosen to better reflect the changing political, economic and social environment 
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in GDR history. These factors in turn will be seen to have influenced the evolving nature of 
how commemorations were proposed, developed and negotiated as an instrument of cultural 
memory.  
1.1.3. National Identity and Collective Memory  
In a wider and contemporary environment, ‘round figure’ anniversaries, and their 
commemorations, continue to form part of what several commentators call a ‘memory boom’ 
(Olick et al., 2011, pp.3-4), which includes memorials, museums and exhibitions (Healy, 
cited in Brady, 2014b, p.99). Most recently, particularly high profile anniversaries such as the 
2014-2018 centenary of the First World War and the 2017 quincentenary of the Reformation 
have been attracting widespread attention in the media and with the general public. The 
associated academic field of memory studies thus provides a crucial theoretical framework 
for this thesis. Within this field and thus of particular relevance to the German context of my 
research question is the concept of collective memory which is closely associated with 
questions of identity and identity-politics (Olick et al., 2011, p.43). What do memory studies 
– in particular concerning collective and/or cultural memory – have to say about the 
formation of national identity and what is the connection to commemorations? 
Astrid Erll presents a comprehensive overview and introduction to the discipline of memory 
studies, particularly in relation to historical and social memory. Memories are described as 
‘subjective, highly selective reconstructions, depending on the situation in which they are 
recalled’ (Erll, 2011, p.8). Erll expands this definition by arguing that memory is less a 
reflection of the past than evidence of the interests of those doing the remembering in the 
present. She refers to Lewis (1976), who outlines a threefold relationship between history and 
memory: ‘(1) remembered history; (2) recovered history, historiographical reconstruction of 
elements of the past suppressed by the collective memory; and (3) invented history, the 
version of history which pursues a (novel) ideological aim’ (ibid., p.43). This third distinction 
leads on to the central concept of the ‘invention of tradition’ as discussed above.  
Erll positions the action of ‘remembering’ in relation to the underlying, much used term of 
‘cultural memory’: ‘cultural memory provides the mental, material and social structures 
within which experience is embedded, constructed, interpreted and passed on […] but it is 
only retrospectively, through cultural remembering, that we create experience as an 
interpretation of events to guide further action’ (ibid., pp.111-112). From the perspective of 
sociology, a recent scholar, (Welzer, 2010, pp.286-287), refers to a number of ‘cultural 
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products’, such as literature, music and images, that, citing Koch, ‘‘can transport historical 
constructions or versions of the past’’ (Koch, 1997). The ideological frameworks and popular 
representations of these ‘high culture’ objects of remembering form a core component of all 
the case studies in this thesis; Schiller’s and Lutherˈs texts, Beethovenˈs music and Kollwitzˈs 
art will be shown to be integral to how they were commemorated. 
In an introduction to A Companion to Cultural Memory Studies (Erll and Nünning, 2010), 
Erll refers to one of the fundamental aspects of cultural memory: the twin levels of individual 
and collective memory. She suggests that collective memory be best used metaphorically, the 
most influential scholarly concepts being Pierre Nora’s ‘Lieux de Memoire’ and Jan and 
Aleida Assmann’s ‘Kulturelles Gedächtnis’. In practice, she argues, the two levels remain 
continuously intact. In the same edited book, Jan Assmann builds on the work of Halbwachs, 
one of the founders of memory studies, who first introduced the concept of collective 
memory (Halbwachs and Coser, 1992). He distinguishes three types of memory: individual, 
communicative, and cultural; the latter is a form of collective memory in that it ‘conveys to 
the people in question a collective, that is a cultural, identity’ (Assmann, 2010, pp.109-118). 
Agreeing with Erll’s theory of active remembering, he asserts that cultural memory is 
disembodied and therefore requires preservation and re-embodiment. ‘Participation’ is such a 
re-embodiment, but in relation to cultural memory, he notes an ‘inherent tendency to elitism; 
it is never strictly egalitarian’ (Assmann, 2010, p.116). This observation offers a further 
useful theoretical connection to the above-mentioned ‘invention of tradition’ as link between 
cultural memory and history. 
In an earlier seminal book, Jan Assmann positions ‘myth’, ‘commemoration’, and ‘ceremony’ 
under the heading of cultural memory, thus providing a number of key theoretical terms 
relevant to this project’s research question: ‘[…] through memory, history becomes a myth. 
This does not make it unrevealed – on the contrary, this is what makes it real, in the sense 
that it becomes a lasting normative and formative power’. He goes on to explain that: 
‘commemoration often takes the form of a festival […] the collective identity needs 
ceremony’ (Assmann, 2011, p.38). He expands on this reference, embedded in ancient times, 
noting that the commemorations in which cultural memory is circulated were historically part 
of rituals and festivals: ‘as long as these rites were predominant, the knowledge that was all 
important for identity was handed down through repetition.’ (ibid., p.72).  
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Aleida Assmann has produced amongst the most influential scholarship to date on cultural 
memory in the German context. In the preface to the English translation of 
Erinnerungsräume (Assmann 1999), Assmann defines her chosen topic as ‘the social and 
political dimensions of cultural memory, focussing on constructions of collective identity 
from social generations to whole nations within their historical contexts’ (Assmann, 2011, 
p.xii). Her paper ‘Soziales und kollektives Gedächtnis’ encapsulates her concept of the three 
steps of social-, collective-, and cultural memory, and connects it to the identity component 
of my research question (Assmann, 2006). Selected memories that are combined to form the 
collective memory of a group of persons strengthen the identity of that group, and that 
identity in turn strengthens the collective memory: ‘das Verhältnis zwischen Erinnerungen 
und Identität ist zirkular’ (ibid., p.2). According to Assmann, cultural memory is similar to 
collective memory as a long-term manifestation, in contrast to the more personal, short-term 
characteristics of social memory. Cultural memory itself is distinct from, and a step beyond 
collective memory in being additionally dependent on scholarly memory, institutionally 
stabilised and developed in libraries, museums and archives (ibid., p.3).  
Questioning why we adopt cultural memory, Assmann points to identity as a key reason, 
positing: ‘vom allgemeinen oder spezialisierten Wissen unterscheiden sich die Inhalte des 
kulturellen Gedächtnisses jedoch dadurch, daß wir sie uns aneignen, nicht um sie zu 
‘‘beherrschen’’oder für bestimmte Ziele einzusetzen, sondern um uns mit ihnen 
auseinanderzusetzen, und sie zu einem Element unserer Identität zu machen’ (ibid., p.4). 
Aleida Assmann finally defines ˈpolitical memoryˈ as arguably the form of memory most 
relevant to the topic of my thesis, as it produces ˈstrong bonds of loyaltyˈ and a ˈstrong 
unifying we-identityˈ (cited in Jones and Pinfold, 2014, p.12). Citing Assmann, Jones and 
Pinfold articulate here a fundamental question that underlies the concept of political memory 
and also paraphrases the essence of my research question: ‘The question to be asked of elite 
appropriations of the past is not, therefore, if they are ‘‘true’’ or ‘‘false’’, but why they 
resonate (or not) with the wider population and the political consequences of their use’ (Jones 
and Pinfold, 2014, p.13).  
Building on the work of Jan and Aleida Assmann, Rigney describes the growth in research on 
commemorations and similar acts of remembrance as a ‘dynamic turn in memory studies’, a 
shift within cultural memory away from ‘focusing on products to focusing on processes in 
which the products play a role’. She defines ‘dynamic’ as meaning that commemorations 
(amongst other forms of remembrance), need to incorporate a ‘narrativising act of 
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remembrance’; cultural memory needs to be performed, that is it needs to be constantly ‘in 
the works’ (Rigney, 2010, pp.345-353). Jan and Aleida Assmann’s overall theoretical 
approach to the impact of cultural memory thus creates an important explanation for why 
political actors mount major celebrations and ceremonies in order to commemorate 
anniversaries, such as those selected for the research project’s case studies.  
Olick adds here a concept of an ‘instrumentalist’ approach to collective memory, 
‘emphasising not what memory does but what we do with it’. He goes on to argue that 
collective memory is ‘also an extraordinarily useful tool of politics and is also continually 
subject to it ‘ (Olick et al., 2011, pp.249-251). As a core feature of this thesis, it remains to be 
seen whether empirical evidence can demonstrate the existence of an ‘instrumentalist’ 
concept behind the design and implementation of cultural commemorations in an 
authoritarian state such as the GDR. Furthermore, such ‘instrumentalist’ evidence of the 
regime’s proactive, deliberate policy might support an ‘intentionalist’ rather than a 
‘functionalist’ or ‘structuralist’ interpretation of the official handling of these events – that is 
one which argues that every aspect of the events was rigorously planned from the outset 
rather than partly developed and adapted as the events unfolded by all involved in the events’ 
implementation. In this way the research outcome here may ultimately provide a new 
historiographical contribution when assessing whether a better understanding of cultural 
commemorations adds greater weight to a ‘top-down’ or ‘participatory dictatorship’ model of 
the GDR, as discussed below. 
Turning specifically to look at these issues in the context of (East) Germany, Koshar lays out 
a German perspective on the framework of collective memory. He argues that in Germany 
four aspects of collective memory have emerged since the late 19th century: the national 
monument, the ruin, the reconstruction, and the trace. All of these can be evaluated in relation 
to the changing political agendas that have driven them during this period (Koshar, 2000). 
Koshar explores a number of angles which together comprise a distinctively German 
association between national memory, culture and society. However, by equating this 
approach with the German notion of ‘Kulturnation’ with its ‘emphasis on ancestry and shared 
history’, Koshar sees a potential contradiction to the concept of ‘invented tradition’. He 
contends that German national identity may be anchored in a ‘core of identity’ which cannot 
be reduced to what constructionists have called the ‘invention of the nation’. Koshar is in line 
here with Anthony Smith’s concept (Smith, 2000, pp.17, 21) of a German ‘ethnic 
community’, based on substantial material objects which were the precondition for the 
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emergence of some sense of a common national history’. This latent controversy is a valuable 
starting point for more detailed research on how the GDR approached and commemorated 
Erbe, German heritage, given its own particular ideological agenda. 
A rather different approach is taken by Jan Palmowski, whose study Inventing a Socialist 
Nation: Heimat and the Politics of Everyday Life in the GDR 1945-1990 claims to be ˈthe 
first book to show how ‘‘national identity’’ was invented in the GDR, and how citizens 
engaged with itˈ (Palmowski, 2009, pp.1-3). His methodology is heavily based on localised, 
empirical evidence, including oral history testimony. Palmowski singles out the language and 
images of ‘Heimat’ as central to the internal representation of the GDR. This, at times 
intensely propagated cultural quasi-mantra, was maintained alongside the political themes of 
antifascism and socialism and implemented through the ‘ideal of the GDR as a ‘‘workers and 
peasants’’ state’ (Palmowski, 2009, p.106). He contends that the population, and its 
willingness to adopt a new national identity, suffered from the real and perceived threat of 
Stasi informers and the growing economic as well as environmental issues of the last two 
decades of the GDRˈs existence. Palmowski goes on to argue that the high culture heritage of 
major German figures in literature, art and music was not mythologised until the early 1970s. 
This conclusion differs markedly from my analysis in the first three case studies, which all 
take place before that time. Although pointing in general terms to the ˈfailure of successive 
cultural initiatives to realise socialismˈ, Palmowski does not examine the documented process 
of appropriating (Aneignung) these German figures, which – as will be seen – forms a 
principal part of my research. In particular, Palmowski pays no attention to the major 
commemorations of some of these same figures that, in my original analysis, determine 
whether, and to what extent, Aneignung achieved official political aims relating to 
‘nationhood’ and (GDR) identity.  
In sum, what is missing from these accounts of collective memory in the GDR is a detailed 
analysis of the processes by which cultural commemorations came about, that is, a detailed 
documentary analysis of behind-the-scenes debates on the mode and purpose of celebrating 
cultural figures. Previous works also focus only very infrequently on the impact of such 
myth-building – that is, the question of whether the outcomes reflected, even partially a 
deliberate, top-down, intentionalist approach or whether they should be interpreted as the 





1.2. THE CONCEPTUALISATION OF THE GDR 
1.2.1. A ‘totalitarian’ state? 
An analysis of the potential impact of commemorations through exploration of the process of 
their creation leads to the question of the extent to which the GDR regime was able to impose 
its concept of national identity from above. Answering this question can in turn make a 
significant contribution to a more refined conceptualisation of the GDR as a political entity – 
positioning it beyond the top-down versus bottom-up models described in the opening 
sections of this chapter.  
The first challenge in this regard relates to the GDR’s forty-year duration. Spread over more 
than a generation, the political, social and economic characteristics of the GDR evolved in 
response to major internal milestones and external developments. These include the uprising 
of June 1953, the erection of the Berlin Wall in 1961, as well as Willy Brandt’s ‘Ostpolitik’-
driven 1972 Basic Treaty, and Gorbachev’s Perestroika leading to the ultimate break-up of 
the Soviet empire. Such periodisation raises the question whether the GDR can be 
conceptualised as a static system. Mary Fulbrook argues for a dynamic, socio-cultural model 
that divides the forty year GDR history into three phases: post war/pre-Berlin Wall (1949-
61); stabilisation and normalisation (1961-79); and a transition to an increasingly consumer-
focused society and its ultimate demise (1979-89) (Fulbrook, 2005, pp.24-28). Although this 
periodisation is very broad, it offers a helpful approach to distinguishing some of the major 
political milestones and phases of GDR history, including the erection of the Wall and the 
distinct political eras dominated by Ulbricht and Honecker.  
The above diachronic challenge is only one of several facing all GDR historians. Konrad 
Jarausch crystallises another basic obstacle confronting all GDR researchers: ‘penetrating 
beneath the uniform surface of dictatorship constitutes the abiding challenge of historicising 
the GDR’ (Jarausch, 1999, p.11). More recently, Andrew Beattie notes a dichotomy between 
the historicisation and politicisation of GDR memory that has evolved since 1989. This 
appears in the relationship between ‘collective’ (using Beattie’s, rather than Assmann’s 
terminology – who would tend to use the term ˈcommunicativeˈ), and ‘official’ memories. 
The former reflects an authentic, grass-roots memory grown from below, and focussing 
mostly on everyday life, Alltag. In its nostalgic guise it is often referred to colloquially as 
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Ostalgie. In contrast, ‘official’ memories, developed – even in some cases imposed from 
above – concentrate on SED domination and repression (Beattie, 2011, pp.11-12). Official 
GDR institutions such as government and mass organisations were inherently secretive. This 
meant that before 1989, historians, particularly in the West, had very limited access to recent, 
that is, post-war archive material. They were thus forced to draw mainly on official speeches 
and tightly-controlled media output as primary sources for their research. As long as the GDR 
existed it is perhaps understandable that contemporary historians of all Western nationalities 
frequently applied vague labels of ‘totalitarian’ and ‘dictatorship’ as part of a Cold War 
terminology or ‘Kampfbegriff’ (Klessmann, 2013, pp.8-10), thus effectively pigeonholing the 
GDR. Whether it is correct to ascribe them to the GDR has been much debated since 1989. 
Of the two, it may be easier to qualify ‘totalitarian’ and even partly question it as an accurate 
description of the GDR, by referring to fundamental theoretical texts on totalitarian theories, 
notably those by Hannah Arendt as well as Karl Friedrich and Zbigniew Brzezinski. Arendt 
focuses on how anti-Semitism and racism were used to develop imperialism and nationalism 
in the nineteenth century. She argues that modern totalitarian states, aware that these methods 
were efficient, use them to achieve their objectives of absolute power and domination of the 
population in their state. Referring in particular to Nazi Germany and 1930ˈs Stalinism, 
Arendt examines how classes become masses. She also emphasises the use of terror and 
propaganda, both of which are critically important features of totalitarianism. Within the 
modern masses Arendt identifies the phenomenon of ‘isolated individuals’ who are provided 
by totalitarian regimes with a new perception of identity in exchange for their total loyalty to 
the state (Arendt, 1951/2017, p.623). Friedrich and Brzezinski describe totalitarianism in a 
way that appears more relevant to the GDR than Arendt’s model. Based on a ‘single binding 
ideology’, the totalitarian state relies on a combination of control mechanisms regarding the 
economy and the media, all supported by absolute police control and a single political party. 
However, at the same time the model ‘allows for the continued existence of "islands of 
separateness", such as the church or family’ – another facet of the model which fits well with 
GDR society (Friedrich and Brzezinski, 1966, p.279). 
As we will note in the following discussion of the term ˈdictatorshipˈ, the ˈtotalitarianˈ 
adjective has therefore provoked a considerable debate about how it might apply to the GDR. 
Jeffrey Herf cites the chairman of the official Enquete-Kommission’s usage in 1994 of 
‘totalitarian’ for the GDR approvingly (Herf, 2008, p.175). Six years earlier, Ross had argued 
that despite the term ‘totalitarian’ having been regularly revived since 1989, the key 
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theoretical criterion of ‘total control’ was missing in many aspects of the GDR’s political and 
social configuration (Ross, 2002, pp.21-25). More recently, Andrew Port has described the 
major scholarly debate centring on a ‘deceptively simple question: was the GDR a totalitarian 
regime in fact as well as in theory?’ At its heart is the variance in approach between a top-
down conceptualisation of the regime focusing on repression, or an emphasis on the GDR 
population’s Eigensinn or agency, and therefore the socio-cultural aspects of the entire GDR 
state (Port, 2013). This apparently polarised choice of applicable models of the GDR is thus 
reflected in the binary choice of whether the ˈtotalitarianˈ tag is relevant or not.  
1.2.2. A ‘dictatorship’?  
The term ‘dictatorship’ has persisted as a component of many conceptualisations of the GDR 
(Ross, 2010, pp.19-43). One key problem is the absence of an identifiable GDR ‘dictator’. So 
as an alternative, the pervasive authority of the political structure has encouraged the concept 
of a one-party, ‘SED dictatorship’ (Faulenbach, 2013). Following the collapse of the East-
West Cold War divide, some historians have proposed other variations of a dictatorship 
model. These seek to adjust the term to a GDR phenomenon of ‘participatory dictatorship’ 
(Fulbrook, 2005, p.12) or ‘(socialist) party dictatorship’ (Ross, 2002) which is then 
empirically validated. An alternative analysis that the GDR is an evolution of the dictatorship 
paradigm, puts forward ‘modern’ as a label (Kocka, 1999, pp.47-69). However, ‘modern’ 
should not be confused with ‘modernising’, particularly in relation to the conservative aspects 
of the Honecker era.  
Ross points out a further concept used to describe the GDR that can be derived from a 
perspective of ideology (Ross, 2002, pp.179-182). Given the realities of ever-present military, 
political and economic dependency on the Soviet Union, this approach positions the GDR as 
a Stalinist dictatorship alongside other Soviet bloc states. Ross goes on to note that a variation 
proposed after 1989 dilutes the ‘Stalinist’ adjective into ‘post-Stalinist’ so as to better reflect 
the transition to a comparatively less radical ideology. In a similar ideological vein, the 
GDR’s self-identification as an ‘antifascist’ state is frequently both cited and explored by 
many pre- as well as post-1989 scholars, including Lindeman (1974), Childs (1983), 
Saunders (2007), Palmowski (2009) and Sayner (2013). A common denominator in this 
scholarship is the recognition that the GDR regime’s widespread usage of the term 
Antifaschismus was primarily needed to legitimise the history of the GDR’s foundation by 
solidifying a separate political, social and cultural identity towards West Germany 
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(Lindemann, 1974). As indicated above, this core discourse of demarcation towards West 
Germany, referred to officially and in GDR media as Abgrenzung, will appear to varying 
degrees in all of the case-studies in this thesis.  
Comparing the work of German to non-German historians, one may note differences in 
conceptualising the GDR. Since 1989, Anglo-American historians such as Fulbrook, 
Allinson, Ross, Betts, and Dennis have historicised the GDR. In contrast, many German 
historians found themselves researching the GDR against a widely prevalent domestic 
climate of Aufarbeitung, of working through the legacy of German unification – that is of the 
GDR’s past (Klessmann, 2013, pp.8-10). This quasi-moral burden resembles a similar 
process much thematised in post-1949 West Germany. Models of the GDR proposed by some 
German historians display a preoccupation perhaps less common among their non-German 
peers. Jürgen Kocka and Martin Sabrow ask whether the GDR, as a ‘second German 
Dictatorship’, was a German phenomenon; did the GDR mirror the Sonderweg debate on the 
origins of the Nazi era as representing a particularly German phenomenon, or was the GDR 
just another milestone in the twentieth century history of Communism? (Kocka and Sabrow, 
1994, pp.200-201).  
Since the mid-1990s, many German and non-German historians have thus come together in a 
more balanced approach to a GDR model. The opening of this chapter introduced the initial 
debate after 1989, which was essentially driven by a binary, bad versus good argument. The 
key controversial terms were the adjectives that should apply: ˈtotalitarianˈ, combined with 
‘dictatorship’ or ‘failed’ combined with ‘state’? However, as seen above the term 
‘dictatorship’ itself was to became an acceptable alternative to the arguably too nondescript 
term ‘state’. ‘One-party’ and ‘authoritarian’ emerged as viable, defining adjectives although 
both contain an element of tautology when combined with ˈdictatorshipˈ. And so several 
scholars continued to propose alternatives on how best to qualify the basic model of the 
GDR. The following brief summary indicates the wide range of approaches to find an 
compromise, acceptable to historians. 
Jarausch was an initiator of this evolving debate, and uses the polarisation described above as 
a starting point. Whilst maintaining the narrative of a ‘Second German Dictatorship’, he asks 
whether the GDR was only an ‘illegitimate, totally politicised totalitarian state’ or a ‘legend 
of good beginning’, a ‘failed egalitarian experiment’ (Jarausch, 1999, pp.3-4, 8-9). He 
substantiates this dichotomy by referring to the above-mentioned traditional, top-down 
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‘totalitarian approach’ versus ‘nostalgic memory’ of some post-1989 historians (1999, p.4). 
Sabrow, in his volume co-edited with Kocka, argues that a socio-cultural GDR history 
provides an ideal empiric foundation for a model of ‘consensus dictatorship’ (Kocka and 
Sabrow, 1994, pp.197-198, 208). This approach was subsequently reinforced by (amongst 
others) Fulbrook (1995, p.276 and 2005, p.12) and Rehberg (2009) in the above-mentioned 
‘participatory dictatorship’ model. Rejecting the totalitarianism paradigms as a Cold War 
relic, Mike Dennis supports Fulbrook’s methodology of periodisation. He also endorses the 
contributions of Jarausch, Kocka and Sabrow in ‘creating a conceptual umbrella of modern 
dictatorship’ through a process of ‘critical historicisation’ (Dennis, 2000, pp. x-xvii). 
Mark Allinson also advocates characterising the GDR as a failed experiment rather than as an 
abnormal state. Based on a regional case study of the state of Thuringia, he further refines 
Sabrow’s and Fulbrook’s definition of normalcy as the regime’s inability to win the 
argument, producing a situation of stable instability (2001, pp.204-224). Sabrow has 
developed this theme by reflecting that participating in society produces a paradox of 
apparent stability in the GDR. Rather than labelling the GDR as a repressive leviathan, he 
advocates a balanced view of the GDR with an implied legitimacy based on tacit consensus. 
Normalcy for him is represented by a multi-layered pattern of social relationships (Sabrow, 
1999, pp. 197-198). More recently, Sara Jones emphasises another approach to a bottom-up 
interpretation of the GDR. Manifest examples of agency (Eigensinn) in the relationships of 
GDR intellectuals with the power structure of the regime are identified in a number of case 
studies; in so doing, a clear pattern of ambiguity emerges in these ‘interactions between rulers 
and ruled in a social structure’ (Jones, 2011, p.6). This ‘ambiguity’ may be extrapolated from 
intellectuals, as a specific sector, to characterizing wider GDR society, thus setting a clear 
limit on the extent to which the GDR can be viewed as a top-down, ‘durchherrschte’ (Kocka, 
1994), pervasively ruled dictatorship.  
The Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung, a German government sponsored institution, has 
published a summary on the growing German debate regarding the use of the term 
Unrechtsstaat to define the GDR (Holtman, 2010). The term itself is inherently vague. In the 
sense of ‘unjust’, the term could reflect the political illegitimacy of an externally imposed and 
enforced regime. On the other hand, it may equally apply to the ‘injustice’ to be found in the 
state’s consistent denial of the universal rule of law, and violations of its citizens’ basic 
human rights, despite having a functioning legal system. As a potential contribution to a 
construct of the GDR, Unrechtsstaat shares a common weakness with the related ideological 
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model, since both lack features that are distinctively East German; both apply just as easily to 
both the Soviet Union and its satellite states in pre-1989/90 Central Europe, indeed to most 
dictatorships; their usage as concepts to describe the GDR deserve therefore to be criticised 
as being only simplistic categorisation (Klessmann, 2013). 
A further, post-1989 feature of German conceptualisation of the GDR can be noted when 
distinguishing former West German from former East German historians. Jessen points out 
that GDR research over the past two decades has been ‘asymmetric’ in being essentially 
driven by West German historians. As a reaction, several previously discredited East German 
historians have begun to stress the relative importance of first-hand memory over remote 
research (Jessen, 2010, p.1055). Stefan Berger examines the post-1989 fate of East German 
historians and suggests that GDR historiography was ‘colonised’ by West German historians, 
as the scholarly credibility of East German historians had supposedly been destroyed during 
their previous tenure (2011, pp.63-66). As an example of a former East German historian 
reasserting his perspective, Bollinger endorses Jarausch’s suggested designation of the GDR 
as a welfare dictatorship. He highlights the accomplishments of the state in the areas of social 
welfare and education as worthwhile ends justifying the unpalatable means of a repressive 
political and social structure (Bollinger and Vilmar, 2002). 
Summarising the range and complexity of labels and terminology, it can be held that some 
twenty-eight years of post-1989 research, both in Germany and elsewhere, have produced a 
range of sometimes contradictory, yet not mutually exclusive concepts to describe the GDR. 
The reasons behind the evolution of these models might be linked to the still incomplete 
research into a widening range of diverse primary sources. These include several large 
official archives and other, still to be fully researched sources such as cultural output, social 
and oral history. The empirical research conducted in my thesis can contribute to these 
debates with analysis of valuable new evidence of a consistent pattern of agency, enjoyed by 
certain sections of GDR society, notably intellectuals, in the context of high profile cultural 
commemorations. In the early years of post-1989 GDR research, binary alternatives of a 
GDR model were represented by top-down versus bottom-up perspectives; ongoing and 
future socio-cultural history research should increasingly substantiate a multi-perspectival 
concept of what the GDR actually was. That outcome would effectively devalue any model 
that merely classifies the GDR through ‘a post-war approach of totalitarianism that focuses 
on offering repression from above rather than cooperation from below’ (Jarausch, 2013).  
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The research question is therefore both important and topical in evaluating how best to 
describe the GDR. By exploring how state-sponsored commemorations shaped national 
identity, the central research problem is linked to ongoing historiographical debates on the 
nature of the GDR and how it should be defined in historical and political terms. These 
arguments provide starting points for consideration of how cultural policy worked under state 
socialism; however, they do not consider in detail the specific role played by an evolving 
practice of cultural commemorations in authoritarian states and their impact on national 
identity. The thesis fills this research gap by combining a detailed historiographical study of 
how such commemorations were proposed and negotiated with recent studies in national 
identity. Based for the first time on a series of comparable case studies, my thesis develops a 
novel longitudinal approach to understanding how commemorations, as a politically 
designated instrument of cultural policy, are developed over time in a state dominated by a 
single political party and ideological structure.  
1.3. CONCLUSION – OVERVIEW OF CHAPTERS 
All of the secondary literature evaluated so far in this introductory chapter represents many of 
the significant contributions to the two main theoretical frameworks underpinning the thesis. 
This detailed review has shown how seminal theories in memory studies provide initial 
insights into the generic features of commemorations including the inter-linked concepts of 
collective memory and cultural memory, invented tradition, national identity, nationalism, 
patriotism and myth. However, it does not necessarily follow that these models support an 
interpretation of the design, execution and legacy features of major cultural commemorations 
that might confirm a certain historiographical model of the GDR. Without an analysis of the 
evidence presented in the case studies that follow, the theoretical scholarship leaves an 
ongoing, often binary debate unresolved: does prima facie evidence of deliberately ‘invented 
tradition’, identified as then having an impact on national identity in the GDR, inevitably 
support a ‘top-down’ model of that state? Or does evidence of agency (Eigensinn) instead 
enhance a ‘participatory’ or ‘consensus’ dictatorship, ‘bottom-up’ model? 
The next chapters concentrate on four cultural commemorations in GDR history. The 
timeframe spans the central part of the state’s existence from the late 1950s to the early 
1980s. Against the background of concurrent political, economic and social conditions both 
within the GDR and abroad, each anniversary represents a snapshot of that year and the two 
to three-year period before it. Each chapter is structured in a broadly similar manner to enable 
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the case-studies to be comparable and thus demonstrate the originality of the thesis. In each 
case the timeline of the commemoration is investigated in three relatively distinct stages. 
Firstly, the chapter explores the aims – that is the planning of the design and content of the 
commemoration events and activities. These include not only formal ceremonies but cultural 
output relating to the cultural personality being commemorated, including academic 
conferences, media content and coverage, and educational activity. Set against the prevailing 
cultural policy, the aims of these commemorations can be seen to be developed within an 
explicitly articulated ideological framework. The basis for this new framework is shown to 
have either been inherited from earlier, albeit smaller scale anniversaries of the same person 
and/or from official GDR constructs and narratives concerning that person that existed before 
the new anniversary.  
Each case study considers how the previous framework or perceived construct for that 
personality was adopted or revised for the commemoration. It then investigates the second 
chronological stage, the actual implementation of the commemoration year and all its events 
and activities. The goal here is to test and interpret any tensions and discernible gaps between 
theory and practice; between the commemoration aims on the one hand and the reality of how 
the plans were negotiated on the other. In a closing ‘outcomes’ section all features of the 
commemoration are assessed in the light of their subsequent reception, longer-term outcomes 
and relevance to the concept of national identity.  
Commemorations in the GDR were not only concentrated on cultural personalities; as in 
many other countries, anniversaries of scientific and political personalities as well as political 
and historical events were also commemorated.2 Nonetheless, as Smith (1991, p.92) has 
noted, nationalists, intent on celebrating the nation, are drawn to the cultural genres, such as 
fine arts, music and literature. This observation is reflected in my specific selection of 
cultural commemorations in this thesis to best explore the impact on national identity.  
The bicentenary of Friedrich von Schiller’s birth in 1959 is the first and earliest GDR 
commemoration selected as case study. An analysis of hitherto largely unresearched primary 
sources exposes an early example of the gap between the theory and practice of cultural 
commemorations in the GDR. External factors play an important role in the design and 
execution of the events. In this case the domestic repercussions of the Cold War reinforce the 
interlinked cultural policies of demarcation to West Germany and appropriation of German 
cultural heritage – Abgrenzung and Aneignung. A second contributing factor for the 
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divergence between what was intended and what transpired in practice emerges in several 
significant organisational issues surrounding the implementation of events and activities. This 
was caused mainly by late planning by the authorities responsible for the events as well as by 
a key stakeholder in the commemoration, the mass organisation, Deutscher Kulturbund 
(DKB). These shortcomings in turn present early pointers to the extent, that cultural 
commemorations contributed to the formation of national identity, based on major cultural 
icons of the past. The new evidence investigated here also suggests initial clues to the 
relevance of such commemorations in supporting the participatory dictatorship model of the 
GDR. 
The centenary of Käthe Kollwitz’s birth in 1967, eight years after the Schiller bicentenary, is 
the smallest in scale of the case studies. Uniquely amongst the four historical personalities, 
primary sources on both sides of the prevailing Cold War divide appear to accept the artistic 
work and political life of Kollwitz as essentially linked to the GDR. This factor lessens the 
overt need for the authorities to adopt Abgrenzung and Aneignung discourses when planning 
the commemoration. Yet a detailed analysis of how she was portrayed in commemoration 
activities, namely a specially commissioned documentary film, exhibition events and the 
GDR media coverage confirms yet again a pattern of discrepancies between the theory and 
practice of this commemoration. Various narratives proposing a more explicitly politicised 
construct of Kollwitz as an anti-fascist, communist and pacifist appear at times to conflict 
with a domesticated paradigm of Kollwitz as ‘grieving mother’ in the way her life and work 
is commemorated. In terms of the research question, selected evidence presented in this case 
study suggests that her status as an existing socialist role model contributing to the formation 
of national identity was reconfirmed by the commemoration rather than noticeably amplified.  
The third case study investigates the bicentenary of Ludwig van Beethoven’s birth that was 
celebrated in many countries in 1970. The GDR’s commemoration is shown to represent a 
continuation of certain features that characterise the Schiller bicentenary, eleven years earlier. 
The twin themes of appropriation and demarcation continue to dominate the ideological 
framework, set against the enduring Cold War. Once again, previously unresearched primary 
sources point conclusively to organisational challenges and a resulting divergence between 
the original plans and the execution of the commemoration. A key factor in this case was the 
difficulty experienced by the regime in communicating an updated, Marxist approach to 
Beethoven. Compared to the Schiller bicentenary, the overall organisational gap is less 
evident. The success of a major recording project presents a more tangible legacy than 
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cultural output during the Schiller bicentenary, and this justifies assessing the outcome of the 
Beethoven commemoration as having a potential, if limited, impact on GDR national 
identity. As chief protagonist in this commemoration, the DKB and its associated musical 
community once again provides primary evidence of agency, which was arguably more 
visible than eleven years earlier.  
The final case study chapter is devoted to the Lutherjahr in 1983, the exceptionally large-
scale commemoration of Martin Luther’s birth quincentenary in the GDR. The uniqueness of 
these events is explored in terms of scope, preparation time, and the involvement of two key 
stakeholders – the Protestant church and the Stasi (Ministerium für Staatssicherheit. The 
latter, in particular, does not appear in any primary sources and secondary literature relating 
to the other case studies. Several reactive interventions by the SED throughout the planning 
and implementation of the Lutherjahr are analysed to reveal how the commemoration and its 
outcomes was affected in practice by unresolved challenges in the church-state relationship in 
the GDR. As one of the most important ‘events’ of the Lutherjahr, the major GDR television 
dramatisation, ‘Martin Luther’, provides significant evidence of this phenomenon, both in its 
gestation, content and reception. In common with the other case studies this chapter 
illustrates how the reality and outcome of the commemoration differed from the initial aims 
and ideological framework. The largely ineffective aim to communicate a Marxist Luther, 
whose life story is coincidentally closely linked to GDR locations, is revealed to be driven by 
a number of political motives. The relatively less important one of reinforcing a GDR-
specific national identity, based on this particular icon of German culture, is more hidden 
than in the comparable Schiller and Beethoven case studies; in the final analysis it appears to 
have been similarly unsuccessful. 
The principal, empirical research method employed in the four case studies is textual analysis 
of official material from several archives. These include the ‘Stiftung Archiv der Parteien und 
Massenorganisationen der DDR im Bundesarchiv’ (BArch-SAPMO) the Stasi Records 
Agency, ‘Der Bundesbeauftragte für die Unterlagen des Staatssicherheitsdienstes der 
ehemaligen Deutschen Demokratischen Republik’ (BStU), the ‘Akademie der Künste’ 
(AdK), and the ‘Deutsches Rundfunkarchiv’ (DRA). The material selected, alongside other 
primary sources including media texts, broadcast output, and literature published at the time, 
is largely unpublished so far.  
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The concluding chapter compares and contrasts the distinguishing characteristics of the four 
case studies, identifies common features and draws overall conclusions as to the likely impact 
on national identity in a wider sense. Lastly, and as an original contribution to the 
historiographical debates on the GDR, the overall research outcome is positioned against the 
main theoretical frameworks presented in this introductory chapter and poses the following 
questions: do the case studies shed further light on the ritualised, repetitive facets of 
commemorations conducted in an authoritarian society? What is the implication of that 
evaluation on the value and potential ability of commemorations to form national identity? 
Does a recurrent pattern of disparity between theory and practice suggest an insuperable 
obstacle to commemorations fulfilling their aims in an authoritarian society? Finally, does the 
relative ineffectiveness of ideological frameworks and many examples of agency in all four 
case studies add new empirical weight to defining what sort of society the GDR was – and 
thereby support or supersede any existing historiographical model? This thesis aims to put 
forward answers to all these interlinked questions. 
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2: THE SCHILLER BICENTENARY, 1959 
 
2.1. INTRODUCTION 
The public commemoration of Schiller’s birth in 1959 was one of several anniversaries of his 
birth and death, celebrated in Germany since the commemoration of his birth centenary in 
1859. In this chapter I will review to what extent the appropriation of Schiller, one of the 
most venerated figures of German high culture, successfully positioned him as a socialist role 
model and whether the implementation largely met the aims set at the outset. If so, did this 
produce an observable contribution to the construction of GDR national identity? Evidence 
will be considered to understand whether the commemoration events may be seen to have 
been designed to achieve a clear distinctiveness to concurrent events in West Germany and 
whether such a policy of demarcation was the overriding concern of the authorities. Any such 
evidence should also provide clues to explicit or implicit motives closely related to this 
policy. Was one such motive an inherent need felt by the SED to legitimise the regime 
domestically? Furthermore, did the SED also aim to promote the state’s stature abroad in 
response to West German economic and political successes at the time? Finally, the chapter 
will also review meaningful evidence of negotiation and compromise to be found amongst all 
those involved in the commemorations and draw conclusions concerning the theory and 
practice of political power and cultural policy at that point in time in GDR history. 
The research method applied in reviewing the Schiller bicentenary in the GDR, as in all the 
subsequent case study chapters, relies primarily on analysis of official files identified and 
researched at the BArch-SAPMO archive. Further primary sources include GDR radio 
broadcasts of the main Weimar events at the DRA and East German publications of that 
period. It should be noted that the amount of data in all the appropriate archives available for 
research on the Schiller bicentenary is more limited than for later case studies in this thesis. 
Even though this may not be unusual for archives going back to the early years of the GDR, 
the relative scarceness of primary sources here is somewhat surprising, given the scale of the 
commemoration and Schiller’s status, alongside Goethe, at the pinnacle of German literature. 
Previous scholarly research (Nutz, 1992; Bilke, 2007, Gudewitz, 2008 and Roßberg, 2009) 
has focused mainly on a comparative analysis of the diverging cultural and political 
approaches in the two German states at that time and comparison to the 1859 Schiller 
centenary. There is little work of a multidisciplinary nature covering the 1959 bicentenary in 
37 
 
any significant detail; monographs and edited volumes on Schiller and his works, such as 
those by Oellers (1970); Dann (2003); Hofmann (2003); Luserke-Jaqui (2005) and High, 
Martin and Oellers (2011) refer only in passing to the bicentenary. This literature is therefore 
only marginally relevant for the purposes of this chapter, as it invariably focuses on 
evaluating reception by contemporary Germanists. This first case study thus fills a gap in 
scholarship by analysing the 1959 commemorations from the perspectives of political and 
cultural history as well as memory studies. 
2.1.1. The political context: the GDR in the grip of the Cold War in 1958/59  
Several developments in the year leading up to the Schiller bicentenary in 1959 provide an 
important political context for how the commemoration events and activities were to be 
designed and executed. 1 January 1958 marked the date that the Treaty of Rome came into 
effect and the European Economic Community became a reality. This historical milestone 
crystallised West Germany’s integration into a larger European economic, social and political 
community. Any thoughts that the GDR leaders may have articulated earlier in the decade of 
forming a separate confederation of the two German states were finally put to bed. From a 
GDR perspective, a perceived threat inherent in the military potential of West Germany’s 
NATO membership was further amplified in March 1958, when the Bundestag formally 
approved government plans enabling the Bundeswehr to acquire nuclear warheads.3 A 
subsequent initiative by the newly elected French President, Charles de Gaulle, to accelerate 
European NATO integration by strengthening bilateral ties with West Germany may again 
have been seen by the GDR as anchoring West Germany further within the capitalist bloc. 
Two events in 1958 can be interpreted partly as reactions to these developments in West 
Germany: internally, the fifth SED Parteitag in July recognised that the then current five-year 
plan, 1956-1960, was failing and replaced it with a new, seven-year plan. Highly 
unrealistically as it was to turn out, the Parteitag set an economic target of year-end 1961. By 
that time the GDR was supposed to overtake West Germany’s standard of living, measured 
by per capita consumption of basic consumer goods. By mid-1959, Otto Grotewohl, as head 
of Government, and Wilhelm Pieck, the State President, were publicly asserting the GDR’s 
Alleinvertretungsanspruch (claim to be the sole legitimate representative) of all Germans 
(Roßberg, 2009, p.143). Externally, 10 November 1958 marked the beginning of a three-year 
crisis over the future of Berlin, culminating in the erection of the Berlin Wall in 1961. The 
Soviet Premier Khrushchev demanded that the Allied Powers, the USA, Great Britain and 
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France should withdraw their forces from West Berlin within six months and that East Berlin 
should fall within the territory of the GDR.  
How do these major geopolitical developments relate to cultural commemorations at the time, 
such as the Schiller bicentenary? The link to the deepening Cold War may be seen in ‘the 
SED’s self-image leading it to consider the use of aggressive rhetoric at the 
commemorations’ (Nutz, 1992, p.75). A detailed analysis of selected primary sources will 
reveal how these geopolitical events contributed to the ideological framework that influenced 
evolving cultural policy in the GDR, and thus the work of political and cultural functionaries 
involved with the commemorations. The external political environment meant that the 
authorities had to establish a clear demarcation line vis a vis concurrent West German 
scholarly approaches to the anniversary of Schiller and his works. Brockmann offers a logical 
explanation for the unique reality of how this environment affected cultural policy in a 
divided Germany at the time: ‘neither of the two German states wanted to imagine itself as 
implicated in a larger cultural unity with the enemy that it continued to reject and revile. 
Precisely because of the essential similarity between the German states, each state had to 
conceive of itself as fundamentally different from its counterpart’ (Brockmann, 1999, p.8).  
In the month immediately preceding the bicentenary, another event took place affecting one 
of the two most visible symbols of national identity next to the national anthem – which had 
been already adopted in 1949. On 1 October 1959, the ‘Volkskammer der DDR’ approved a 
new national flag. This differentiated itself from the original German flag by incorporating 
the coat of arms of the GDR, consisting of a compass and a hammer encircled with rye. Karl 
Maron, Interior Minister, confirmed the political rationale for this change as a clear break 
from any previous self-identification of a single German nation:  
[…]die Änderung [war] erforderlich, als der einzige rechtmäßige deutsche Staat auch 
in der Flaggenführung sichtbar von dem Westnationalen Separatstaat unterscheidet. 
Die Einführung der neuen Staatsflagge nach zehnjährigem Bestehen unserer Republik 
war notwendig geworden, weil die alte schwarz-rot-goldene Fahne von den 
reaktionären Kreisen der Westzone immer offener für ihre aggressiven Absichten 
missbraucht und so bei allen Völkern in Misskredit gebracht wurde. Angesichts dieser 
Entwicklung genügt es nicht mehr, dass sich die beiden deutschen Staaten äußerlich 
nur durch ihre Hymne unterscheiden (Roßberg, 2009, pp.143-144) 
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But even the official approach to culture, instrumentalised increasingly to crystallise a GDR 
national identity, had already changed in the five years preceding the Schiller bicentenary; a 
brief review illustrates Brockmann’s thesis of similarity-driven demarcation. 
2.1.2. The SED tightens cultural policy in the late 1950s 
Following the unsuccessful June 1953 rebellion, a number of bureaucratic structures were 
replaced in January 1954 by the creation of the Ministry for Culture (Ministerium für Kultur, 
hereafter referred to as ‘MfK’). At the time there was a temporary thaw and consequent 
reduction in political intervention in cultural affairs (Herbst, 1994, pp.553-566). 
However, in reaction to the 1956 uprising in Hungary, SED hardliners reasserted their 
influence, and in October 1957 the Zentralkomitee der SED (hereafter referred to as the ‘ZK’) 
created a commission for cultural affairs within the Politburo under Alfred Kurella; ‘Im 
ideologischen Kampf für eine sozialistische Kultur’ became its Leitmotif (Herbst, 1994). 
According to Herbst this second period in the chronology of GDR cultural policy lasted from 
1954 until the rise of popular culture in the West and the emergence of Wolf Biermann in the 
East in the early 1960s (ibid., pp.557, 561). The first Bitterfeld conference of April 1959 
marked the most prominent political milestone at that time. The so-called Bitterfelder Weg 
(‘Bitterfeld Path’) became a core strategy of GDR cultural policy until 1971. It was designed 
to promote the penetration of socialist culture within all sectors of GDR society, effectively 
uniting intellectuals and the working class through cultural events for workers and local 
participatory structures (ibid., p.557).  
Towards the end of the GDR’s existence a team of contributors within the ZK produced a 
major 550-page volume under the editorial leadership of the Germanist, Professor Horst 
Haase. This publication – Die SED und das Kulturelle Erbe – Orientierungen, 
Errungenschaften, Probleme – provides a valuable primary source on how the Party 
retrospectively viewed cultural heritage in a political context during the 1950s and beyond. 
Reacting to the ‘Einbeziehung der BRD in das imperialistische NATO-Pakt-System’, the 
GDR was seen to be undergoing an ‘Aufschwung der sozialistischen Kulturrevolution und 
verstärkte Bemühungen um das sozialistische Kultur und Kunsterbe in der zweiten Hälfte der 
fünfziger Jahre’. The competition of societal systems between East and West Germany is 
noted as providing the SED with a major rationale to exercise the lead role in developing 
cultural policy in the GDR. Haase’s explanation of how the creation of a separate GDR 
national identity became a strategic priority for the SED supports Brockmann’s analysis, 
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cited above: ‘Es kam also darauf an, den Menschen die sozialistische Perspektive der DDR 
eindeutig bewusst zu machen’ (Haase, 1988, pp.223-261). 
In language reflecting both the point in time and official publication background in which it 
was written, Haase suggests that the GDR’s cultural community was seen as a hindrance in 
achieving these ambitions:  
Aber besonders in der Intelligenz und unter den Kulturschaffenden vollzog sich der 
Prozess des Umdenkens sehr zögernd. […] Unter ihnen war, wie der Bericht des 
Zentralkomitees der SED an den V. Parteitag 1958 feststellte, die Auffassung 
vorhanden, dass die Wiedervereinigung Deutschlands ohne Klassenkampf und ohne 
Verlangsamung oder gar Preisgabe des weiteren sozialistischen Aufbaus zustande 
kommen könnte. Es dauerte geraume Zeit, bis diese Ansichten durch die schrittweise 
Klärung der damit zusammenhängenden theoretischen Fragen und die offensive 
politisch-weltanschauliche Arbeit der Partei überwunden werden konnten. Das alles 
wirkte sich auch nachdrücklich auf das Verhältnis zum Kulturerbe aus (Haase, 1988, 
p.224). 
In practice the SED concluded that it needed to contemporise cultural heritage as a major tool 
in developing a separate GDR cultural identity: 
Einer der Wege, um zu einer höheren Kultur aller Werktätigen zu gelangen, um die 
sozialistische Nationalkultur zu entwickeln, sah die Partei darin, Brücken zu schlagen, 
Zugänge zu schaffen zu den überlieferten Formen großer Kunst (ibid., p.256). 
Haase goes on to cite the bicentenary commemoration of Handel’s death in 1959 as an 
example of that form of memory-work employed by the SED to assert its role in cultural 
policy: ‘Die Partei nutzt auch im Kunstbereich weiterhin wichtige Jubiläen zur 
Positionsbestimmung’. Although these Handel commemoration events were far less visible 
than the coincidental Schiller celebrations in the same year, Haase’s narrative provides some 
evidence of the SED’s explicit intent to appropriate cultural heritage in its decision to declare 
the 1959 anniversary as Handel-Gedenkjahr: 
Mit ihrem Beschluss setzte die Partei nicht nur die kontinuierliche Orientierung auf 
das Werk Handels fort, sondern sie machte besonders die Künstler der DDR darauf 
aufmerksam, wie jener Komponist des 18. Jahrhunderts mitreißend und 
volksverbunden das Neue seiner Epoche in kühnen Werken zu gestalten wusste. 
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Außerdem war die Aneignung dieses Werkes für die Partei ein erneutes Beispiel, das 
lehrte, durch eine historische Betrachtungsweise, im zeitbezogenen und manchmal 
sogar religiösen Gewande das Humanistische, Zukunftsträchtige, ja Revolutionäre 
dieser großen Kunstschöpfungen zu erkennen’ (ibid., p.257). 
The SED’s strategy of appropriating cultural heritage for its own purposes is thus made 
explicit in the phrasing: ‘Aneignung dieses Werkes für die Partei’. Bearing in mind its 
official authorship, it is understandable that even twenty-nine years after the 1959 Handel 
commemorations this publication lacks any reference to or objective analysis of the actual 
events and to what extent the SED was able to persuade the artistic community to cooperate 
in their approach to this prominent example of cultural heritage. Curiously, the concurrent 
Schiller bicentenary goes unmentioned, despite enjoying a far higher public profile at the 
time than the Handel events in that same year. It is therefore essential to research the official 
records in order to assess how the concepts and events surrounding the Schiller anniversary 
related in theory and practice to prevailing cultural policy aims. 
2.2. AIMS 
2.2.1. Abgrenzung and Aneignung: key political themes of cultural policy 
On 9 May 1955, the anniversary of Schiller’s death in 1805, the then GDR Minister for 
Culture, Johannes R. Becher, appropriated a tribute by Goethe: ‘Denn er war unser! Mag das 
stolze Wort den lauten Schmerz gewaltig übertönen!’ (my emphasis). The original quotation 
became the title of Becher’s festive address at the Weimar National Theatre: ‘Denn er ist 
unser: Friedrich Schiller. Der Dichter der Freiheit’ (Bilke, 2007, p.473). This sentence was to 
convey the central political message within the above mentioned cultural policy of Aneignung 
– that is, cultural appropriation – that characterises the 1955 and subsequent Schiller 
commemorations in the GDR. At every step, the planning of Schiller’s bicentenary in 1959 
demonstrates how the politically controlled cultural system in the GDR sought to 
contemporise Schiller in the light of an evolving socialist nation. In doing so, the authorities 
intended to distance the GDR’s approach from the prevalent West German academic attitude 
of using ‘objective’ analysis (as they saw it) to free Schiller from the ‘“Klischeevorstellungen 
und Etiketten" typical of earlier Schillerian reception history’ (Nutz, 1992, p.65). This policy 
of distancing or demarcation to West Germany is referred to hereafter as Abgrenzung and was 
the dominant and often explicit political motive for cultural appropriation; it represents the 
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second political theme that will be shown to permeate both this commemoration in 1959, and 
to varying degrees, the later case studies in this thesis. 
2.2.2. Planning the bicentenary: off to a late start 
The first documented evidence of planning activity for the Schiller bicentenary 
commemoration was recorded only four months before the beginning of 1959. The actual 
formal preparations did not start until early in the anniversary year itself. This late start 
indicates that the bicentenary was never intended to be a whole ‘Schiller Year’, with various 
events and cultural activity spread from the beginning of 1959. In this respect the Schiller 
bicentenary will be seen to differ somewhat from the Beethoven and Luther anniversaries 
researched in this thesis. 
A common feature of all major cultural commemorations in the GDR was the establishment 
of an official planning committee representing the significant political and cultural 
stakeholders concerned. In this case it was known as the ‘Schiller Komitee der Deutschen 
Demokratischen Republik’, hereafter referred to as the ‘Schiller Committee’. The Committee 
met four times during 1959, in January, March, July and finally in late October. The size of 
the Schiller Committee meant that it acted effectively as the senior oversight body. The 
principal working group delegated to operate as a steering committee met for the first time in 
February 1959. An important task of the Schiller Committee, discussed in more detail below, 
was to issue an official and widely-publicised declaration in July 1959, proclaiming the 
purpose, scope and content of the anniversary celebrations (hereafter referred to as the 
‘Schiller Declaration’). This core aspect of the Schiller Committee’s remit articulated the 
ideological framework for commemoration; it will be seen to be replicated by similar 
committees in the later case studies. Finally, under the immediate supervision of the Schiller 
Committee and ultimately the SED, two major government ministries (Culture and 
Education) and a number of mass organisations assumed responsibility for the detailed plans 
and subsequent implementation.  
2.2.3. Schiller redefined: humanist, proto-socialist, ‘of the GDR’? 
What image of Schiller did those planning the events intend to transmit? How might this 
relate to the keys themes of Aneignung and Abgrenzung and the construction of a separate 
GDR national identity? The earliest available evidence of initiatives and plans for the 1959 
Schiller commemoration events is a letter from Otto Lang, General Director of the Deutsches 
Nationaltheater Weimar, to Alfred Kurella, Chairman of the Cultural Commission of the ZK, 
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on 20 August 1958.4 Referring to earlier discussions between him and the Weimar city 
council, Lang proposes that his theatre stage a Schiller-based festival of performances over a 
three-day period in August 1959, with a strong focus on youth participation. In his reply three 
weeks later Kurella agrees in principle but defers to the outcome of future discussions 
involving two of the largest mass organisations: the official youth movement, Free German 
Youth (Freie Deutsche Jugend, hereafter referred to as ‘FDJ’), and the Free German Trade 
Union Movement (Freier Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund, hereafter referred to as ‘FDGB’).5 
The core planning process for the Schiller commemorations emerged five months later in the 
formal inauguration (‘Konstituierung’) of the Schiller Committee. This body comprised fifty-
three members chaired by the Minister for Culture, Alexander Abusch, himself coincidentally 
an expert on Schiller. The stakeholders included representatives from a wide range of 
political, academic and intellectual sections of the GDR such as MfK, Ministry for Education 
(Ministerium für Volksbildung, hereafter referred to as ˈMfVˈ), and the GDR media. Major 
regional centres including Erfurt, Leipzig, Halle, Gera and Rostock were also represented on 
this large body.6 The main purpose of the first meeting was to appoint four Kommissionen. 
The individual remits of these working groups were: ‘1. ‘Konzeptionskommission’; 2. 
‘Programmkommission’; 3. ‘Kommission zur Vorbereitung der wissenschaftlichen 
Konferenz’, (9 to 12 November 1959); 4. ‘Publikationskommission’.7 The 
Konzeptionskommission meeting on 23 February 1959, reveals its status as the major steering 
group of only five members, chaired by Abusch himself. Echoing similar SED 
pronouncements from the 1955 commemorations, four main principles are noted in the 
minutes of this first Committee meeting.8 Firstly, the commemoration events need to 
demonstrate a connection between the national and social issues raised by Schiller’s works at 
the time as a pointer to contemporary issues in the GDR and beyond. Secondly, the working 
class and the GDR are the sole legitimate heirs of Schiller. Thirdly, the GDR fulfils demands 
set out by Schiller in his vision of a better human society and lastly, Schiller’s approach to 
national issues is to serve as model for contemporary GDR writers. 
Without going into further detail the commission also notes at the same meeting apparent 
contradictions within Schiller’s works that cannot be overlooked. Signalling its hegemonic 
claim to Schiller’s cultural heritage, the commission nevertheless states that it is prepared to 
collaborate with both West German institutions and individuals interested in the 
‘Herausarbeitung des wahren humanistischen Gehalts an Schiller’.9 The external and internal 
political climate had changed in the four years since commemorations in 1955 surrounding 
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the 150th anniversary of Schiller’s death. However this statement may be seen as an attempt 
to replicate the ‘overlap and cooperation’ that were previously observed in collections of 
speeches and essays in East and West Germany in 1955 (Martin 2006, p.12). If this spirit of 
cooperation with West Germany was a serious declaration of intent then it suggests a certain, 
if limited, continuity in the approach to the 1959 commemorations that would seem, at the 
same time, to contradict the new emphasis on rigid demarcation.  
By 20 March 1959 a second comprehensive meeting of the main Schiller Committee10 was 
able to agree an outline series of events and initiatives for the bicentenary year, based on a 
proposal by the Konzeptkommission working group back to the Schiller Committee.11 These 
events were to culminate in the main festivities in Weimar, scheduled to take place over eight 
days in November around Schiller’s birth date. The overall programme, described more fully 
in the next section, was recorded as a preliminary plan of the Schiller Committee.12 The role 
of the working class may be seen here to have been a particular political priority. The 
Konzeptkommission had previously noted the preeminent position of workers in relation to 
Schiller, set out already during the 150th anniversary of Schiller’s death:  
Die Stellungnahme des ZK der SED aus dem Jahr 1955 wird auch für die Arbeit des 
Schiller Komitees im Jahr 1959 die wichtigste Grundlage sein. Es sollen einige 
wichtige Stellen aus diesem Dokument in der Konzeption zitiert werden. […] ‘Die 
Arbeiterklasse und die Deutsche Demokratische Republik als einzig rechtmäßige 
Erben Schillers. Die Bedeutung des Schillerschen Werkes für die Entwicklung der 
sozialistischen Weltkultur’.13 
Therefore in order to highlight the primacy of the working class and its relationship with 
creative artists the Schiller Committee’s plan calls for the FDGB to play its part:  
Der Freie Deutsche Gewerkschaftsbund wird Veranstaltungen mit Werken von 
Schiller in das Programm der Arbeiterfestspiele aufnehmen. In den Betrieben werden 
die Schillerehrungen auf die Brigaden und Gemeinschaften der sozialistischen Arbeit 
orientiert und sollen Anlass sein, die Beziehung zwischen den Kulturschaffenden und 
der Arbeiterklasse noch enger zu gestalten.  
The MfV was urged to emphasise the use of existing material from the 1955 
commemorations but at the same time increase the involvement of students in new 
commemoration events. The meeting also agreed that a conference of German literature 
teachers across the GDR should be arranged. Other items discussed include: the Deutscher 
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Kulturbund (hereafter referred to as DKB) to focus on initiating events at regional and 
communal levels within its comprehensive network; new and existing films to be screened, 
and the state broadcasters to be encouraged to provide a wide variety of performances of 
Schiller’s plays and other cultural programming. This Schiller Committee session was the 
first to agree to review a proposal from the Bremen theatre to arrange the exchange of three 
productions between West and East Germany. A decision to go ahead would depend on 
agreement on the selection of plays as well as the production approach and interpretations.  
The final, and arguably most important, item in the context of the thesis’s research question, 
debated at this planning session, was the draft of an official Schiller Declaration on the 
bicentenary by the Schiller Committee for widespread publication within the GDR. In it, the 
basic principles from the Konzeptkommission are further elaborated upon.14 The inclusion 
here of cultural-political messages as ideological framework may be seen as the most 
important opportunity for the authorities to project their official ideological aims relating to 
the personality and work of Schiller.  
In the Schiller Declaration, the 1959 commemorations are explicitly linked back to the 1955 
commemoration, suggesting an emphasis on an evolutionary approach to how the bicentenary 
should be celebrated, rather than a rejection of those earlier events:  
Bereits vor vier Jahren, als die 150. Wiederkehr des Todestages von Friedrich Schiller 
Anlass zur Besinnung auf sein Werk gab, sprach die deutsche Arbeiterklasse durch 
das Zentralkomitee ihrer Partei, der Sozialistischen Einheitspartei Deutschlands, zum 
deutschen Volk über die Größe und Bedeutung des Dichters und über die Aufgabe der 
echten Aneignung seines unverfälschten Erbes. Dieser grundlegende Beschluss vom 
Jahre 1955 hat noch immer seine volle Bedeutung.  
The Schiller Declaration positions the celebrations in a contemporary context of progress 
achieved by the ‘Verwirklichung der humanistischen Ideale’ throughout the GDR state and 
society. In its appeal to all GDR creative artists to maximise their immersion in Schiller’s 
works the whole cultural community of the GDR is called on to adopt a ‘lebendige 
Interpretation, die den kämpferisch-humanistischen Geist der deutschen klassischen Literatur 
für unser Zeit weiterentwickelt’, rather than to interpret Schiller narrowly within the 
historical context of the late 18th century. Above all, the Schiller Declaration notes the moral 
and cultural supremacy of the GDR in contrast to West Germany, thus justifying a clearer 
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display of Abgrenzung in the GDR’s approach to the bicentenary than was the case in the 
1955 anniversary: 
Schärfer noch als 1955 ist im Schillerjahr 1959 unser deutsches Volk vor die 
nationale und humanistische Aufgabe gestellt, den alten Verderber unserer Nation, 
den deutschen Militarismus zu bändigen, um unser Volk auf die Bahn der 
demokratischen Wiedervereinigung zu führen und ihm eine friedliche Zukunft zu 
sichern. Wir grenzen uns jedoch klar ab von der geplanten verfälschenden 
Schillerehrung der Machthaber von Bonn, die im Zeichen der antinationalen, für 
unser Volk verhängnisvollen NATO-Politik stehen.  
The Declaration goes on to create a clear link between the appropriation of cultural heritage 
and national identity in the sense of that heritage becoming ‘Nationalkultur’:  
Im Zeichen dieser grundverschiedenen Entwicklungswege in den beiden deutschen 
Staaten und der sozialistischen Umwälzung in unseren Deutschen Demokratischen 
Republik wird das Schillerjahr 1959 beweisen, daß das Wachsen und Werden unserer 
nationalen sozialistischen Nationalkultur auf das Engste verknüpft ist mit der 
Aneignung und Weiterentwicklung unseres humanistischen Erbes. Dieses Erbe stellt 
einen unlösbaren Bestandteil der sozialistischen Nationalkultur dar.  
The ideological construct thus positions Schiller as a contemporised, socialist role model. The 
portrayal demonstrably aims to promote national identity in the sense of identification with 
an appropriated major literary icon of German culture. In this regard, the construction is also 
in line with the principle of Abgrenzung by encouraging a discourse on Schiller that stands in 
clear contrast to that of the perceived historicisation of Schiller by West German Germanists. 
This draft Schiller Declaration was sent back to the working groups, to be finally adopted and 
published after the third Schiller Committee meeting of 7 July 1959. 
At the next organisational level within the state apparatus below the Schiller Committee, the 
MfK and MfV proceeded to put the ideological aims of the Schiller commemoration into 
effect. In an undated directive, the Minister for Culture, Alexander Abusch, issued 
instructions to the respective culture departments within local GDR councils across the 
country.15 Referring to the Schiller Declaration, and citing specific examples, the Schiller 
commemorations are directed to become an integral, omnipresent component of all cultural 
activities particularly in the context of socialist work practices and worker participation:  
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Die Ehrungen Friedrich Schillers sollen, den Charakter unserer sozialistischen 
Kulturarbeit entsprechend, einen organischen Bestandteil der kulturellen und 
künstlerischen Tätigkeit, insbesondere der kulturellen Massenarbeit, bilden. Sie sollen 
mit der Bewegung ‘der lesende Arbeiter’, mit der ‘Woche des Buches’, der 
kulturellen Entwicklung der Brigaden der sozialistischen Arbeit verbunden werden 
und in den Programmen der Kulturinstitutionen enthalten sein.  
An undated directive from the MfV to all schools as well as institutions involved in teacher 
training refers directly to the Schiller Declaration and indirectly to the Bitterfelder Weg. The 
comprehensive directions covering all relevant taught subjects and syllabi stress the special 
role of the German working class as true heir of the classical national poet Schiller. Only the 
working class can properly recognise his contribution and put his ideas into practice in the 
present: ‘Insbesondere muss deutlich werden, daß die deutsche Arbeiterklasse die wahre 
Erbin des Werkes unseres klassischen Nationaldichters Friedrich Schiller ist, daß sie erst 
seine Leistung wahrhaft zu würdigen und seine Ideen für unsere Zeit zu verwirklichen 
vermag’. All classrooms across the country are therefore instructed to arrange a 
commemorative ceremony on Schiller’s birth anniversary, 10 November 1959.16 In a further 
order, the Ministry issued detailed methodical notes to all teacher training establishments 
with instructions on Schiller interpretations to be used in the core subjects of German 
literature, history and music teaching. Where possible, material centrally collated by the 
Deutsche Pädagogische Zentralinstitut is to be used. Examples of such interpretations 
include: an emphasis for German literature lessons on linking Schiller’s poetry to the 
literature of the Romantic period, interpreting the dramas Wilhelm Tell with reference to the 
1813-1815 wars of liberation, and of positioning Kabale und Liebe within the context of 
Schiller’s difficult experiences in his youth. In music lessons important poetry such as An den 
Frühling and An die Freude are to be cross-referenced respectively with Schubert’s song 
setting and Beethoven’s usage in the last movement of his ninth symphony. Lastly, in history 
lessons, Schiller’s national and liberal thinking is to be contextualised within specific 
historical events including the first popular revolution in the Netherlands, the 30 Years War, 
German culture before the French Revolution and the independence wars of the British 
colonies in North America.17 The prescriptive tone: ‘für alle Schulen und Einrichtungen der 
Lehrer-und Erzieher-Ausbildung wird angewiesen,[…] alle Schüler der allgemeinbildenden 
Schulen von der neunten Klasse ab, sollen den Film Kabale und Liebe als Schulveranstaltung 
besuchen’, and the itemised content of this communication is significant as it represents a 
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strict official framework rather than a set of guidelines. In this respect the school may be seen 
to represent a key site for the formation of national identity in the GDR – a phenomenon that 
was to become more visible in the last two decades of GDR history with respect to teaching 
materials (Saunders, 2007, pp.12, 34). The directive thus fulfils the closing paragraph of the 
Schiller Declaration:  
Vor allem aber sollte Schillers Wort in den Schulen vor der Jugend erklingen. Die 
kraftvollen Ideen, die der Schillerschen Dichtung innewohnen, sind stets von der 
Jugend mit Begeisterung aufgenommen worden […] Auch die Jugend unserer Zeit, 
der die Aufgabe gestellt ist, mitzubauen an der friedlichen Zukunft ihres Vaterlandes 
und in der ersten Reihe der Bahnbrecher einer neuen, sozialistischen Welt zu stehen, 
wird das flammende Pathos und die fortschrittlichen Gedanken der dichterischen 
Werke Schillers in sich aufnehmen und sich auch davon zur heutigen Tat begeistern 
lassen.18 
There is little archival evidence of how and to what extent Abusch’s school directive was 
actually complied with. However a letter of 15 September 1959 from the MfV’s head of 
extramural studies to all German subject tutors identifies ‘wissenschaftliche Mängel’ in some 
of the material used in a Schiller extramural circular to students. The letter deplores 
‘ideologische Schwächen’ in the circular’s criticism of Minister Abusch’s book on Schiller 
and an over-emphasis on religion when interpreting Schiller’s works. The communication 
closes in pointing out that all extramural students are to receive a written revision of the 
correct scholarly approach to Schiller and his works.19 
The key ideological aims for how Schiller and his bicentenary commemorations were 
intended to be positioned may be summarised as focussing on three themes: firstly, Schiller’s 
Humanism – a term which had become an often-repeated core ingredient of GDR official 
rhetoric relating to the appropriation of German cultural heritage (Kulturerbe); secondly, the 
incorporation of Schiller within a socialist national culture, stressing particularly the active 
involvement of the working class and youth within the framework of the Bitterfelder Weg; 
and finally, the overarching theme of Abgrenzung to West Germany, of creating a manifestly 
socialist approach to Schiller’s life and work in order to reinforce the GDR’s claim to be the 
true and only representative of German culture. This political dimension can arguably be 
interpreted as a top-down intention to ultimately legitimise the regime by promoting a 




With the ideological framework for how a humanist and socialist Schiller was to be 
incorporated into a programme of commemoration events and cultural activities in place, how 
closely did the actual execution of the programme follow the stated aims? Did the authorities 
need to get involved in response to issues emerging once those charged with the 
implementation began their work? The following section summarises and investigates the 
main events, identifies these issues and analyses how the SED, in particular, reacted.  
2.3.1. Summary of events and activities: unrealistically ambitious? 
The Schiller bicentenary commemorations took place over a six-month period from early 
May until mid-November 1959. The events began with an official wreath-laying ceremony at 
Schiller’s monument, the opening of an exhibition on ‘Schiller and the stage’ and special 
theatre performances, all in Weimar on 9 May. The next six months featured a multitude of 
minor and larger theatrical and literary events organised across the GDR by the various mass 
organisations mentioned earlier. A highlight of this period was a Schiller youth festival 
(‘Schiller-Festspiele der Jugend’), hosted by the FDJ in Weimar from 19 to 30 August and a 
new film production of Schiller’s play, Kabale und Liebe. New publications included a 
revised edition of all Schiller’s works and a 32-page biography of Schiller aimed at young 
readers. The commemoration events ended with a week (Festwoche) of major official and 
cultural events in Weimar and Jena from 6 to 14 November, scheduled around Schiller’s birth 
anniversary on 10 November. 
2.3.2. Schiller Committee stakeholders: coordination issues and variable commitment 
from ‘unreliable’ intellectuals 
By March 1959, two months before the official start, there appears superficially to be 
significant momentum amongst stakeholders in the planning of these commemorations. Yet 
at the same second meeting of the Schiller Committee that month, the scope and complexity 
of the commemoration programme was beginning to prove unrealistically ambitious given 
the limited time available to plan, coordinate and implement all the events and cultural 
activity. Underlining the particular importance of the Academic Conference (explored more 
fully in the next section) the Committee records considerable impatience at the slow progress 
of the preparations. This may be interpreted at best as evidence of an unrealistic timeline 
accompanied by poor coordination amongst the stakeholders. More revealingly, it could also 
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indicate a reluctance of two of the Conference’s joint organisers to accept unquestioningly 
instructions from the Schiller Committee as carrying the full weight of SED authority and 
therefore to handle the events as a daily priority.20  
Charting the overall progress of the Schiller Committee over the ten months of its existence 
reveals that what should have been a straightforward handover from overall planning by the 
Committee to execution by other commemoration stakeholders was not always orderly and 
effective. A closer look at examples of mass organisation contributions to the implementation 
illustrates how these issues may have negatively affected the desired aim of creating a 
socialist Schiller in the wider context of GDR national identity.  
An FDGB file note records high-level discussions between senior FDGB officials and the ZK 
even before the first meeting of the Schiller Committee at the end of January 1959. The initial 
plan specifies a National Theatre event in Weimar on 9 May 1959, targeting the 
‘Arbeiterklasse’ in Weimar, with all local workplaces to participate. This cultural event could 
then be replicated in other towns across the country and also at the annual national worker 
festival. In terms of resources the FDGB would need both educational material and scholarly 
lecturers, ‘um die Popularisierung eines richtigen Schillerbildes bei 
Gewerkschaftsveranstaltungen durchführen zu können’. The principal publishing initiative is 
to be entitled Schiller und die Arbeitsklasse, due for publication in April 1959, and designed 
to provide orientation on the Schiller commemorations to all FDGB affiliated trade unions.21 
But six months later an internal FDGB memo refers to the decision taken at the third session 
of the Schiller Committee in early July, designating specific events to be organised in 
Dresden, Erfurt, Stralsund, Leipzig and Berlin under the title Arbeiter ehren Schiller. 
Organisational inconsistencies appear here between the lines: each of the five events is to be 
organised locally either by the FDGB, the local DKB or a local coordinating Schiller 
Committee. Nine further towns are named for similar events but are yet to be scheduled in 
detail. The memo states that the national Schiller Committee has taken charge of the 
‘organisatorische Festlegung’ of these events, suggesting that the FDGB may not have 
properly taken on board its original organisational responsibilities up to that point in time.22 
Under the overall control of the SED, the DKB played a central role in providing resources 
for the Schiller commemorations, both in terms of material such as brochures, slides and tape 
recordings of Wilhelm Tell, supplying lecture venues as well as personnel to lead the local 
cultural events.23 A memo from the DKB’s Central Secretariat to the four main regional 
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offices of the DKB provided the concept for parallel conferences in May and June 1959 in 
Erfurt, Leipzig, Berlin and Rostock. The objective of these internal DKB events was to instil 
an ‘ideologische Konzeption’ in some 200 participants, who would subsequently be deployed 
at commemoration events across the GDR. These speakers were to be primarily Germanists, 
as well as drama experts, librarians and other intellectuals whose work involved Schiller.24 
An undated communiqué goes on to report on the Berlin conference of 24 June 1959. Dr. 
Werner Thalheim, Director of the Germanistisches Institute at Berlin’s Humboldt University, 
focuses in his lecture on ‘Schillers ideologischer Kampf um die Herstellung der nationalen 
Einheit Deutschlands in Zusammenhang mit der Lösung der sozialen Frage’. Thalheim 
(unrelated to the secretary of the Schiller Committee) also reinforces a core political message 
on the ‘Schiller Verfälschung in Westdeutschland, wo versucht wird, Schiller vollständig zu 
entpolitisieren, und ihn für die Ideologie der NATO nutzbar zu machen’. The final paragraph 
of his speech, as cited in the communiqué, reveals an unmistakeable objective of the Schiller 
commemorations; identification with the GDR nation’s (appropriated) cultural heritage is 
behind the core theme of worker involvement with the Schiller bicentenary commemoration. 
This objective can only be attained by establishing a link between the nation’s workers and 
farmers – thus, by implication, not only the highly educated, cultural GDR elite – and 
German cultural heritage: 
Für alle verantwortlichen Institutionen und Organisationen muß es das 
hauptsächlichste Anliegen sein, vor allem die Arbeiter der sozialistischen Brigaden 
und die Bauern der Landwirtschaftlichen Produktionsgenossenschaften mit dem 
fortschrittlichen Werk Schillers vertraut zu machen, um das klassische Kulturerbe 
unserer Nation zu einem echten Bestandteil aller Menschen in der DDR werden zu 
lassen.25 
The full weight of this appeal is contained in the expression ‘echter Bestandteil’. This 
phrasing converts a potential sense of national identity, gained by citizens identifying with 
their cultural heritage, into the cultural heritage itself becoming a permanent, integral element 
within all citizens. The use of this term evokes the Schiller Declaration’s allusion, cited 
earlier, of Kulturerbe needing to become a component (Bestandteil) of Nationalkultur. 
2.3.3. The Schiller Festwoche: a predictable format with no surprises  
The Festwoche in Weimar comprised a full programme of varied daily events, titled 
collectively as ‘Schiller Ehrung der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik: Festtage in 
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Weimar und Jena’.26 These included theatrical performances, concerts, exhibitions and public 
lectures throughout the entire week. The culmination of this Festwoche was the 
‘Wissenschaftliche Konferenz über das Schaffen Friedrich Schillers’, referred to hereafter as 
the ‘Academic Conference’, from 6 to 9 November and the official wreath-laying and Festakt 
ceremonies on 10 November, both described below in more detail. The conference and 
official ceremonies were the main components of a formulaic approach to major cultural 
commemorations in the GDR that we will see replicated in the other three case studies.  
The concept and format of the Academic Conference followed an existing template for 
academic conferences at major cultural commemorations. The purpose and targeted 
participants were formally confirmed at the March meeting of the Schiller Committee.27 The 
Conference is to be jointly organised by the Schiller Committee, the ‘Nationale Forschungs- 
und Gedenkstätten der klạssischen deutschen Literatur in Weimar’ and the Friedrich-Schiller 
University in Jena. The Leitmotif of the Conference is aimed to contrast new, Marxist 
approaches to Schiller, based on the historical-materialistic method, with West German 
‘bourgeois’ interpretations: ‘Die Konferenz soll Wert und Bedeutung des Werkes Friedrich 
Schillers für die sozialistische Kultur fixieren, indem sie die Marxistische Schillerforschung 
durch neue Erkenntnisse bereichert und sich mit der bürgerlichen Forschung der Gegenwart 
auseinandersetzt’. The six main lectures are confirmed as: ‘Volk und Held in den Dramen 
Schillers’ (Hans-Günther Thalheim); ‘Der Begriff der Bürger-Freiheit und der nationalen 
Unabhängigkeit in Schillers historischen Schriften’ (Karl-Heinz Hahn); ‘Theorie und Praxis 
in Schillers Schaffen, dargestellt an Wallenstein’ (Hans-Jürgen Geerts); ‘Schiller und die 
Bühnenpraxis’ (Armin-Gerd Kuckhoff); ‘Schillers Gedichte in der Tradition deutscher Lyrik’ 
(Hans Mayer); and ‘Schiller und der Begriff der Popularität’ (Edith Braemer). All GDR 
intellectuals involved with Schiller are thus specifically targeted: ‘Mit der Konferenz strebt 
der Veranstalter die Zusammenfassung aller literaturwissenschaftlich arbeitenden Menschen 
in der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik an, deren Bemühungen besonders in diesem Jahr 
auf die Lösung von Problemen der Schillerforschung gerichtet sind’. Guests are listed as 
Germanists, philosophers, writers, teachers and individuals associated with the theatre as well 
as with literary publications.28 Nutz puts forward a plausible secondary objective, proposing 
that the Conference’s stated inclusivity was also aimed at converting those intellectuals 
within the GDR, whose outlook was known to be ‘liberal’ and ‘revisionist’ (Nutz 1992, p.75). 
This target group may be seen to have included one of the main speakers, the literary scholar, 
critic and author Hans Mayer, who was to commit Republikflucht, i.e. not return to the GDR 
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from an authorised trip to West Germany, four years later. In a separate speech after the 
Schiller bicentenary, Mayer criticised the GDR commemorations as ˈetwas eintönig und allzu 
stark aufeinander abgestimmtˈ and ˈdem Gegenstand nicht immer angemessenˈ (cited in 
Roßberg, 2009, p.156).  
Closing the chronological narrative of the GDR Schiller bicentenary, the final Festakt 
ceremony in Weimar was held on the evening of 10 November 1959, the anniversary of 
Schillerˈs birthday. Preceded by an official wreath-laying ceremony at Schillerˈs monument 
outside the Nationaltheater, the programme consisted of a festive speech (‘Festansprache’) 
by Alexander Abusch, framed with music by Handel and Beethoven and the spoken Prologue 
from Schiller’s play, Wallenstein. The reception of this ceremony is discussed in the later 
‘Outcomes’ section.  
2.3.4. Repeated SED interventions seek to close gaps between aims and implementation  
Several documents expose the manifest influence exercised by the SED on the 
implementation of the 1959 bicentenary, both within the Schiller Committee and at other 
national and local organisational levels. As will also be noted in the subsequent case studies, 
it is important to consider in some detail the nature and extent of SED interventions in major 
cultural commemorations. Firstly, by identifying the otherwise hidden implementation issues 
resulting from non- or poor compliance with the aims of the commemorations, the analysis 
exposes why the SED needed to intervene in the first place. Moreover, these illuminating 
interferences serve to question the reality of a power structure that a ˈtop-downˈ 
historiographical model of the GDR might otherwise suggest.  
Shortly before the third session of the committee in July 1959, a group of leading SED 
members within the committee issued a critical status assessment together with an agreed list 
of action initiatives. Overall criticism is levelled at the lack of publicity within the GDR, 
singling out the fact that not even Neues Deutschland (hereafter referred to as ‘ND’) had 
published the Schiller Declaration. These ‘Schwächen in der gesamtdeutschen Arbeit und in 
der Vorbereitung der Festtage im November’ are attributed to an unsatisfactory response to 
the Committee’s efforts by other bodies:  
Die zusammenfassende, populär basierende vorbereitende Tätigkeit des Büros des 
Schiller-Komitees ist darum besonders gehemmt, weil als Einwand gegen die 
Notwendigkeit konkreter Festlegungen von den verschiedensten Stellen immer wieder 
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gesagt wird: ‘Es ist ja noch viel Zeit. Ihr seid in diesem Jahre die letzten. Im Moment 
haben wir Vordringliches zu tun.’29  
The term ‘Gesamtdeutsch’ here may be understood as a reference to the perceived 
competition represented by concurrent West German commemoration activity surrounding 
the Schiller bicentenary. 
An internal memo within the MfV reports on a meeting of the Parteiaktiv of the Schiller 
Committee on 12 June 1959 which had heavily criticised the Weimar representatives on the 
main Schiller Committee for overreaching their independence and thus challenging the 
overall authority of the Committee. This had required the SED having to intervene and, as 
remedial action, direct that prior approval of the Schiller Committee was mandatory for the 
production concept of all performances of Schiller plays throughout.  
Diskussion zur Einheit der Parteigruppe des Schiller-Komitees und im 
Zusammenhang damit zur Stärkung der Autorität des Komitees: es scheint zwischen 
den Genossen des Schiller-Komitees Widersprüche und verschiedene Auffassungen 
zu geben, die sich dahingehend auswirken, daß sich die Gruppe aus Weimar als 
selbstständige Gruppe betrachtet und die Autorität des gesamten Schiller-Komitees 
für alle Veranstaltungen im Schillerjahr nicht genügend anerkennt. Es wurde für 
notwendig gehalten, und auch beschlossen, daß die Konzeption aller in diesem Jahr 
zur Aufführung gelangenden Schiller-Dramen in der Republik durch Mitglieder des 
Schiller-Komitees geprüft und durch Diskussionen und Aussprachen an Ort und Stelle 
– wo das notwendig ist – korrigiert wird.30 
There is no record in the files to what extent this directive was complied with. The SED 
members on the Committee also appear to be particularly concerned about a perceived scant 
awareness of the GDR’s Schiller commemorations outside of the GDR, all the more 
unacceptable as similar events in West Germany were getting far more publicity. Therefore in 
order to reinforce the GDR’s claim to be the main German representative for the bicentenary 
it is agreed to appoint a five person SED working group (Parteiaktiv) within the main 
Schiller Committee consisting of senior representatives of the ZK, MfK and the Schiller 
Committee secretary. This group is charged with several initiatives to tighten up bicentenary 
planning and implementation, with an overriding aim of reinforcing the authority and unity of 
the committee in its leading control role.31 
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As became frequently apparent throughout the bicentenary in the GDR, this preoccupation 
with demarcation to West Germany ties in with the ZK’s undated proclamation on the 
Schiller year. Quoting Friedrich Engels that Schiller’s ‘Jugendwerke atmen einen Geist der 
Herausforderung gegen die ganze deutsche Gesellschaft, wie sie damals bestand’, the public 
statement is almost entirely devoted to attacking supposed distortions of Schiller’s heritage in 
West Germany. By claiming that nations and their national cultures had ‘survived’ Schiller, 
West Germans and their ‘volksfeindliche Politik’ are accused of falsely historicising Schiller, 
the ‘volkstümlichste Freiheitsdichter’.32 
In this context, evidence of apparently nervous SED Vorgaben, ostensibly in the sense of 
specific instructions rather than guidelines, appear in minuted decisions of the Schiller 
Committee on the preparations for the Academic Conference:  
Die Referate sollen - entgegen der Empfehlung der Friedrich-Schiller-Universität Jena 
- ausschließlich von Hochschulgermanisten der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik 
gehalten werden. Gäste aus dem Ausland sollen zur Teilnahme eingeladen werden, 
etwaige Diskussionsbeiträge von ihrer Seite sollen im Einzelnen abgesprochen 
werden. Einladungen an Philosophen, Historiker und Schriftsteller der Deutschen 
Demokratischen Republik erfolgen namentlich (Roßberg, 2009, p.154).  
A possible repercussion of the University stepping out of political line here may be seen in its 
subsequent omission as organiser listed in the official programme of the Conference.33  
A letter of 13 August 1959 from Willie Lewin, ZK member within the Schiller Committee, to 
Helmut Holtzhauer, head of the ‘Nationale Forschungs- und Gedenkstätten der klassischen 
deutschen Literatur in Weimar’, who had overall responsibility for the November Festwoche, 
provides further evidence of overt SED interference in the implementation process. A 
strongly worded reprimand to Holtzhauer who had missed an earlier meeting with SED 
members, and even failed to send a substitute, sets the tone for a general criticism of the 
quality and quantity of ongoing bicentenary preparations. Referring to the Bitterfelder Weg, 
Lewin highlights the predominant purpose of the Academic Conference: ‘[…] wie das 
kulturelle Erbe, in diesem Falle das Erbe Schillers, für die Entwicklung der sozialistischen 
Nationalkultur nutzbar wird’. Mirroring the creation of a discrete SED action group within 
the main Schiller Committee, Lewin confirms a unilateral SED decision to establish a 
Weimar based SED Parteiaktiv, representing both the MfK and other local institutions, to 
assume responsibility for a preparation of the Conference that would conform to the 
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expectations of the Party.34Although this initiative may be seen as a reactive, even knee-jerk 
intervention, it demonstrates how the SED through its representatives on the Schiller 
Committee, did not lose sight of its primary aim of ensuring that both cultural and political 
policy objectives were met at that time. Subsequent assessments discussed below illustrate 
shortcomings in achieving those objectives, which ultimately diminished the intended impact 
of the commemorations on national identity. 
When analysing the SED’s interference in the bicentenary, an internal report by Werner 
Thalheim, secretary to the main Schiller Committee, offers further insights into the entire 
implementation process. An interim report, dated 24 July 1959, describes a remedial action 
trip to Dresden, Karl Marx Stadt, Erfurt, Weimar and Leipzig. The visits seem to have been 
triggered by a perceived lack of progress in the ongoing planning and execution of events. 
Various shortcomings are described in frank detail. These range from the absence of a 
regional or local Schiller committee in the Dresden area, logistical issues around suitable 
event venues in Erfurt, and unsatisfactory premises in Weimar for the local Schiller 
committee. The situation at the time in Leipzig needed a larger scale intervention as the first 
local Schiller committee meeting had only taken place in early July. The meeting had been 
very poorly attended and as a result it was agreed that several senior Schiller Committee 
members from Berlin were to be drafted in as future support in Leipzig.35 The common theme 
behind all these interventions was a perceived flaw in communication and cooperation 
between local branches of the DKB and their counterpart branches in the FDGB mass 
organisation, suggesting a lack of local leadership. 
The interim report seems to point to the problematic calibre and commitment of many 
individuals; event preparations and performance overall appears to have been most advanced 
where the local DKB in particular had the ‘right’ people on the ground taking appropriate 
initiatives. The FDGB is criticised for not having meaningfully used their branch network – 
indeed, Thalheim found evidence that little or no information had been passed down from 
FDGB headquarters. In addition, there was a clear lack of positive cooperation between the 
local Schiller committees (where established), and the mass organisations on the one hand 
and the local theatre and artistic community on the other. The report therefore recommends 
that the ZK should issue specific instructions to regional SED offices to increase their 
involvement in the process, and that a status discussion with the MfK would be crucial to 
ensure improvements. This follow-up action agreed on the spot shows that Thalheim had full 
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authority to instigate concrete solutions and – by re-asserting the official seniority of the SED 
in the implementation process – ultimately restoring the power structure referred to above.  
2.4. OUTCOMES  
This section explores results, as far as they may be identified, of how the Schiller bicentenary 
commemorations were implemented. These findings are evaluated as they relate to the 
research question, namely whether and, if so, the Schiller commemorations can be said to 
have contributed to the formation of national identity in the GDR. The specific focus is on 
identifying any clear disparity that appeared between these outcomes and the original aims of 
the commemorations. The analysis is based primarily on documented interim and evaluation 
evidence from the stakeholders, as well as media reception.  
2.4.1. The reality of attempting to position Schiller as a working-class hero  
An overall slowdown and weakness in the implementation process surfaced by the third 
meeting of the Schiller Committee in July. Whereas the second meeting had not registered 
attendance and apologies, the session four months later records names of 22 attending and 31 
absent, of which several were without apologies.36 A status report submitted to the meeting 
lists a number of additional events organised for subsequent months both in Weimar and 
across the DKB network.37 Although most mass organisation activity including DKB, FDGB 
and FDJ is reported to the meeting as being on track, several negative comments are minuted. 
On behalf of the FDJ an official requests additional resources for their future events, even 
though no FDJ representative attended the meeting. The third meeting of the Committee 
criticises the low number of theatres actually performing Schiller plays across the GDR’s 
stages that year, comparing the actual number of 44 separate productions to the total number 
of 70 theatres available. In a wider context, but without citing any specific examples, the 
Committee also points to patchy resonance within the population to the Schiller 
commemorations, suggesting this may be due to insufficient communication in general:  
Es ist den Mitgliedern des Komitees vielleicht nicht immer klar, mit welchem 
Interesse unsere Äußerungen in der Öffentlichkeit verfolgt und aufgenommen werden. 
Auch diesmal sollte die Sitzung mit einem Kommuniqué abgeschlossen werden. In 




Similar dissatisfaction had already surfaced in May 1959 when unnamed members of the 
Schiller Committee lodged a file note (Aktennotiz) in the archives of the Friedrich-Schiller-
University in Jena. The note criticises the lack of public awareness in the GDR compared to 
far more visible events in West Germany; it states that the opening events in May 1959 had 
received ‘ ‘‘eine ungenügende Beachtung in der Öffentlichkeit’’ und daß ‘‘die Ausstrahlung 
des Schiller-Komitees […] noch außerordentlich gering sei’’[…] ‘‘demgegenüber wirken die 
Organe der Bundesrepublik jedoch sehr aktiv in der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik’’’ 
(cited in Roßberg, 2009, pp.159-160). 
Minuted discussions at the meeting also reveal some of the practical issues that arise in 
fulfilling the objective of achieving non-professional – that is, especially worker – 
participation in artistic productions. A Schiller Festival week in the Thüringen village of 
Bauerbach, (associated historically with Schiller as providing him with a place of refuge in 
early 1783), is initially cited as an example of a positive response to an appeal from the 
regional Schiller Committee. 120 out of 350 inhabitants are reported to have been involved in 
assembling the relevant stage and facilities and the first four performances had attracted some 
11,000 visitors from nearby communities. As Bauerbach is located within the five kilometre 
restricted area (‘Sperrzone’) adjacent to the West German border, the Committee is asked to 
intervene with the Ministry of the Interior (Ministerium des Inneren) to relax access to the 
area during forthcoming productions in August and September. The meeting notes that local 
amateur actors are also involved in these productions and that an ‘Arbeiter-und Bauerntheater 
Friedrich Schiller der Gemeinde Bauerbach’ had been formed, offering basic acting lessons 
(schauspielerische Grundausbildung). The somewhat lofty introductory remarks point to the 
Bauerbacher Schiller-Festwoche as demonstrating: ‘[…] die Richtigkeit und Bewährung der 
in der Erklärung des Schiller-Komitees zum Ausdruck kommenden Forderung nach 
Besitzergreifung der Kunst’. However, no detail on the number of individuals actually 
involved in the artistic rather than logistical aspects of this festival is provided to the meeting. 
This may suggest that the actual number was too small to be meaningful, which would 
indicate a divergence between the theory of involving the working class and reality. The 
potential existence of such a gap is borne out by Herr Kühne, (first name unknown), 
representative of the DKB, reporting that some professional actors were unhappy with the 
involvement of amateurs in their productions because of their dialect and regional accents:  
Auf der Leipziger Referenten-Konferenz hatten Künstler Vorbehalte. Sie wollten 
Schiller davor bewahren, im Dialekt gesprochen zu werden. Damit bremsen sie, wenn 
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auch nicht immer absichtlich, die Volksinitiative. Das Komitee sollte solchen 
Tendenzen entgegenwirken und den Künstlern helfen, ihre Vorurteile zu überwinden. 
The Theatre Studies expert, Professor Armin-Gerd Kuckhoff, replies with an admonition 
couched in socio-political terms, reinforcing a Marxist approach: 
Die Frage des Dialekts ist eine Frage der sozialen Zuordnung. Aneignung Schillers 
heißt auch Kampf gegen die Kleinbürgerlichkeit. Die Künstler sollen sich nicht über 
das, was nicht klappt, beschweren, sondern hingehen und ihre Erfahrungen vermitteln. 
Der Kampf um die Sprache gehört zur Erstürmung der Höhen der Kultur.   
The minutes of the meeting furthermore record complaints about a lack of ideologically 
consistent artistic interpretations of Schiller across the GDR and a small working group is 
immediately set up within the Schiller Committee to investigate further. In their defence, 
MfK representatives explain that they cannot interfere in the creative process and can only 
make cautious suggestions and follow up if these are not adopted. This defence is particularly 
noteworthy as it reveals the reality of constraints and even limitations in authority facing 
officials trying to communicate a new, socialist Schiller. Finally, the minutes of the session 
expose political pressure to step back from the original intention of exchanging theatre 
performances across the intra-German border. Indeed, one of the focal aspects of the Cold 
War competition between the two German states was the location of significant places of 
memory in both countries (Dann, 2003, p.119). The Committee instructs that the Weimar 
events are to be promoted as the only true Schiller commemorations; any significant GDR 
involvement in West Germany’s commemorations might create the impression that the events 
in Schiller’s West German birthplace, Marbach, were an all-German commemoration; 
‘keinen unnötigen Glanz’ should be given to those specific events.38 
A comparatively sparse report on the fourth and apparently final session of the Schiller 
Committee on 27 October 1959 registers brief updates from various mass organisations, but 
does not provide further details or critical comments on the actual status at that time. The 
only indication of ongoing problems is a recorded urgent need to support major industrial 
companies with more resources, so as to enable their workforce to become more involved in 
various commemoration events. This would seem to confirm that four months on from the 
July meeting and with only two months to go in 1959, the involvement of workers in the 
commemoration was still not meeting the desired level. The report closes with a consensus 
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for a subsequent review in early 1960, which should also discuss how to popularise German 
classical literature in future years.39  
The DKB files reveal more examples of self-criticism of shortcomings in their main 
contributions to the Schiller bicentenary than most other primary sources researched here. An 
undated communiqué on the Berlin conference does not shy away from registering that 
various speakers at the conference had criticised the lack of uniformity across the country in 
setting up local Schiller committees; this was clearly hindering overall preparations for the 
Schiller commemoration events. In a similar vein, an internal unsigned DKB report looks 
critically at its four speaker conferences. Although deemed to have been successful, both 
organisationally and in terms of overall attendance (some 260 scholars and artists), the 
assessment criticises the content of certain presentations. Speakers are named as having been 
too superficial in their analysis of Schiller’s works or having concentrated narrowly on his 
dramas rather than also covering his poetry. Other presenters are censured for lack of 
reference to the Bitterfelder Weg or failing to emphasise the prevailing policy of preserving 
and appropriating cultural heritage. However, there is no criticism of the fact that only one of 
the four conferences appears to have discussed the differing approaches to Schiller between 
the two German states across the Iron Curtain. This omission seems inconsistent with the 
usual explicit demarcation rhetoric, mentioned elsewhere as being a ubiquitous political 
approach to the Schiller bicentenary as such.40 
2.4.2. The Festwoche and general reception: little to show for all the efforts? 
An emphasis on Abgrenzung to West Germany as the key message may, in contrast, be 
detected in the transcript of a report on the Academic Conference by GDR radio. The highly 
polemical commentary concentrates on contrasting ‘distorted’ West German approaches to 
Schiller with those of the GDR. The broadcast highlights in some detail various major 
differences in scholarly analysis as well as in the interpretations underlying productions of 
the same Schiller dramas in both countries.41 There is no record of any major problems in 
how the conference was executed, nor whether it was judged to have met all original 
purposes. The broadcast mentions only West Germany and Austria as non-socialist countries 
providing delegates to the Schiller conference. The Schiller Declaration had stated clearly: 
‘Die Wirkung von Schillers Werk geht jedoch weit über die nationalen Grenzen hinaus. Sein 
Werk ist der ganzen Menschheit zugehörig’.42 The missed opportunity represented by an 
apparently meagre international participation in this major event suggests that any underlying 
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political wish that the commemoration would significantly contribute to the GDR’s 
international recognition and related legitimacy may not have been achieved in this respect. 
By way of contrast, the postscript to a commemorative Schiller compilation at the time is a 
noteworthy example of a non-confrontational approach that lacks the aggressive tone of 
official cultural rhetoric at the time. In this afterword, Dr. Ursula Wertheim, editor and 
prominent literary scholar, appears to acknowledge that prevailing West German 
interpretations of Schiller in a historical context may exist side by side with an East German 
contemporisation (Wertheim, 1959, p.240): 
Es ist, bei Förderung des Ministeriums für Kultur, das Verdienst des Verlages Neues 
Leben, dass wir dieses Schillerbuch, ein Lesebuch mit Bildern und zeitgenössischen 
Dokumenten, jetzt zum 200. Geburtstag des Dichters vorlegen können. […] Es kam 
darauf an, Schiller als Teilnehmenden an einer großen nationalen und literarischen 
Bewegung zu zeigen, als deren bedeutendste Repräsentant er neben Goethe in jeder 
Epoche anzusehen ist. Nur aus der vollen Berücksichtigung auch der objektiv-
historischen Faktoren im Zusammenhang mit den subjektiv-biografischen ist das 
künstlerische Werk in seiner Zeit gebundenen und zugleich aktuellen Bedeutung, in 
seiner nationalen und zugleich internationalen Wirkung zu begreifen  
The Festakt attracted full GDR media coverage, as might be expected for the official state 
tribute of the bicentenary, attended by many of the most senior SED members, led by Walter 
Ulbricht. After he had stated at the Fifth Party Conference of the SED in July 1958 that the 
workers must strive for ‘die Höhen der Kultur’, the ND newspaper described the Weimar 
events as ‘wahrhaft nationale Ehrung’, through which Schiller had reached ‘bis in die 
Betriebe und selbst in kleinste Dörfer’ (Nutz, 1992). Setting the rhetoric of the main SED 
media organ aside there is otherwise no evidence to suggest that this event received any 
particular attention within the GDR or abroad. Despite its designation as a major event within 
the overall GDR commemorations, the Festakt can best be characterised as a ˈperformative 
ritualˈ, (in the sense of Butler et al., as described in the Introduction chapter), rather than 
adding anything substantially new to the political discourse of other major commemoration 
events such as the Academic Conference. An extract from the keynote speech, entitled 
‘Schillers Menschenbild’, in which Abusch justifies the appropriation of Schiller in terms of 
the ongoing socialist cultural revolution, illustrates this: 
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So ist es heute unsere neue sozialistische Gesellschaft, geführt von der Arbeiterklasse, 
die diese Kluft zwischen Ideal und Wirklichkeit, zwischen Kunst und Leben immer 
schließt und die in ihrem weiteren Übergang zur kommunistischen Gesellschaft auch 
Schillers Traum einer harmonischen Gesellschaft ohne Klassenspaltung verwirklichen 
wird (cited in Roßberg, 2009, pp.156-157). 
The repetitive, predictable format and content of these formal ceremonies, involving largely 
the elite of GDR society rather than a cross-section of the population at large, is therefore at 
best only likely to have been received as underscoring the importance attached by the state to 
the commemoration. It appears unlikely that the Festakt in itself may have otherwise 
contributed meaningfully to the overall objective of promoting national identity amongst the 
citizens of the GDR.  
But formal elements of the Festwoche, such as the Festakt, were not the only aspect of the 
commemoration to reveal potential reception issues. A further primary source confirms the 
perception of an unsatisfactory public resonance to the commemoration as a whole. The early 
signs of poor reception, noted above in May and July by the Schiller Committee, are 
corroborated by the Märkische Volksstimme after the Festwoche in November 1959. The 
newspaper condemns low levels of participation at various bicentenary events by officials 
from cultural, educational and industrial institutions across the town of Brandenburg:  
Vertreter der Abteilung Volksbildung beim Rat der Stadt und beim Rat des Kreises 
glänzten ebenso durch Abwesenheit wie die der Abteilung Kultur, der demokratische 
Block war ebenso wenig vertreten wie der Kreis Friedensfahrt. Von etwa 800 Lehrern 
in Brandenburg waren bestenfalls acht anwesend. Die Werksleiter der VEB hätte man 
ebenso sehen mögen wie die sozialistischen Brigaden und viele andere (cited in 
Roßberg, 2009, p.160). 
2.4.3. Official assessments: offering frank insights into implementation issues and their 
potential origins? 
Four months after the end of the commemoration events, Siegfried Seidel, Leiter der 
Abteilung Literatur und Buchwesen, MfK, wrote to Bodo Uhse, Sekretär der Sektion 
Dichtkunst und Sprachpflege, Deutsche Akademie der Künste (hereafter referred to as 
‘AdK’). Written on behalf of Abusch as Chairman of the Schiller Committee, the letter 
thanks Uhse for his work as member of the Schiller Committee without mentioning any 
specific contributions. The communication does however set out a succinct, retrospective 
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synopsis on how the authorities, in particular the MfK, wanted to describe and record the 
outcome of the Schiller commemorations in its immediate aftermath. 
Mit Genugtuung, ja mit Stolz dürfen wir auf die politischen, wirtschaftlichen und 
kulturellen Erfolge des Jahres 1959, einschließlich der nationalen Schillerehrung 
zurückblicken. Überall in Betrieben, Schulen und Dörfern unserer Deutschen 
Demokratischen Republik haben sich zahlreiche Menschen in den vielfältigsten 
Formen mit dem Dichter und seinem Werk beschäftigt und somit dazu beigetragen, 
dass klassische Kulturerbe unlösbar mit der werdenden sozialistischen Nationalkultur 
zu verbinden. Hierbei war, was wir mit Freude registrieren, besonders stark unsere 
Jugend vertreten.  
Die Nationale Schillerehrung der DDR war eine Angelegenheit des ganzen Volkes. 
Sie hat die ungeteilte Bewunderung aller Teilnehmer und Gäste hervorgerufen und 
bewies der Welt erneut, dass nur in einem friedlichen Deutschland die großen Werte 
der Klassik bewahrt werden können.43 
The overall outcome as presented would seem to satisfy, in general terms, all the official aims 
in the Schiller Declaration and subsequent official rhetoric. However the most remarkable 
feature of this testimonial in the context of the research question, is the specific recognition of 
the link between the GDR’s cultural heritage and its socialist Nationalkultur as a feature of 
the commemorations deserving special mention. The noteworthy implication is, as in the 
corresponding section of the Schiller Declaration, that national identity in the sense of 
national culture is nascent (‘werdend’), in other words it is still in the process of being 
formed. 
In contrast to the positive tone and content of Seidel’s letter, a final assessment by Werner 
Thalheim, Secretary to the Schiller Committee, following on from his interim report reviewed 
above, presents a rather different assessment of the outcomes of the commemorations. A day-
to-day fragmentation of operational authority and competence throughout the Schiller 
commemorations shows up clearly in his eight-page final evaluation, addressed to Siegfried 
Wagner, head of the ZK’s Kulturabteilung.44 Notwithstanding an overall assessment that the 
national commemorations in Weimar, Jena and across the GDR had been successful, 
Thalheim warns about a tendency of public officials to say ‘Ende gut, Alles gut’. He also 
justifies the report by pointing to an apparent unwillingness of the MfK to conduct its own 
critical post mortem of the bicentenary process. Thalheim begins by pronouncing blandly on 
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the political and cultural success of the commemorations for the ‘Junge Arbeiter und Bauern 
Nation’. Echoing official pronouncements on the Schiller year he describes the events as a 
major step: ‘das klassische Erbe unlösbar mit der sozialistischen Nationalkultur zu 
verbinden(ibid.). Referring to strengthening of external political legitimacy as one of the 
crucial objectives of the year, he claims that representatives of sixteen countries (but without 
mentioning from which side of the Iron Curtain) as well as a large number of West German 
visitors can only have been impressed by the artistic and scholarly excellence of events. This 
in turn, according to Thalheim, must finally have removed any doubt as to which German 
state is now the true custodian of German cultural heritage. 
Whereas the positive outcomes from cultural output and activities is summarised in one page, 
under the heading ‘Kritische Wertung’, Thalheim then devotes five pages to the considerable 
organisational weaknesses, and characterises them as being largely invisible:  
[…] es wäre jedoch falsch, sich an diesen Erfolgen zu berauschen und aufgrund der 
positiven Ergebnisse des Schillerjahres die großen Fehler, Schwächen und Mängel zu 
übersehen, die der Arbeit des Schiller-Komitees anhafteten und die nach außen 
wahrscheinlich kaum in Erscheinung getreten sind (ibid.).  
However, in pointing to the apparent success of a widespread renaissance of local Schiller-
related initiatives in 1959 ‘ohne besondere staatliche Lenkung und Planung’, Thalheim 
appears to gloss over his own and SED-led interventions. This distortion can be understood 
as Thalheim preferring to mask the full extent of the weaknesses and personal failings 
(including his own), rather than exaggerate the strength of cultural awareness and 
bicentenary-led promotion of national identity across the GDR.  
The main section of Thalheim’s assessment does however contain a noteworthy ‘mea culpa’ 
confession that he may not have been sufficiently assertive in chasing up operational delays:  
Ich will mit der Kritik an mir selbst beginnen. Meine eigene Arbeit schätze ich so ein, 
daß ich der Aufgabe nicht immer voll gerecht wurde, was politische Notwendigkeit 
und Entschiedenheit in der Durchsetzung bestimmter Forderungen anbelangt. Allzu 
oft habe ich mich von allgemeinen Redensarten und leeren Versprechungen leitender 
Stellen abspeisen lassen, ohne mit Nachdruck Entscheidungen und Termine zu 
verlangen (ibid.).  
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The report goes on to highlight the overall structure of the MfK and its bureaucratic silo 
structure of departments as the common denominator behind most of the issues in the 
implementation of the Schiller commemorations. The MfK had lacked a central liaison 
person to coordinate the various departments, the office of the Schiller Committee and the 
‘politische Kommandostelle des Ministeriums’. In practice, this resulted in having to 
reconcile different opinions between the various departments such as theatre, literature, 
cultural relations and the office of the Minister himself. A good example was the difficulty in 
reaching internal consensus on the guest list for foreign visitors to the major events. Although 
over a hundred potentially influential intellectuals from West Germany had been on an initial 
list, many were unable to attend as they received their invitations either too late or were held 
up by unnecessary delays in the processing of their visitor visas. Similarly, an initiative 
agreed in detail by a senior ministry official and the head of the Schiller Gesellschaft to 
promote student exchanges between Weimar and Stuttgart was subsequently vetoed by the 
Minister and his Secretary of State. More embarrassingly, all these delays are claimed to have 
created an impression in the West that hardly any Schiller related events were being planned 
in the GDR. The Germanist, Professor Müller at the Friedrich-Schiller University in Jena is 
singled out in the report for severe reprimand for having implicitly supported West German 
reactionary elements rather than promoting the national image of the GDR: when asked at a 
Schiller conference in Munich he had attended during the summer of 1959 what was going on 
in the GDR, Professor Müller is quoted by Thalheim (but without citing his source), as 
replying: ‘Das machen dieses Jahr die Marxisten unter sich!’ (ibid.). Another major problem, 
in contrast to similar commemorations such as those organised by the Handel committee in 
1959, was the absence of a properly functioning Parteiaktiv. A named SED member of the 
Schiller Committee, charged with coordinating this group, comes under heavy criticism for 
lack of engagement and commitment. As a result, the leadership role of the party in the whole 
commemoration project had not sufficiently come to the fore. 
Thalheim identifies as ‘gemeinsame Ursache der hier aufgezeigten Mängel, die 
Hauptschwäche bei der Arbeit des Ministeriums für Kultur in der noch stark verbreiteten, 
routinemäßigen und bürokratischen Arbeitsweisen’ (ibid.). However, other than stating 
blandly that ‘Wir brauchen jedoch, um zur gebildeten Nation zu werden, planmäßiges 
Arbeiten und Beständigkeit auf allen Gebieten’ (ibid.), Thalheim stops short of articulating 
any specific lessons learned (ibid.). This might be interpreted as illustrating a politically 
institutionalised unwillingness in the GDR to go beyond criticising the status quo to 
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recommending particular changes for the future. Yet despite expressing a need for closure in 
his covering letter to the report, Thalheim seems to leave open a door for future follow-up 
when he recommends that the party should conduct a collective evaluation of the 
commemorations with all those involved:  
Ich erlaube mir darum, Dir als Anlage eine kurze kritische Einschätzung der Arbeit 
des Schiller-Komitees zu übersenden, und spreche die Hoffnung aus, daß Du die Zeit 
findest, sie zu lesen und mir Deine Meinung dazu zu sagen. Besser wäre es natürlich 
noch, wenn, zumindest auf parteilicher Ebene, eine kollektive Auswertung mit den 
Beteiligten vorgenommen werden könnte, damit die Arbeit nicht nur aktenmäßig, 
sondern auch gedanklich abgeschlossen werden könnte (ibid.). 
In the context of the research question, Thalheim reminds the reader to begin with of the 
fundamental link between the commemorations, cultural heritage and ˈnational cultureˈ. But 
as to how the latter may have been influenced by the commemorations is not referred to 
directly in what follows. Instead, Thalheimˈs above-mentioned interpretation of the missed 
opportunity, caused by avoidable bureaucracy, to attract more foreign visitors offers a 
potential clue to his thoughts on the underlying links: ‘[…] so zeigt das deutlich, welche 
Möglichkeiten wir besaßen, um kulturpolitisch offensiver wirksam zu werden’. Having 
pronounced earlier on the ‘sozialistische Nationalkulturˈ objective, his use of the general 
term, ˈkulturpolitischˈ and the plural form of ˈMöglichkeitˈ may be read as insinuating wider, 
missed opportunities to promote national culture, and thus arguably national identity.  
2.5. CONCLUSION 
Primary sources on the aims, design and implementation of the 1959 Schiller bicentenary 
commemorations discussed in this chapter expose a clear gap between theory and practice – 
between the initial aims of the Schiller Committee, associated SED rhetoric, and the reality of 
late, reactive and inconsistent implementation on the part of GDR stakeholders, resulting in 
mixed outcomes. Initial attempts at the beginning of the bicentenary process to create a 
central message, namely the much touted Schiller Declaration, were only partly successful as 
a basis for a coordinated approach by all official participants in the commemorations. 
Weaknesses in communication, even with regard to effective publicity via state-controlled 
media, raise the question as to whether the preparations would have been more successful had 
they begun rather earlier than the primary sources state. Even repeated interventions by SED 
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officials could only provide sticking-plaster solutions to what appears to have been an 
uncoordinated and narrow-minded bureaucratic implementation at local level. 
Several public pronouncements linked the official humanist interpretation of Schiller to the 
ideal of a new, socialist personality as an ideological framework, an approach that will be 
seen to be repeated in subsequent case study chapters. At first sight, primary data supports the 
conclusion that building national identity was an explicit rather than incidental aim of the 
Schiller bicentenary commemorations; as mentioned above, it does reappear in official 
communications after the commemorations were over. Nevertheless there is more significant 
evidence that a reactive and, at the time, highly visible policy of demarcation to Schiller’s 
perceived treatment in West Germany was the more dominant driver for both the original 
design of the commemorations and the subsequent SED-led interference; this policy was 
apparent throughout the entire period leading up to and including the actual 
commemorations. Although it may be argued that national identity is almost always formed 
with reference to the ‘other’, the negative look over the shoulder to West Germany as a 
defensive discourse thus dictated the Schiller bicentenary rather than positive aspects of a 
new national identity emerging ten years after the founding of the GDR. As will be seen in 
later chapters a changing approach to Abgrenzung did in fact serve to partly promote a more 
positive national identity in the GDR when commemorating other icons of German high 
culture. As regards cultural heritage itself, one specifically contrasting legacy between the 
two German states emerged from the Schiller bicentenary that arguably supports the lasting 
impact of the GDR’s more intensive and politicised approach to Kulturerbe. After 1972, 
Schiller was no longer a mandatory module of German language and literature studies in 
West German schools. In contrast, Schiller was retained in syllabuses at GDR schools until 
the state’s demise (Roßberg, 2009, p.121).  
Recent scholarship proposes that the SED used commemorations, alongside museums, 
monuments and memorials, as part of a long-standing plan deliberately to manipulate popular 
memory, whilst conceding that ‘memory work rarely has immediate, measurable effects on 
collective memory’ (Olsen, 2015, p.4). Commemorations are correctly identified as providing 
‘the opportunity for rituals to reinforce specific memories of historical figures and events’ 
(Olsen, 2015, p.216). On the other hand, detailed research of official files demonstrates that 
the SED leadership, senior government and mass organisation functionaries were handling 
the Schiller bicentenary commemoration as a short-term opportunistic reaction to an ad-hoc 
calendar event, rather than as part of a deliberate, long-term strategy, labelled, rather vaguely, 
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by Olsen in a general commemoration context as ‘memory-work’. Any existing longer-term 
commemoration strategy would be expected to produce distinct signs of continuity in the 
records of that time. Some of the detailed planning documents cited here mention resources 
used four years earlier, and the Schiller Declaration does restate the ideological framework of 
the 1955 anniversary. The inclusion of the Academic Conference and a Festakt indicates a 
continuing basic format for this commemoration. But otherwise there is little data covering 
event planning and execution as such that refers to either the preceding Schiller anniversary 
or to the concurrent Handel celebrations. This apparent omission suggests that the 1959 
commemorations were treated operationally by the authorities as an important but stand-
alone occurrence, rather than one amongst an ongoing series of major anniversary 
commemorations designated for comparable and consistent management. An apparent 
reluctance to document any lessons learned for similar events in the future further supports 
this explanation. 
In her assessment of the SED’s core strategy for implementing its policies, Fulbrook 
observes: 
The party aimed at total penetration and control of social processes, total persuasion 
of all the people, total conformity and outward support.[…] Functionaries and mass 
organisations, in other words “institutional carriers” of the system, such as teachers, 
were of course crucial to the maintenance and reproduction of the system of 
domination (Fulbrook 1995, p.62). 
But the effectiveness of relying on other institutions within the overall state apparatus to 
implement policy changed over time: ‘In the 1950s, the state’s penetration of society by 
functionaries was precarious, tentative, and often unreliable’ (ibid.,p.63). Fulbrook offers a 
plausible social history explanation for this which ties in to the dates of the Schiller 
bicentenary: ‘Many SED members and functionaries were simply not willing to engage in 
local confrontations which might endanger good neighbourly relationships’ (ibid., p.67). 
Relating Fulbrook’s conclusion to several aspects of the Schiller bicentenary encourages 
support for her ˈparticipatory dictatorshipˈ model of the GDR system. At the outset, there was 
a clear intention to impose a top-down approach to how the commemorations were to be 
executed. However, these aims proved to be limited in their effectiveness, thus creating a gap 
between aims and outcomes. This was partly due to late timing, but also to a manifest 
multiplicity of poorly co-ordinated participants exhibiting varying degrees of agency in their 
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response to the presumed control by the Schiller Committee and the SED behind it. This 
initial observation needs to include the caveat that the research in this chapter targets a 
snapshot of GDR history (1958-1959). It is therefore all the more important to investigate and 
compare other similar commemorations over an extended period of GDR history before 
drawing general conclusions on the relevance of cultural commemorations to 
historiographical models of the GDR.  
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3: THE KOLLWITZ CENTENARY, 1967 
 
3.1. INTRODUCTION 
In the context of the four case studies selected for this thesis, the Kollwitz centenary 
commemoration is unique, as the cultural personality commemorated may be categorised as 
‘modern’ rather than ‘classical’. Many of Kollwitz’s contemporaries in the German art world 
were still alive at the time of the anniversary in 1967 and their perspective on her life and 
times can also be interpreted as contemporary testimony. Compared to the first case study 
selected for this thesis, the Kollwitz commemoration in the GDR provides evidence of a 
different ideological framing of her work and personality as the basis for promoting a 
particular national identity in the GDR, combining twentieth-century art and politics.  
An analysis of various primary sources will show that several narratives were used in 
depicting Kollwitz. At times, these contradict rather than complement each other. Three 
sometimes interwoven perspectives of Kollwitz will be shown to have been employed 
throughout the commemorations: culturally, as an artist; socio-politically, as an engaged 
socialist and pacifist; and personally, as a mother and widow. As artist, the construct of 
‘Wegbereiterin des Sozialistischen Realismus’, referring to the dominant art movement in the 
GDR, was in itself challenged at times; socio-political narratives of Kollwitz as ‘Kämpferin 
für das Proletariat’, ‘friend of the USSR’, ‘antifascist and communist’, and ‘pacifist’ are often 
combined and identified within her work and personal diaries. At the same time, all these 
same sources were often characterised as linked to the theme of ‘grieving mother’. This 
chapter will position the elements of this framework, forming part of the aims of the 
commemoration, against her biographical background as selectively interpreted by the 
stakeholders of the commemorations. The chapter will identify whether any – and if so, 
which – narratives became dominant, and whether this was by design or because of a gap 
between theory and reality appearing in the implementation of events. As in the other case 
studies in this thesis, the chapter will seek to identify the outcomes of the Kollwitz centenary, 
and will conclude by attempting to assess the potential impact on national identity within the 
GDR relating to this role-model of German art and socio-political engagement.  
As before, the main research method in this chapter will be textual analysis of archival 
sources in the BArch-SAPMO and AdK archives, as well as press coverage in East and West 
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Germany at the time. Primary sources also include a short documentary film; a detailed 
viewing provides valuable insights into how Kollwitz was portrayed in line with the above 
mentioned narratives. Extensive extracts from Kollwitz’s diaries and letters are quoted 
heavily within the commemoration’s main official speeches, press and documentary film 
coverage, all of which will be also be discussed. A caveat on the value of diaries as a primary 
source should be noted here. Diaries and letters provide factual information and also record 
emotions, both through the subjective prism of the diarist. The Kollwitz letters and diaries 
add value to my research primarily by revealing clues as to how the extracts were edited in 
the GDR in order to support the intended narrative; that is, what was left out by the editors 
becomes as relevant as what was included. The question also arises as to why these personal 
records became so important in the context of this particular commemoration and to what 
extent they were cited as a construction of truth and authenticity to support the framing of 
certain (gendered) narratives. 
Secondary literature on Kollwitz is almost entirely devoted to her artistic work. Scholarship 
on her reception in the GDR is very limited and until recently mainly confined to the wider 
topic of the GDR’s approach to modern art (Goeschen 2001, pp.45-46, 68-77). A new, 
comprehensive biography of Kollwitz includes a short section on her centenary 
commemoration in the GDR. It describes the main events, concluding that Kollwitz’s status 
in the GDR remained unchanged by the commemoration (Schymura, 2014, pp.361-369). My 
research will look in more analytical depth at the aims, implementation and outcomes of the 
events, based on a wider selection of primary sources – all in the context of the research 
question concerning the formation of national identity.  
Kunstpolitik played a central role in the GDR’s official cultural policies. In the years up until 
1953 it was predominantly formed by normative cultural policies and corresponding 
organisational structures prevailing in the Soviet Union. From the beginning of the GDR, 
however, there were clear signs of a persistent policy of cultural Abgrenzung, a demarcation 
to West Germany, contributing to the promotion of a separate national identity for the GDR 
(Lippke, 2000, pp.476-478, 552).45 The German tradition of Proletarian Art, stretching back 
to the first two decades of the twentieth century, remained popular after the Second World 
War. In the early years of GDR cultural politics it was publicly resisted by prominent SED 
officials such as Wilhelm Girnus, head of the section Fine Arts and Literature in the ZK 
(Goeschen, 2001, pp.46-47). The ZK thus proclaimed a core policy in May 1951: ‘Der 
Kampf gegen den Formalismus in der Kunst und Literatur, für eine fortschrittliche Deutsche 
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Kultur.’ Kollwitz was initially a target in this official campaign, despite her prestigious status 
of having been a highly visible opponent and victim of Nazism. Although her works had 
already been widely exhibited in the first years of the GDR, she began to attract criticism 
from several hardline artists and intellectuals for her almost-exclusive artistic focus on the 
poor and deprived sections of society. Her hitherto widely-accepted status as a trailblazer for 
Socialist Realism was questioned by an anonymous critic, using the fictitious name 
‘N.Orlow’.46 Orlow’s identity attracted considerable speculation at the time and later, and is 
now thought to have been Kurt Magritz, a well-known, influential editor (Schymura, 2014, 
p.335). His published criticisms of Proletarian Art also extended to the theatre. Orlow’s 
charge stated: ‘Die Fürsprecher des Häßlichen in der Malerei suchen zuweilen Käthe 
Kollwitz als ihre Vorläuferin und als Stammutter der proletarischen Kunst in Deutschland 
darzustellen’. Orlow went on to assert that Kollwitz could not be that role model as she had 
grown up in a bourgeois, social background and had only viewed workers as the suffering 
class (Schymura, 2014, pp.336-341). 
By late 1953, Kollwitz was fully rehabilitated (Goeschen 2001, p.66). The negative portrayal 
of Kollwitz as a bourgeois philanthropist was abandoned, thanks to wide support from certain 
artists and intellectuals within the AdK. By the time of her birth centenary, as will be seen in 
this case study, it was above all the artist and contemporary of Kollwitz, Lea Grundig, and 
the art historian, Heinz Lüdecke, who emerged during the planning and implementation 
phases of her centenary commemorations as long-term proponents of the above-mentioned 
competing narratives on Kollwitz. 
3.2. AIMS 
In the following I will consider what the available primary sources can tell us about the 
planning process of the Kollwitz centenary commemoration in the GDR; was it fit for 
purpose in terms of timing and scope, and is there any evidence of lessons learned from 
previous commemorations? Was a consistent ideological framework developed and 
communicated? Is there an indication of SED interventions and, if so, what were the reasons?  
3.2.1. Planning the commemoration: brief and simple 
The process for designing the format and content of the centenary activities was short in 
duration and more straightforward than for the other three commemorations researched in this 
thesis. This is a reflection of both the relatively modest scale of the commemorations as well 
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as the undisputed lead role of the institution taking primary responsibility for almost all of the 
activities. As in the other case studies, an official committee was formed which needed to 
meet only twice, in late April and mid-June 1967, to agree the overall plans and oversee a 
smaller working group. The size of the committee was almost half that of equivalent 
committees in the other case studies, another indication of the dimension of the Kollwitz 
commemoration. Behind the scenes, the SED can be seen to have taken an observer role in 
the process. Unlike the DKB’s lead role in the preceding Schiller commemorations, the AdK 
was the GDR organisation responsible for coordinating the Kollwitz centenary. As will be 
seen, the AdK’s quasi-ownership of the centenary commemoration, through its Fachgruppe 
Bildende Kunst, is documented as being logical, especially as Kollwitz had been a long-time, 
prominent member of the AdK’s predecessor institution, the Preußische Akademie der 
Künste (referred to hereafter as the ‘Akademie’) before the Second World War. Although this 
particular cultural commemoration was publicly led by the AdK, the SED’s ultimate 
influence and notional control can be found in a formal ZK resolution: ‘Bei der Vorbereitung 
und Durchführung der Käthe Kollwitz Ehrung arbeitet die AdK zusammen mit dem 
Ministerium für Kultur und der Partei und dem Staatssekretariat für das Hoch- und 
Fachschulwesen.’47 
Compared to the late starting preparations for the Schiller bicentenary, the first plans for this 
commemoration emerged rather earlier, before the centenary year began. As early as 1962, 
Otto Nagel, the AdK’s most senior representative at the time, tried to set the preparations in 
motion but was turned down without any reason other than timing by the MfK’s (then) 
Minister, Alexander Abusch:  
Sehr verehrter Genosse Präsident, ich danke Ihnen sehr für Ihr Schreiben vom 
18.5.1962, mit dem sie auf den 100. Geburtstag von Käthe Kollwitz im Jahr 67 
verweisen. Ich erachte es für notwendig daß zur Vorbereitung des 100. Geburtstages 
der großen Künstlerin ein Komitee gebildet wird, halte es jedoch für verfrüht, dies 
jetzt zu tun.48 
The AdK member Heinz Lüdecke subsequently recommended in May 1966 that a 
commemoration should take place, comprising a relatively small number of events and 
projects focussing on Kollwitz’s birthday on 8 July 1967, in order to make best use of 
available cultural resources (Schymura, 2014, p.361). There is no record of a specific 
immediate response to the AdK’s renewed initiative but the AdK archive contains a 
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noteworthy letter to Dr Karl Hossinger, Director of the AdK, later to be appointed Secretary 
to the centenary’s organising Kollwitz Committee. An individual named Lüebbecke, who 
appears to have been previously closely associated with the fine arts section of the AdK, is 
highly critical of the MfK and its ability to work with the AdK. The letter echoes the earlier 
correspondence between Abusch and Nagel, and the subsequent evaluation report of the 
Schiller Committee. It confirms a repeated pattern of tension and dysfunctionality between 
the MfK and cultural officials outside government which cannot have been beneficial for the 
smooth execution of the commemorations:  
Bitte, verzeih, daß ich mich als der Privatmann, der ich nun bin, in Sachen hineindränge, 
die mich nichts mehr angehen! Aber ich möchte doch sagen: die Zusammenarbeit mit 
dem Ministerium für Kultur erweist sich wieder einmal, wie schon so oft, als unmöglich, 
jedenfalls auf dem Gebiet der bildenden Kunst. Ich würde an deiner Stelle keine Zeit und 
Nervenkraft darauf verschwenden, das Ministerium zu irgendwas zu bekehren, daß es 
nicht will. Die AdK ist vom Ministerium für Kultur unabhängig und braucht sich nicht 
darum zu kümmern, was man dort möchte oder nicht möchte […]. Die AdK sollte sich 
aus dieser Bürokraten-Hysterie heraushalten, sich klar und zielbewusst etwas vornehmen, 
was sie selber durchführen kann, und nicht mehr fragen oder verhandeln. Bei der 
Behandlung der Käthe-Kollwitz Angelegenheit durch die Regierungsstellen, soweit ich 
sie miterlebt habe, besteht nun ernstlich die Gefahr, daß zum 100. Geburtstag der großen 
Künstlerin in der DDR überhaupt nichts mehr geschieht, weil keiner zuständig sein will. 
Das wäre eine Schande.49 
Whether or not it was related to perceived late timing issues surrounding the Schiller 
bicentenary, the AdK seemed very keen to assume responsibility for ensuring that 
preparations for the Kollwitz commemorations got under way. In October 1966, the AdK 
once again took an early initiative by offering assistance to the Ministerium für Post-und 
Fernmeldewesen in designing a special commemorative postage stamp for the upcoming 
Kollwitz centenary. 
Despite the scope of the commemoration being more limited than for the Schiller bicentenary 
in 1959, the events as such were similarly important in terms of those involved. As for past 
major commemorations, an official coordinating committee, the ‘Käthe-Kollwitz-Komittee’ 
(hereafter referred to as the ‘Kollwitz Committee’) was formed, comprising the relevant 
political, government and cultural organisations. Within this committee, four representatives 
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of the AdK, the MfK, the major Berlin museums and the Humboldt University, respectively, 
took on the role of ‘Arbeitssekretariat’ (hereafter referred to as working group). A formal 
meeting of this working group met on 14 March 1967 to agree recommendations for the 
membership of the Kollwitz Committee, as well as a four-page draft resolution outlining the 
purpose and content of the commemoration events.50  
This subsequent ‘Beschluß über die Käthe-Kollwitz-Ehrung 1967’, adopted by the Kollwitz 
Committee at its first meeting on 28th April, became the key planning document for the 
centenary.51 The final composition of the twenty-eight member committee, contained in an 
appendix to the resolution, mostly followed the working group’s recommendations. The SED 
party and government were represented at a senior level through the Minister of Culture, 
Klaus Gysi, as a Kollwitz Committee member, and his predecessor, Alexander Abusch, as its 
chairman. The FDGB mass organisation, which was to be actively involved in publicising the 
centenary, was included as on other similar major commemoration committees. The FDJ was 
missing, although the inclusion of the head of a Berlin school on the Kollwitz Committee 
may be interpreted as ostensibly addressing youth interests. 
3.2.2. Aims and Ideological Framework: Socialist Realism, social progress, solidarity 
with the Soviet Union 
The resolution adopted by the Kollwitz Committee is significant when it comes to identifying 
the aims of this particular commemoration and the way in which Kollwitz was to be framed. 
The opening section of the resolution sets out briefly the objectives of the commemoration. 
Crucial aspects of Kollwitz’s life and work are picked out: her artistic contribution to the 
post-1945 art form of Social Realism, her political activism on behalf of the working class 
and her connection with the Soviet Union: 
Käthe Kollwitz gehört zu den Begründern der sozialistisch-realistischen Kunst in 
Deutschland. Die Skala ihres Schaffens reicht von der Darstellung des Großen 
Deutschen Bauernkrieges und des kämpfenden Proletariats bis zu ihren 
eindrucksvollen Grafiken und Plastiken für den Frieden, gegen den Krieg. Die 
meisterhafte künstlerische Kraft ihrer Werke und ihre innerparteiliche Stellungnahme 
für den gesellschaftlichen Fortschritt hatte große nationale und internationale 
Wirkung. Die Solidarität von Käthe Kollwitz mit der Sowjetunion und die erste 
Ausstellung ihrer Werke in der Sowjetunion 1924 ließen sie auch einen deutlichen 
Einfluss auf die sowjetische Kunst ausüben (ibid.). 
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In contrast to the other commemorations researched in this thesis, there is a remarkable 
absence of any explicit reference to Kollwitz’s status and reception in the West, and West 
Germany in particular. However, the lack of an accompanying hostile message towards West 
Germany, widely employed in the Schiller bicentenary and (later) Beethoven 
commemoration, does not imply any lesser claim to GDR exclusivity than those 
commemorations. Kollwitz’s work and legacy is linked to the realism of contemporary GDR 
artists, with an implied contrast to the widely differing styles, including abstract, of 
contemporary West German artists: ‘Ihr Schaffen ist ein lebendiges Erbe für die Künstler der 
DDR, in deren realistische Werke das künstlerische Vermächtnis von Käthe Kollwitz 
eingeflossen ist (ibid.).’  
A Marxist-Leninist framework, such as was set out at the time of the Schiller bicentenary, is 
less openly referenced in the resolution. Nonetheless, many aspects of her centenary in the 
GDR portray Kollwitz as an exemplary humanist and politically engaged artist, thus serving 
as a role model for a socialist GDR society. An incident relating to one aspect of the 
commemoration project demonstrates this. Shortly before the main commemoration events of 
July 1967, the Kollwitz Committee secretary, Dr. Hossinger, complained formally to the 
Committee’s chairman, Alexander Abusch, that the Deutsche Post der DDR was about to 
issue the commemorative postage stamp without prior consultation with either the AdK or the 
Committee regarding the design.52 The main gist of the complaint was that the stamp was 
based on a third-party portrait. Instead, according to Hossinger, the Deutsche Post should 
have used one of Kollwitz’s more politically appropriate self-portraits in order to comply 
with the ideological aims of the commemoration:  
Die Qualität des Stiches selbst ist sehr gut. Die Darstellung der Käthe Kollwitz aber 
weicht wesentlich von der Vorstellung aufgrund ihres eigenen Selbstbildnisses ab. 
Insbesondere wird sie alt, sentimental und leidend dargestellt und nicht als die große 
Künstlerin und Kämpferin als die sie für uns weiterlebt (ibid.).  
A later West German biographer amplifies Kollwitz’s unsentimental approach to her self-
portraits: ‘Auffallend ist die Tatsache, daß gerade ihre Selbstbildnisse meist kühler, 
distanzierter, verhaltener im Ausdruck sind als ihre anderen, so betont emotionalen Werke.’ 
(Krahmer, 1981, p.13) The postage stamp incident illustrates how, in their efforts to comply 
with the ideological aims of the commemoration, the authorities attempted to project a 
different self-image to the one that the artist herself may arguably have intended. 
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The resolution also refers to Kollwitz’s interventions on behalf of the Soviet Union in the 
1920’s and 1930’s in the context of the coincidental fiftieth anniversary of the Russian 
revolution in the Kollwitz centenary year. The key official resolution (‘Beschluß über die 
Käthe-Kollwitz-Ehrung 1967’) states: ‘Die Ehrung ist so konzipert, daß sie gleichzeitig ein 
Beitrag zum 50. Jahrestag der Großen Sozialistischen Oktoberrevolution wird.’  
The remainder of the resolution is devoted to listing the key components of the 
commemoration events described in more detail in the next section of this chapter: Neither 
the resolution nor the preceding working group meeting record any official plans to publicise 
the Kollwitz centenary through an official statement and through harnessing the media, as 
was the case for the Schiller commemoration. In the same context, there is also no mention of 
specific educational activities for the centenary, whether at school or in the workplace. The 
absence of similar explicit and proactive policies to that of other commemorations suggests 
an official approach that was relatively relaxed and comparatively low-key. It points to a 
consensus among the organisers of viewing Kollwitz as a personality already well-established 
in the GDR. Being already ‘one of us’ meant therefore being able to dispense with 
communication and educational initiatives otherwise needed to deliver a politically-inspired 
appropriation of a major cultural personality. 
Heinz Lüdecke emerges from this and several other primary sources cited later in this chapter 
as the central and most influential contributor to the Kollwitz centenary commemorations. 
But although his approach mainly conforms to the official ideological framework, there are 
indications of considerable independence of thought and action. This in turn illustrates 
weaknesses in the AdK as coordinator fully imposing its concept and execution of the events. 
In a lengthy letter to Eduard Claudius, Vizepresident der AdK, Lüdecke distances himself 
from a key component of the Kollwitz Committee’s formal resolution and the overall 
ideological framework as such in terms of Kollwitz’s political and artistic portrayal. 
Referring firstly to her alleged expulsion by the Nazis in 1933 from the AdK’s predecessor 
institution, he clarifies that she and the author, Heinrich Mann, resigned voluntarily. This was 
after Kollwitz had been persuaded by fellow members that because the whole academy was 
threatened with dissolution by the new regime she and Mann should consider resigning. More 
importantly he takes issue with the exaggerated, as he sees it, positioning of Kollwitz in the 
resolution as a ‘Begründer der sozialistischen-realistischen Kunst in Deutschland’. He warns 
that most readers will take this as referring to the later art movement as a method rather than 
stating, more accurately, that her works were realistic in style and socialist in message. So he 
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pleads in remarkably strong language for honesty and precision, particularly in terms of the 
GDR’s external credibility and reputation:  
Ich bin der Meinung, daß es von Käthe Kollwitz so viel Großes und Gutes zu 
berichten gibt, daß wir sämtliche Verzierungen oder Übertreibungen, die 
Kompliziertheit der Vorgänge und des Wesens der Künstlerin verleugnen, nicht nötig 
haben. Wir machen uns mit solchen Phrasen vor der Weltöffentlichkeit 
unglaubwürdig. […] Haben wir derartige Taschenspielerkunststücke nötig? Ich 
glaube daran, daß die stärkste Waffe der Kommunisten im Kampf der Meinungen und 
Ideologien die unbedingte Sauberkeit, Ehrlichkeit und Exaktheit ist.53 
Lüdecke was thus able to put forward his corrected version of Kollwitz’s resignation in his 
official AdK pamphlet, discussed later. However, the Kollwitz Committee retained their 
reference to Kollwitz and Socialist Realism in their invitation letter for the academic 
conference organised as part of the centenary in November 1967: ‘Die Konferenz soll 
Beiträge zu einem vertieften Marxistischen Bild von der Kunstgeschichte des 20. 
Jahrhunderts, insbesondere vom Lebenswerk der Begründerin des sozialistischen Realismus 
in der deutschen bildenden Kunst.’ If anything the tension between Lüdecke and the AdK is 
more visible here, as Kollwitz appears to have been promoted in the space of three months 
from one of the founders of Socialist Realism to the founder of the movement.54 
A lack of consistent, ongoing political involvement in the planning of the centenary is 
evidenced by the record of the only other formal meeting of the Kollwitz Committee, on 14 
June 1967, less than four weeks before the main events.55 The twelve (out of the original 
twenty-eight) members who attended were all representatives of cultural and academic 
institutions. There was a complete absence of government or senior party individuals, 
including the Kollwitz Committee’s chair and deputy chair. Even Lüdecke chose to absent 
himself, claiming in a postcard to the Kollwitz Committee: ‘An der organisatorischen Arbeit, 
deren Wichtigkeit ich nicht unterschätze, kann ich mich nicht beteiligen, und demzufolge 
wäre es nutzlos, wenn ich zu Ihrer Arbeitstagung erschiene. MfG.’ To which an unknown 
recipient of the postcard noted in handwriting, ‘Unverschämtheit!’– suggesting perhaps that 
Lüdecke was arrogant.56 Despite these examples of agency exercised by Lüdecke, the most 
influential intellectual amongst others in the AdK involved in the commemorations, there is 
no evidence in the files to indicate that the SED interfered in this or the subsequent 
implementation phase of the commemoration. This may be interpreted as senior officials, 
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such as those within the ZK, Abteilung Kultur, not sensing any threat to their authority or 
party discipline – all the more plausible in a relatively low-profile, domestically-focussed 
commemoration, in contrast to the Schiller bicentenary, for example, and its external, 
demarcation aspects.  
3.3. IMPLEMENTATION 
This section examines the main components of the Kollwitz centenary commemoration, how 
they were implemented and to what extent they consistently reflected the aims described 
above. The five key groups of activity were firstly, media representations (as a 
commemorative activity in and of themselves); secondly, formal events, including wreath-
laying ceremonies and a Festakt on Kollwitz’s birthday, 8 July 1967; thirdly, a short 
documentary, produced by DEFA, on the life and works of Kollwitz; fourthly, July 
exhibitions in Berlin and Moscow entitled ‘Käthe Kollwitz und ihre Zeitgenossen’; and 
lastly, scholarly output, led by the AdK, including a keynote pamphlet by Heinz Lüdecke and 
an academic conference in November 1967 on developments in socialist art.  
3.3.1. Framing the implementation and reception of formal events: was the GDR media 
in agreement? 
Although the AdK took the lead in planning and executing the Kollwitz centenary 
commemorations, there are relatively few documents in the AdK, nor in the MfK and SED 
files, that provide meaningful evidence on how the formal events were carried out. In this 
case study I will therefore look primarily at media coverage at the time and how they, the 
media, framed the events. A media analysis that will continue in the Outcomes section will 
allow appropriate data to be identified on how the formal events tied in with the initial 
official ideological framework and how that conclusion may affect the overarching research 
question of national identity and the related historiography debate.  
A general system of delegated press self-censorship had evolved by the late 1960s, based on 
expected standards of behaviour that were understood by journalists and editors (Barck, 1999, 
pp.213-214). Comprehensive censorship was therefore for the most part unnecessary in order 
to control content. However, when it came to the design of the commemoration, a multi-level 
planning structure existed to ensure that the agreed ideological framework could be easily 
disseminated (ibid., p.217). Anniversaries were ‘an obvious example of how the SED, 
through its ZK, Abteilung Agitation und Propaganda, could effectively plan many of its 
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papers’ headlinesˈ (Childs, 1983, pp.229-30). This system applies to each of the four case 
studies in this thesis. 
 
Shortly before the centenary year, a regional newspaper published a two-column homage to 
Kollwitz.57 The author, Monika Säglitz, outlines three connected themes that were to feature 
in the centenary’s subsequent media treatment. In contrast to the official narratives set out as 
described above, she opens with motherhood, and its repeated use crystallises the tone for the 
entire tribute: 
 
Eine Mutter, die sich schmerzerfüllt abwendet, weil sie das Leid ihrer hungernden 
Kinder nicht mehr ertragen kann; die Kleinen, sich an den Rock der Mutter 
klemmend, mit flehenden Augen um Nahrung bittend und darunter mit einfacher 
klarer Schrift nur das eine Wort: ‘Brot’! Dieses Bild, daß Mitleid, Mütterlichkeit, 
Anklage und leidenschaftlichen Protest ausdrückt, charakterisiert das Schaffen von 
Käthe Kollwitz. (ibid.).  
Kollwitz’s gender is also linked to the second theme – her bourgeois background: 
Die Künstlerin wurde am 8. Juli 1867 in einer bürgerlichen Familie geboren […]. 
Später nahm sie, da die Akademie ihr als Frau nicht zugänglich war, privaten 
Malunterricht in Berlin und München. Bei ihren Streifzügen nach interessanten und 
lobenswerten Motiven entdeckte sie das harte und freudlose Leben der unteren 
Volksschichten, ein Leben, das dem ihren so völlig fremd war. (ibid.).  
A third, evidently socio-political theme provides the conclusion to this assessment of 
Kollwitz; the tension between her residual bourgeois attachment and her identification with 
socialism:  
Wenn Käthe Kollwitz auch die Fesseln der bürgerlichen Gesellschaft nie ganz 
sprengen konnte, so stand sie doch mit ihrer großen Kunst immer auf der Seite der 
unterdrückten und erkannte ihr großes Ziel, den Sozialismus, an: ‘Darum bin ich mit 
ganzem Herzen für einen radikalen Schluss des Irrsinns und erwarte nur vom 
Weltsozialismus etwas.’ (ibid.).  
At the end, Säglitz qualifies a reference in Kollwitz’s diary to global, rather than German 
socialism. She leaves the GDR reader with a connection between the timing of Kollwitz’s 
death and the subsequent transition from fascism to the ‘new beginnings’ of socialism: ‘Sie 
starb am 22. April 1945 in Moritzburg bei Dresden, ohne den Untergang des Faschismus und 
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ohne den Neubeginn erlebt zu haben.’ This approach was echoed by subsequent reporting in 
the year of the centenary (ibid.).  
The GDR newspaper coverage in 1967 concentrated on the three-day events centred around 
Kollwitz’s birthday in July, including the Festakt, and two wreath laying ceremonies in 
Berlin. The preceding months of 1967 had seen only a brief newspaper report of a Kollwitz 
exhibition in Belgium58 and a short account of an AdK plenary session, confirming approval 
of key factual aspects of the centenary events by Alexander Abusch, as Chairman of the 
Kollwitz Committee.59 
The Festakt on Kollwitz’s birthday, 8 July 1967, appears to have been a relatively modest 
replication of similar ceremonies at other cultural commemorations.60 The printed invitation 
only lists the main hosts, Klaus Gysi, Minister of Culture, as senior representative of 
government and party; Alexander Abusch, his predecessor as Minister, and now the 
Chairman of the Kollwitz Committee, and Eduard Claudius, President of the AdK. On the 
day of the Festakt, ND provided the defining GDR media reporting and commentary on 
Kollwitz for her centenary commemoration. The newspaper devoted its entire culture section 
to articles by representatives of the AdK and the GDR Fine Arts community. The full page 
spread also included extracts from Kollwitz’s published diaries and letters.61 Lea Grundig 
begins her lead article with a political reference. She equates the highly prominent position of 
Kollwitz in German art to that of Gorky in Russian literature in his equally iconic depiction 
of the oppressed proletariat possessing the means to liberate itself:  
Wir feiern heute den 100. Geburtstag von Käthe Kollwitz, der großen Meisterin, die 
für die deutsche bildende Kunst so viel bedeutet wie Gorki für die russische Literatur. 
In ihrem Werk wird zum ersten Mal das Proletariat nicht nur unterdrückt und leidend 
dargestellt, sondern als die Klasse, die als einzige die Kraft hat, sich zu befreien und 
damit alle Unterdrückung aufzuheben (ibid.).  
The representation of Kollwitz in this tribute becomes more complex, as Grundig point outs 
in the next sentence that Kollwitz was engaged with wider human issues: ‘ …und doch ist ihr 
Hauptthema Leiden, Unterdrückung und auch Kampf.’ Grundig does not hide the political 
ambivalence of Kollwitz’s refusal to identify formally with any specific organised socialist or 
communist party, despite her professed political leanings: ‘Sie spricht abweisend von 
Parteiwesen, und doch sind es wenige, ganz wenige Künstler, die so absolut und unbedingt 
wie sie Partei ergriffen haben’ (ibid.). The political positioning in Kollwitz’s biography 
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becomes further complicated by Grundig’s repeated mention of her bourgeois origins: ‘Käthe 
Kollwitz kam aus einem bürgerlichen Hause. Ihr Weg zur Arbeiterklasse war kein einfacher 
Entscheid. In ihren Tagebuchaufzeichnungen spiegeln sich ihr Kämpfe im Schwanken 
zwischen Idee und Wirklichkeit wieder. Die idealistische Auffassung hat es ihr schwer 
gemacht’ (ibid.). It is Kollwitz’s personal qualities as protective woman and mother that then 
visibly dominate the tribute: ‘Mutter und Kind ‒ sie sind das Zentrum ihres gesamten 
Werkes. Die Mutter im weitesten, größten Sinne als die Bewahrerin des Lebens, als die 
Beschützerin der Kinder. In ihrem großen Frühwerk, im Weberzyklus, ist da die Frau an der 
Wiege (ibid.).’  
 
For Grundig, these qualities are as relevant to understanding Kollwitz’s persona as the 
headline that dominates the entire page: ‘Kühne Verfechterin revolutionärer Künste’. This 
epithet suggests a one-dimensionally bold advocate, whereas Grundig transmits a 
contradictory image of Kollwitz as a politically hesitant artist. She quotes Kollwitz:  
 
[…] die Loslösung vom Reformismus der SPD war für Käthe Kollwitz ein 
schmerzhafter Prozess. Es drängt sie, den Arbeitern die Erinnerung an den 15. Januar 
1919 zum Geschenk zu machen. Verwirrungen und Unsicherheit machen sie 
schwankend. Sie schreibt noch am 2. Oktober 1920 in ihr Tagebuch ‘Man hätte mich 
eben ganz in aller Stille lassen sollen. Man kann ja auch von einem Künstler, der noch 
dazu Frau ist, nicht erwarten, dass er sich in diesem wahnsinnig komplizierten 
Verhältnissen zurechtfindet’ (ibid.).  
 
Grundig does not speculate whether Kollwitz’s phrasing of ‘…noch dazu Frau…’ may have 
been intended to be ironic. However, in describing her death with repeated references to 
Kollwitz’s gender, Grundig might herself be understood to have taken Kollwitz’s earlier 
quote at face value: ‘In Moritzburg bei Dresden, wenige Tage vor Kriegsende, ist. sie 
gestorben. Die alte Frau, die in dem kleinen Ort Still erlosch, hatte ihre Werte in der ganzen 
Welt. […] Für die Heimbürgin in Moritzburg war die alte Frau nicht mehr als die anderen 
Toten des 22. April 1945: Eine alte Frau, die von außerhalb gekommen war’ (ibid.). 
A quarter of the whole page is taken up by a reproduction of Kollwitz’s drawing, ‘Empor 
zum Licht’, one of the items selected for the centenary exhibition. Hans Fehsel, a graphic 
artist in the GDR, provides a short commentary on the background to this work. In line with 
Grundig, Fehsel emphasises Kollwitz as woman and mother as explanation for her legacy, 
both in Germany and beyond: ‘Sie wollte ‘‘wirken in ihrer Zeit’’ diese geniale, 
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unvergleichliche Frau mit dem großen, mitfühlenden, mütterlichen, gütigen Herzen, voller 
Liebe den Bedrängten und Liebenswerten zugewandt und voller Hass den Peinigern, 
Menschenverderbern abgeneigt’ (ibid.). Fehsel closes his article by summarising Kollwitz’s 
legacy: ‘Sie wirkte mit ihrer großen Kunst als Erzieherin der Gefühle nicht nur in ihrer Zeit. 
Sie wirkt weiter, stärker denn je, auf deutschem Boden wie in Griechenland, Vietnam wie in 
Nahost.’ (ibid.). Fehsel chooses notably to say ‘deutschem Boden’ rather than ‘DDR Boden’, 
thus inferring a contemporary and universal pertinence to her political legacy, even in West 
Germany.  
As a third contributor to the ND section, Heinrich Scheel, historian and Vice-President of the 
AdK, also prefers to refer to Kollwitz by gender rather than as an artist in an account of his 
correspondence with Kollwitz during the Second World War: ‘Die grossherzige Frau, von 
den Faschisten aus der Akademie der Künste entfernt und in ihrer künstlerischen Tätigkeit 
gewaltsam eingeschränkt’ (ibid.). In 1938 Kollwitz had corresponded with a friend of Scheel. 
Responding to the friend’s request for a signed print, Kollwitz had sent him a copy of an 
earlier drawing of the same subject. After Scheel’s friend was killed as soldier in 1941, 
Scheel inherited the drawing and the friend’s correspondence with Kollwitz. Scheel contacted 
her to ask whether he could keep these items. Scheel cites extracts from his subsequent 
exchange of letters with Kollwitz, focussing on her pacifist denunciation of the ongoing war: 
‘Diese Zeit ist so schwer zu tragen! Damals im Weltkrieg schrieb Stefan George: ‘‘es geht 
ein Krachen durch den jungen Wald’’ ‒ und jetzt geht wieder ein Krachen durch den jungen 
Wald […]. Wir brauchen doch die Jugend, wir brauchen das Leben der Jugend.’ (ibid.). 
Scheel praises Kollwitz’s courage in writing to him explicitly as a complete stranger. Above 
all he stresses the motivational value of her letter to him and his fellow resistance fighters:  
Zweierlei mag dem Leser heute bei der Lektüre dieses Briefes auffallen. Zum ersten 
antwortete Kollwitz einem ihr bis dahin völlig Unbekannten, zum anderen schrieb sie 
unter den Bedingungen des faschistischen Terrors, der jede Spur einer Kritik des 
verbrecherischen Krieges blutig verfolgte. Beide Gesichtspunkte mussten die ja nicht 
unbekannten Beschreibungen veranlassen, ihre Worte mit einiger Vorsicht zu setzen. 
Und dennoch! Wer ihrer künstlerischen Arbeiten kannte, dem offenbarte sie sich auch 
in diesen Zeilen ganz unmittelbar. Am Kreise der Widerstandskämpfer, die ich 
angehörte und dem ich den Brief bekannt machte, wurden die Worte von Kollwitz, als 
Bestätigung und Ansporn aufgefasst, im Kampf gegen den imperialistischen Krieg 
des deutschen Faschismus das letzte zu wagen (ibid.).  
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The reader will have noted that this account encourages identification with the official 
construction of the GDR in terms of its formation in the late 1940s. Scheel draws a direct line 
between Kollwitz and the antifascist heritage of the GDR, which was integral to official 
constructions of national identity. 
Finally, the extracts from her diaries and letters in this edition of ND seem to have been 
selected to draw out additional political aspects of Kollwitz’s life, including her pacifism:  
Ich habe immer wieder versucht, den Krieg zu gestalten. Ich konnte es nie fassen. 
Jetzt endlich habe ich eine Folge von Holzschnitten fertig gebracht, die einigermaßen 
das sagen, was ich sagen wollte. Es sind sechs Blätter: das Opfer – die freiwilligen – 
die Eltern – die Mütter – die Witwen – das Volk. Diese Blätter sollen in alle Welt 
wandern und sollen allen Menschen zusammenfassend sagen: so war es ‒ das haben 
wir alle getragen durch diese unaussprechlich schweren Jahre. (letter to Romain 
Rolland, 23 October 1922): 
Her humane commitment to publicise the victims of hunger is displayed in her diary of 5 
January 1920, reprinted in ND: 
Ich habe wieder ein Plakat zu machen übernommen, eine große Hilfsaktion für Wien. 
Ich will den Tod machen. Wie er die Hungerpeitsche schwingt und tief gebückt, 
schreiend und stöhnend die Menschen, Frauen, Kinder, Männer an ihm vorbeiziehen. 
(ibid.). 
Lastly, the image of Kollwitz embracing, in the words of her diary of 31 December 1917, the 
new force for the good in the Russian revolution, provides the ND editors with an arguably 
fortuitous allusion to the fiftieth anniversary of the revolution in the same year as Kollwitz’s 
centenary:  
Was hat dieses Jahr gebracht, was hat es genommen? Es war schwer und ernst wie die 
beiden anderen Kriegsjahre […] Gegeben hat es neue Ausblicke durch Russland. Und 
da ist etwas Neues in die Welt gekommen, was mir entschieden vom Guten zu sein 
scheint (ibid.).  
These extracts are placed in a separate box of only half a column out of the total six columns 
of text within the page. Although visually understated, the extracts are important in 
suggesting an authentic image of Kollwitz that both reinforces and expands on Grundig’s 
lengthier tribute and Scheel’s anecdotal contribution.  
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In short, the key narratives on Kollwitz in this ND coverage on the main anniversary date are 
of a politically-engaged fighter for pacifist and working-class causes and of an antifascist 
with links to the USSR. All these elements can be clearly linked to a specific vision of GDR 
national identity. It is these elements rather than the lesser, interwined narratives of 
‘Wegbereiterin des Sozialistischen Realismus’ and grieving mother that dominate here. 
3.3.2. The public events: repeating the reactive, unoriginal approach of the Schiller 
bicentenary? 
As with the 1959 Schiller celebrations, the minutes of the final planning meeting reveal 
problems that may be attributed to an inconsistent handling of the planning process over 
preceding months.62 Several action points thus pre-empt a low turnout in the official July 
events. The Kollwitz Committee itself is called upon to publicise the Festakt and other public 
events surrounding 8 July 1967: ‘Um einen guten Besuch der Festveranstaltung in Berlin zu 
sichern, wurden die Mitglieder des Kollwitz Komitees gebeten, die Werbung zu 
unterstützen’(ibid.). But there is not only an issue with public awareness of the main events; a 
perceived lack of public involvement is addressed by adding, late in the day, a new event to 
the commemoration ceremonies: ‘8. Auf Vorschlag von Professor Kremer und Herrn Flick 
wurde beschlossen, auf dem Käthe-Kollwitz-Platz in Berlin ebenfalls eine Kranzniederlegung 
und eventuell eine Großveranstaltung durchzuführen, um auch die Bevölkerung an der 
Ehrung zu beteiligen’ (ibid.). […] ‘9. Herr Flick erklärte sich bereit, sich schriftlich an alle 
Käthe-Kollwitz-Schulen zu wenden, um einen guten Besuch auf dem Käthe-Kollwitz-Platz 
zu gewährleisten (ibid.).’ As a result, the Kollwitz Committee aimed to use the opportunity of 
this new, public event to display belatedly the participation of youth and the workplace in the 
commemoration: ‘11. ‘An der Kranzniederlegung nehmen teil: zwei Mitglieder der Sektion 
bildende Kunst, zwei Schüler der Käthe-Kollwitz-Oberschule Mühlenbeck, die auch den 
Kranz tragen werden, sowie Mitglieder der Käthe-Kollwitz-Brigaden des Kabelwerkes 
Oberspree und des Glühlampenwerkes’ (ibid.). The emphasis on the workplace here is 
particularly important; it exposes a perceived gap between the official portrayal of Kollwitz 
at the forefront of the working class and the potential, embarrassing reality of the working 
class being comparatively invisible at the events. An internal local authority memo provides 
an amusing example of the nervousness at all official levels about avoiding any embarrassing 
publicity relating to this important occasion:  
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Betrifft Feierstunde auf dem Kollwitzplatz: am 22. Juni fand eine Beratung über die 
Feierstunde auf dem Käthe-Kollwitz-Platz im Rat des Stadtbezirks Prenzlauer Berg statt 
[…] Die HO-Gaststätte Kollwitz-Klause hat sich nach Ortsbesichtigung als eine 
Pferdefleisch-Gaststätte herausgestellt. Die Abteilung Kultur übernimmt es, eine 
Änderung des Namens schnellstens herbeizuführen).63 
The final programme for the official ceremonies was subsequently published only ten days 
before the events. They consisted of a wreath-laying ceremony (Feierstunde) at the Käthe-
Kollwitz-Platz on 6 July; launch of the exhibition, ‘Käthe Kollwitz und ihre Zeitgenossen’, 
and the premiere screening of the Kollwitz documentary, ‘Saatfrüchte sollen nicht vermahlen 
werden’, both on 7 July; and finally, on 8 July, a further wreath-laying at Käthe-Kollwitz’s 
grave and the main Festakt. In order to ensure a good turnout, the closing sentences of the 
published programme emphasise that the key events are open to all: ‘Alle Veranstaltungen 
zur Käthe-Kollwitz-Ehrung sind öffentlich. Die Bevölkerung der Hauptstadt der DDR ist 
hierzu – besonders zum Festakt im Apollo Saal der Deutschen Staatsoper – herzlich 
eingeladen’.64 
3.3.3. The film: reinforcing a portrayal that balances competing narratives  
The officially commissioned documentary, ‘Saatfrüchte sollen nicht vermahlen werden’ was 
another main item in the ‘Beschluß über die Käthe-Kollwitz-Ehrung 1967’ and has a running 
time of some nineteen minutes (Tetzlaff, 1967). The title is based on a quotation by Goethe65 
and was also the title of Kollwitz’s final graphic work in 1945. The quotation helped to 
establish her public profile as a pacifist when she used it in 1918 in a published anti-war 
appeal: ‘ ‘‘Es ist genug gestorben! Keiner darf mehr fallen! Ich berufe mich gegen Richard 
Dehmel auf einen größeren, welcher sagte: ‘‘Saatfrüchte sollen nicht vermahlen werden’’.’ 
(Schymura, 2014, pp.185-186). The use of this quotation as title may, at first, seem unusual, 
as it may have been received by viewers as highlighting the pacifist aspect of Kollwitz’s 
political activity. In contrast, ‘Kämpfende Kunst’ had been the title of a shorter, 1959 DEFA 
documentary on three closely linked pre and post-war artists, Käthe Kollwitz, Otto Dix and 
Otto Nagel. This earlier title would have been superficially more in tune with the ongoing 
official emphasis in 1967 on Kollwitz’s socialist credentials regarding her political activism 
for the ‘ausgebeutete, entrechtete, doch kämpfende Deutsche Arbeiterklasse’.66 But the new 
title also positions Kollwitz alongside Goethe as one of Germany’s foremost national icons, 
thus adding even more weight to her cultural stature.  
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The film selects historical snapshots of milestones in the life of Kollwitz, beginning with the 
period at the end of the nineteenth century when she was already an established artist, and 
ending with her death in 1945. The screenplay concentrates on selected extracts from 
Kollwitz’s comprehensive diaries, set against photographs of her works including many self-
portraits, together with film material from the First World War and the interwar periods. The 
diary excerpts are read by an actress. This use of a first-person, dramatised voice heightens 
the emotional impact of the diary texts in combination with the images chosen – for example 
of soldiers marching off to war, and Nazi storm troopers in trucks. As contrast, the occasional 
voice-over commentary is provided by a speaker whose emotionless tone is more in line with 
the style of a documentary film. 
The short opening sequence in the first seven-minute section is set against a self-portrait of 
Kollwitz as a young woman and the early works that gained her fame: the graphic series 
based on Gerhart Hauptmann’s play, ‘Die Weber’. The commentary strikes an immediate 
political note that broadens the political scope of the film’s title: ‘Inmitten der 
Wilhelminischen Ära offenbart eine große Künstlerin ihr Herz für die Ausgebeuteten und 
Unterdrückten’. Her life story moves on to the first milestone, the early death of Kollwitz’s 
older son, Peter, on the Western Front. Her family tragedy is overlaid in the commentary with 
a further political message about the rationale for the Great War and its long term 
repercussions: ‘1914 zieht ihr Sohn als Freiwilliger in den Krieg und auch sie selbst kann 
noch nicht durchschauen, daß Deutschlands Söhne für eine schlechte Sache missbraucht 
werden. Durch Leid und Irrtum beginnt für die 47 jährige noch einmal ein langer Weg zu 
neuen Erkenntnissen.’ Her personal tragedy, however, remains the main content of the diary 
extracts, with the grieving mother Leitmotif of her work dominating the imagery, thus 
seemingly suggesting that this aspect of Kollwitz’s life is the key to understanding her 
development as a politically committed artist.  
The second, three-minute section of the film is devoted to Kollwitz’s pacifist public stance 
and her reaction to the assassinations of Karl Liebknecht and Rosa Luxemburg in the 
immediate post-1918 period. A quote and a still image from one of Liebknecht’s last 
speeches connect to Kollwitz’s pacifism: ‘Genug und übergenug der Metzelei! Nieder mit 
den Kriegshetzern diesseits und jenseits der Grenze! Ein Ende mit dem Völkermord. Der 
Hauptfeind steht im eignen Land.’ The choice of diary extracts citing her reactions to 
Liebknecht’s murder is significant in mentioning the political background and bourgeois 
roots of Kollwitz, by then already fifty-three years old: ‘Ich war politischer Gegner, aber sein 
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Tod gab mir den ersten Ruck zu ihm hin. Später las ich dann seine Briefe, was zur Folge 
hatte, daß seine Persönlichkeit mir im reinsten Licht erscheint.’ The inclusion at this point of 
Kollwitz’s refusal to be identified as a fully committed socialist at that time may seem more 
surprising, although arguably weakened by the rhetorical question ending this quotation: ‘Ich 
habe als Künstler das Recht aus allem das Gefühlsgehalt herauszuziehen, auf mich wirksam 
zu lassen und nach außen zu stellen. So habe ich auch das Recht den Abschied der 
Arbeiterschaft von Liebknecht darzustellen ohne dabei Liebknecht politisch zu folgen, oder 
nicht?’ 
Although this seemingly tortuous personal pathway to socialism may not have been unusual, 
any risk that this quote may be received by the film’s viewer as a distancing statement is 
mitigated by the subsequent explanation. The first half of the film closes with a commentary, 
suggesting a resolution of Kollwitz’s dilemma: ‘[…]und Käthe Kollwitz stellt ihre Kunst in 
den Dienst des Proletariats.’ Yet the careful process of diary selection becomes clear from 
Kollwitz’s words, that precede the diary extract used in the film: ‘Ich schäme mich, daß ich 
immer noch nicht Partei nehme und vermute fast, wenn ich erkläre, keine Partei anzugehören, 
daß der eigentliche Grund dazu Feigheit ist. Eigentlich bin ich nämlich gar nicht 
Revolutionär, sondern Evolutionär. Weil man mich aber als Künstlerin des Proletariats und 
der Revolution preist und mich immer fester in die Rolle schiebt, so scheue ich mich, diese 
Rolle nicht weiter zu spielen.’ (diary extract, dated October 1920, cited in Krahmer 1981, 
p.94) These words had been left out by the scriptwriter, thus hiding the extent of Kollwitz’s 
wrestling with her perceived political identity. 
Six of the remaining ten minutes are centred on the long-lasting artistic aftermath of the loss 
of Kollwitz’s son. This was the work closest to her heart, (ibid., pp.76-80), the Totenmahl at 
the German military cemetery in Flanders where her son is buried. The twin sculptures of 
grieving parents were modelled on Käthe Kollwitz and her husband, Karl. They were 
completed after many years of planning and financial issues, described in some detail in the 
film’s diary extracts. The section closes with various images of the intermediate models for 
the sculptures and a commentary, delivered this time with noticeable pathos: ‘Das Werk, um 
das sie seit 1915 ringt, ist vollendet.1932.’ This section of the film was regarded as relatively 
innovative and specifically encouraged by the Kollwitz Committee: ‘Das Arbeitssekretariat 
begrüßt dieses Vorhaben auch deshalb, weil es mit einer bisher wenig bekannten Seite im 
Schaffen von Käthe Kollwitz bekannt macht und es bisher in der DDR keine Filmaufnahmen 
des Totenmahles gibt.’67 
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The last four minutes of the film begin with a film clip of dozens of Nazi brown-shirts 
jumping out of trucks. Quotes from her diaries, accompanied by political commentary, are 
reintroduced to position brief milestones in the last twelve years of Kollwitz’s life, that 
coincided with the height of the Nazi period: ‘Das dritte Reich bricht an. Ich hoffe, daß bei 
einer kriegerischen Bedrohung der UdSSR, die Arbeiterschaft wenigstens der führenden 
Staaten Europas sich endlich zur geschlossenen Abwehr zusammen findet.’ A further setback 
is then noted: ‘Am 15. Februar 1933 müssen Heinrich Mann und ich aus der Akademie 
austreten, weil wir den Aufruf zur Einigung der Linksparteien unterschrieben haben. Wenn 
nur die Steine dort in Belgien bleiben an der Stelle für die sie gemacht sind.’ While bringing 
out her political allegiance, this extract is the only reference in the entire film to her 
membership of the AdK; the fact that she had been the first woman to be admitted as member 
is not even mentioned.  
The diary reference to the ‘Belgian stones’, that is the Flanders Totenmahl, introduces the 
remaining two minutes of the film. This final section contains short diary extracts covering 
her last, increasingly unhappy war years. These culminated in the death in 1940 of her 
husband, the death in 1942 of her soldier grandson Peter, and banishment from Berlin to 
Moritzburg in 1943 where she died just before the Soviet troops reached nearby Dresden in 
1945. The film ends with two images: a still photograph of the last work forming the title of 
the film and a still of her 1932 poster, ‘Wir schützen die Sowjetunion’. The accompanying 
diary extract from 1942 reunites all three key ingredients as a consolidated, framing narrative 
of Kollwitz: a mother/grandmother, a pacifist and a political thinker: ‘Unterdes war Hans 
[Kollwitz’s surviving younger son] hier. Er kam ganz spät zu mir herein. Da wusste ich, daß 
Peter tot ist. Am 22. September ist er gefallen. Darum bin ich mit ganzem Herzen für einen 
radikalen Schluss dieses Irrsinns und erwarte nur von dem Weltsozialismus etwas.’  
So by the end of her life Kollwitz has, according to the film’s storyline, fought her way to 
accepting an arguably utopian vision of socialism as the only ‘true path’. She goes on:  
Ich beschließe noch einmal zum dritten Mal dasselbe Thema aufzunehmen. Diesmal 
kucken die Saatfrüchte der Mutter überall aus dem Mantel heraus und wollen 
ausbrechen. Aber die alte zusammenhaltende Mutter sagt ‘Nein! Ihr bleibt hier. 
Einstweilen dürft ihr euch raufen. Aber wenn Ihr groß sein werdet, habt ihr euch auf 
das Leben einzustellen und nicht wieder auf den Krieg.’ Das ist nun einmal mein 
Testament. Saatfrüchte sollen nicht vermahlen werden.  
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The film thus creates an overall impression well matched to the selected diary extracts, 
images of Kollwitz, her works, and historical film clips. The choice of images achieves a 
balance that suggests Kollwitz’s life was interwoven between her personal tragedy and the 
causes she espoused. The intermittent commentary in the film’s screenplay feels more 
contrived. As is the case with the press coverage and official speeches, the film reinforces an 
established interpretation of Kollwitz’s specific legacy and its contribution to national 
identity in the GDR rather than promoting a new one.  
3.3.4. ‘Käthe Kollwitz und ihre Zeitgenossen’: exhibiting the international proletariat  
Another major cultural event of the commemoration year, an exhibition hosted by the AdK 
and opened on 8 July 1967, demonstrates that one of the competing narratives of Kollwitz, 
that of ‘Kämpferin für das Proletariat’ was possibly the most important one for the AdK in 
their central role as organiser of this particular event. Despite being dedicated explicitly to 
Kollwitz’s centenary in the official catalogue (Ludwig et al., 1967, p.3), the exhibition 
included only six works by Kollwitz herself, alongside 210 works by 100 artists from nine 
countries. One reason suggested for exhibiting other artists was the fear that comparatively 
recent Kollwitz exhibitions in 1960, 1962 and 1965 would have lessened public interest in 
this event (Schymura, 2014, p.364). In consequence, Schymura proposes persuasively that the 
overriding rationale for the academic establishment to choose a different concept was the 
opportunity to display the wider international applications of Socialist Realism. The AdK’s 
vice-president, Eduard Claudius, however, explains the curation concept in a more general 
introduction to the catalogue as being: ‘[…] die Persönlichkeit und das Werk der Künstlerin 
in einem großen Zusammenhang darzustellen.’ (Ludwig et al., p.3). Without alluding to the 
Socialist Realism movement by name, Claudius spells out the exhibition’s context with an 
explicit connection to Kollwitz: 
Es gibt eine große Zahl von Künstlern, nicht nur in Deutschland, sondern auch in 
anderen Ländern, die wie Käthe Kollwitz von den großen sozialen Problemen und 
revolutionären Ereignissen ihrer Zeit gedrängt wurden, mit ihren Arbeiten Partei zu 
ergreifen. Viele dieser Künstler werden durch diese Ausstellung zum ersten Mal in 
Berlin bekannt gemacht, darunter auch einige, deren Arbeiten hauptsächlich 
Mitgefühl mit den durch die Klassengesellschaft entrechteten und verarmten 
bekunden (ibid., p.3) 
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The narrative of ‘Kämpferin für das Proletariat’ as the core political driver in Kollwitz’s life 
is thus chosen as the common denominator in the show. The six selected works by Kollwitz 
all follow this theme, bearing the titles: ‘Kampf im Wirtshaus’, ‘Zyklus ‘‘Ein 
Weberaufstand’’, ‘Zyklus ‘‘Bauernkrieg’’’, ‘Aufruhr’, ‘Brot’, ‘Verbrüderung’, and 
‘Heimarbeit’. Kollwitz’s commitment to the cause of the socially and politically oppressed 
proletariat is also attributed to the works of the other artists selected. Beyond major German 
contemporaries of Kollwitz such as Ernst Barlach, Otto Dix, George Grosz, Oskar 
Kokoschka and Max Liebermann, the selection was expanded to non-German artists, 
constituting around a third of the total. The inclusion of representatives from five West 
European countries and prominent names such as Camille Pissaro and Georges Roualt, 
creates a clear message of Kollwitz’s place, and by implication that of the GDR, in taking the 
lead in responding artistically to the universal issue of oppression.  
Claudius positions the topic as not only retrospective but as an ongoing scholarly task, 
associated with the upcoming anniversaries of the twin pillars of Marxist-Leninism, in 1968 
and 1970 respectively: ‘Die Ausstellung soll der Beginn einer eingehenden 
wissenschaftlichen Erforschung des gesamten Problemkreises sein und in weiteren 
Ausstellungen, so zum 150. Geburtstag von Karl Marx und zum 100. Geburtstag von W.I. 
Lenin ihren Niederschlag finden’ (ibid., p.3). This reference also implicitly helps to further 
anchor the narrative of Kollwitz as ‘Freund der Sowjetunion’ – albeit ranked in terms of the 
works chosen behind the narrative of ‘Kämpferin für das Proletariat’.  
The structure and content of the catalogue offers clues to how Kollwitz and her 
contemporaries were presented to the wider public reader beyond the exhibition’s visitor. The 
cover features a self-portrait woodcut of Kollwitz which is not one of the actual exhibits, and 
does not point to the chosen context and political message of the show. However, the choice 
here makes sense; it reminds the reader and visitor of the personality being commemorated 
by the staging of the exhibition itself.  
The catalogue itself is a modest 28-page booklet, containing a list of all works exhibited, 
where they were held at the time and short biographies of the artists. The booklet closes with 
photos of only 28 of the 210 works. ‘Brot’ (1924) one of Kollwitz’s most iconic works, is the 
only one of the six exhibited that is reproduced in the catalogue. It appears in a group of 
several photos with an explicit political theme or message, such as Lea Grundig’s 
‘Diskussion zwischen Kommunisten und Sozialdemokraten’, and Martha Schrag’s 
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‘Arbeitslose’. More important, in the context of implicitly aligning Kollwitz with the pre-war 
German Communist Party, is its placement as penultimate photo; ‘Brot’ is effectively 
inserted between Hans Grundig’s ‘Selbstmord ist kein Ausweg – Kämpft mit der KPD’, 
(1930), and the closing reproduction of John Heartfield’s poster, ‘Kämpft mit uns! Wählt 
Kommunisten – Liste 4’, (1930). 
Consistent with the other artists in the exhibition, the paragraph on Kollwitz merely lists her 
key biographical dates with no further commentary. So, for example, it mentions her election 
as member of the Akademie in 1919 without observing that she was the first female member. 
Given the presumed space limitations in this section of the catalogue, it becomes evident that 
it is the mostly politically relevant dates that were chosen to set the scene for the choice and 
context of Kollwitz’s works. The loss of her son, Peter, in 1914 is therefore the only personal 
date listed after her marriage in 1891. Kollwitz’s public protest as pacifist in 1918, her trip to 
the USSR in 1927 and even her exhibition in Moscow in 1932 are all preferred to later 
personal milestones such as the death of her husband in 1940, the death of her grandson Peter 
in 1942 on the Russian front, and her banishment from Berlin in 1943 – all of which arguably 
influenced her final works. 
The catalogue also contains the hint of a contradiction in how the exhibition was finally 
executed. A comparison of the works listed and the 28 reproductions selected for the 
catalogue reveals an anomaly. Three works by world-famous artists: Van Gogh’s ‘The Road 
Workers’, Bonnard’s ‘ La petite blanchisseuse’ and Beckmann’s ‘Die Nacht’ are all pictured 
misleadingly in the catalogue, yet are absent from the list of exhibits. There is a small-print 
note at the end: ‘Aus konservatorischen Gründen konnten nicht alle für die Ausstellung 
erbetenen Werke ausgeliehen werden.’ However, a closer review of where the actual exhibits 
were held at the time reveals only museums and private collections within the Soviet bloc. 
The commercial and poster artist Klaus Wittkugel makes a sweeping attack on officials in 
West Germany in his inauguration speech for the exhibition. He puts forward a more 
significant, although unproven political reason for the absence of certain works: ‘Bonn hat 
sich an politischen Manipulationen schuldig gemacht und verhindert, daß man in großem 
Umfang Leihgaben aus Westdeutschland und den übrigen Ländern des NATO zeigen 
konnte’.68  
In short, the exhibition differs from other activities in the Kollwitz centenary commemoration 
and how they were addressed in the GDR media as well as official speeches in one important 
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respect. The concept of the exhibition and its accompanying catalogue focuses almost 
exclusively on one construction of Kollwitz: ‘Kämpferin für das Proletariat’(Ludwig et al., 
1967). This appears to have been justified by the unifying context of Kollwitz’s artist 
contemporaries and their works of Socialist Realism selected by the curators. The ‘friend of 
the Soviet Union’ allusions and the link to German pre-war communism go well with this 
single narrative. On the other hand, and in particular contrast to the film, both the pacifist and 
the grieving mother iconography that characterise so many of Kollwitz’s best known works is 
completely ignored. This single-narrative slant may have been politically expedient, but it is 
all the more remarkable if one reflects on the artistic and intellectual background of the 
AdK’s members acting here as curators. The above-mentioned coincidental linkage to the 
fiftieth anniversary of the Russian revolution in 1917, was addressed by staging the main 
Berlin exhibition as well as the initial screening of the documentary film at the Haus der 
Deutsch-Sowjetischen Freundschaft in Berlin. The exhibition was subsequently shown in 
Moscow, as a further mark of the importance in both countries of linking Kollwitz’s personal 
history to the 1917 revolution, thus underlining that Kollwitz was ‘one of us’ in a wider, 
Soviet-bloc context. As a literal representation of the GDR-Soviet friendship, this may have 
arguably contributed, even positively enhanced a particular vision of GDR national identity 
based on a demonstration of socialist inclusivity. 
3.3.5. The official Kollwitz pamphlet: cementing the political narratives 
A 42-page pamphlet (Lüdecke, 1967), commissioned by the Kollwitz Committee, was the 
AdK’s second official contribution to the centenary alongside the organisation of the 
exhibition. In his introduction, Lüdecke points out that he is providing neither a biography 
nor an appraisal of Kollwitz’s works. As the title, ‘Käthe Kollwitz und die Akademie’ 
indicates, the purpose of his publication is to chart the relationship between Kollwitz and the 
Akademie during the period of her membership, from appointment, together with fifteen 
other artists including Ernst Barlach (Schymura 2014, pp.236-237) on 17 March 1919 to the 
immediate aftermath of what was, effectively, her expulsion in 1933. The introduction closes 
with an implied connection between the past Akademie and the contemporary AdK. By 
suggesting a link to historical, progressive elements in the Akademie,69 Lüdecke positions the 
AdK as its legacy institution, whose quasi-inheritance is further legitimised by the application 
of socialist historiography: ‘Der Verfasser hofft, damit zu der Würdigung der progressiven 
Kräfte in der alten Akademie der Künste beizutragen, die eine Ehrenpflicht der neuen 
Akademie der Künste und der sozialistischen Geschichtsschreibung ist.’ (Lüdecke 1967, p.6) 
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Lüdecke’s short reference to Kollwitz’s appointment is strangely uninformative, although he 
does offer an explanation for Kollwitz’s widespread status across the main social classes who 
carried weight after the First World War:  
Über die Einzelheiten der Aufnahme Käthe Kollwitz in die Akademie sind wir nicht 
unterrichtet. Bei dem Ruf, den sie in der Arbeiterschaft, in der sozialdemokratischen 
Partei, im liberalen Bürgertum und unter den Künstlern genoss, war es eine 
Selbstverständlichkeit, daß sie zum Akademiemitglied gewählt wurde, nachdem die 
Kräfte, die es bis zum Novemberrevolution nicht zugelassen hatten, vorübergehend 
kulturpolitisch entmachtet waren (ibid., p.10). 
Given that he appears to have based his publication on access to the Akademie’s archives, it 
is unclear whether any specific records on the appointment process were missing or had been 
destroyed during the Second World War. But if so, why does he not refer to this in his 
introduction? The implementation of the official legal framework of gender equality70 was 
developing and expanding throughout most of the GDR’s lifetime (Kranz, 2005). In this 
context there appears to be a missed opportunity for Lüdecke to highlight the pioneering 
aspect of Kollwitz becoming the first female member of the Akademie. However, this 
omission is in line with the apparent non-inclusion of this particular achievement in other, 
centenary-related publications, speeches, and the film as noted above. Although Kollwitz is 
referred to repeatedly in the pamphlet as a wife and mother, this apparent oversight in turn 
can be interpreted as further evidence of gender being viewed, as far as explicit references are 
concerned, as a relatively insignificant element in the socio-political framework of Kollwitz’s 
centenary. Kollwitz herself appears to have been ambivalent about her appointment in her 
diary entry of 31 January 1919: ‘Große Ehre, aber ein bißchen peinlich für mich. Die 
Akademie gehört doch zu den etwas verzopften Instituten, die beiseite gebracht werden 
sollten.’ (cited in Krahmer, 1998, p.108) 
Conforming to the overall ideological framework, Lüdecke puts forward the same, closely 
related, political narratives of Kollwitz, that have already been identified in the other 
Kollwitz commemoration events: ‘Anti-Faschist und Kommunist’ and ‘Freund der UdSSR’. 
As in the official documentary film, and much of the press coverage of Kollwitz in the GDR, 
Lüdecke’s account relies heavily on selective use of extracts from the Kollwitz diaries and 
letters. He chooses episodes in the early years of her membership as proof, that while 
identifying herself nominally with the SPD through her vote, her real sympathies lay with the 
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new German Communist movement. A letter from 1919, just after gaining Akademie 
membership, is interpreted as pointing to her emotions, and how they determined Kollwitz’s 
underlying political leanings:  
Aus diesem Brief erfahren wir auch, was Käthe Kollwitz damals politisch fühlte und 
dachte […]71 ‘Das waren die Revolutionstage. Was geworden ist, hat ein etwas 
anderes Gesicht bekommen, als man geträumt hat […] Gegen das, was man erwartet, 
ist das, was die Sozialdemokratie gegeben hat, dürftig. Und nun kommt der 
Kommunismus, in dem unbestreitbar eine Idee liegt, und zieht die Menschen eben 
diese Idee wegen an sich. Ich schick euch hier einen Aufsatz von Gorki; vielleicht 
kennt ihr ihn […]. Er hat mich, muss ich sagen, erschüttert. Es ist mir furchtbar 
schwer, Stellung zu nehmen. Gewählt habe ich mehrheitssozialistisch, aber doch 
wünschte ich sehr, die Regierung gäbe mehr’ (Lüdecke, 1967, pp.9-10). 
As in Lea Grundig’s article in ND, we note Kollwitz’s own reference to Gorki in Lüdecke’s 
editing. The quote may again serve to reinforce an association of Kollwitz with this Russian 
icon in the mind of the reader. The Gorki reference is repeated in a later episode, based on the 
celebration of her 60th birthday in 1927, which coincided with the tenth anniversary of the 
Russian Revolution. Lüdecke’s version, and the accompanying extract, draw out the 
interwoven themes of Kollwitz as ‘Freund der Sowjetunion’ and ‘Kommunist’:  
Käthe Kollwitz jedoch bekannte in der ‘AIZ’ (Arbeiter-Illustrierte-Zeitung, Jg. 1927, 
Nr.20): ‘Es ist dies nicht die Stelle uns auseinanderzusetzen, warum ich nicht 
Kommunistin bin. Es ist aber die Stelle, um auszusprechen, daß das Geschehnis der 
letzten zehn Jahre in Russland mir an Größe und weittragender Bedeutung nur 
vergleichbar zu sein scheint dem Geschehnis der großen französischen Revolution. 
Gorki spricht in einem Aufsatz aus der ersten Zeit der Sowjet-Republik von dem 
Fliegen ‘‘Sohlen nach oben’’. Dieses Fliegen im Sturmwind glaube ich in Russland 
zu spüren. Um dieses Fliegen, um die Glut ihres Glaubens habe ich die Kommunisten 
oft beneidet.’ Sie und ihr Mann, der Arzt Doktor Karl Kollwitz, waren dann in der 1. 
November Hälfte als Ehrengäste in Moskau. (ibid., p.16). 
The narrative of Kollwitz as pacifist also emerges in the pamphlet in connection with her 
confirmation as a Prussian official; but, as in other centenary events and associated media 
commentary, this theme appears to be less important than the main political narratives, as it is 
alluded to only once, and indirectly: ‘Die Kollwitz jedenfalls ließ sich durch ihre neue Würde 
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nicht daran hindern, sich im Oktober 1928 durch die Unterzeichnung eines Aufrufes dem 
Kampf der fortschrittlichen Intellektuellen gegen den Bau eines Panzerkreuzers 
anzuschließen.’ 
The second half of the pamphlet focuses on factual detail but with hardly any additional 
political commentary on the antifascist Kollwitz narrative that began before and continued 
after the Machtergreifung in 1933. This covers Kollwitz’s public appeal in 1932 to unite the 
political forces of the left as well as examples of decreasing public exposure to her works in 
the period between her resignation from the Akademie in February 1933 and her final 
contacts with the Akademie in October 1936. Drawing in detail on Kollwitz’s diaries and 
private letters, Lüdecke can be seen to have won the argument with the official Kollwitz 
Committee regarding the avoidance of hyperbole. He effectively corrects the phrasing chosen 
in the earlier published resolution that he had criticised as implying a voluntary resignation: 
‘Kollwitz war 15 Jahre lang Mitglied der Preußischen Akademie der Künste, bis sie 
zusammen mit Heinrich Mann aus Protest gegen den Faschismus 1933 austrat.’72 Instead he 
describes Kollwitz’s reaction, the key word ‘deklarieren’ making it clear that the resignation 
had been forced on her: ‘Käthe Kollwitz nahm den als freiwilligen Austritt deklarierten 
Ausschluß aus der Akademie der Künste ruhig auf, jedenfalls äußerlich.’ (ibid., p.34).  
The pamphlet ends by staking a claim for the GDR as the only legitimate actor in the 
centenary commemoration:  
Käthe Kollwitz erlebte den Augenblick nicht, da die von ihr geliebten Menschen die 
Fäuste aus der Tasche nehmen konnten. […] Heute jedoch zu ihrem 100. Geburtstag, 
werden in unserem Teil Deutschlands, dem deutschen Arbeiter-und-Bauern-Staat, die 
Ehrungen nachgeholt, die ihr gebühren und ihrem Wesen gemäß sind. Sie 
beschränken sich nicht auf Reden, Schriften und Gesten, sondern bestehen vor allem 
darin, dass ihr humanistisches Vermächtnis auf allen Gebieten des Lebens erfüllt 
wird. (ibid., p.42). 
By referring to ‘unserem Teil Deutschlands’, this statement manifestly claims Kollwitz for 
the GDR; it promotes closer identification with the GDR as the legitimate heir to this legacy 
of antifascism and the fight for a better society, than may be inferred in other sources 
analysed in this chapter. Finally, the message is further amplified when Lüdecke echoes a 
humanist narrative common among other cultural commemorations in the GDR; namely that 
the GDR alone can fulfil the humanist legacy of its German cultural heritage. 
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3.4. OUTCOMES  
This section analyses the overall reception of the Kollwitz centenary commemorations and 
identifies potential legacies, both against the background of noticeably reduced appropriation 
and demarcation motives that were so prevalent in the previous case study. As noted in the 
Implementation section above, the media involvement before and during the main 
anniversary days, may be viewed as commemorative activity in and of itself. The media 
reporting thereafter can be considered as a measure of the reception/outcome of the events.  
3.4.1. Post-event media coverage in East and West: political themes dominate but not 
exclusively. 
The day after the Festakt, ND reported the highlights of Abusch’s speech at the event.73 The 
report adopts a particular political tone at the outset:  
Dr. Abusch, […] gab in seiner Rede auf dem Festakt zum 100. Geburtstag von Käthe 
Kollwitz eine umfassende Würdigung ihrer Persönlichkeit und ihres revolutionären 
künstlerischen Wirkens. Über das Verhältnis der Künstlerin zur Arbeiterklasse sagte 
er unter anderem: ‘wie alle Grossen der Kunst und Literatur, zeichnete sich Käthe 
Kollwitz dadurch aus, dass sie an einer Zeitenwende in den Klassenkämpfen das zu 
erreichen vermochte: die Gestaltung neuer Wirklichkeiten im künstlerischen Bild 
(ibid.). 
Abusch begins by acknowledging Kollwitz’s bourgeois upbringing. At the same time he 
positions her within the wider context of the German socialist workers’ movement rather than 
a formal party-political allegiance: ‘Der Weg ihrer Entwicklung seit den Jugendjahren, trotz 
mancher Widersprüchlichkeit, wurde geradezu klassisch für den Weg eines Künstlers, der 
sich am Ende des 19. und in der ersten Hälfte des 20. Jahrhunderts mit der deutschen 
sozialistischen Arbeiterbewegung verband’ (ibid.). Abusch continues to situate Kollwitz 
politically with two further items of evidence supporting an alignment with German 
communism:  
Alfred Kurella berichtete davon, dass sie bereits Ende November 1919, also während 
sie an dem Liebknecht-Blatt arbeitete und sich mit den ersten Entwürfen für das 
Gefallenendenkmal auseinandersetzt, ihr Atelier für eine illegale Tagung der sich 
gründenden kommunistischen Internationale zur Verfügung stellte (ibid.). 
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Abusch describes Kollwitz’s words and deeds in opposing the Nazis as being completely in 
step with those of the German communist party during the 1920s. These references to the 
German communist party of old, subsequently to be banned in West Germany, may be 
construed as a useful means for Abusch to implicitly appropriate Kollwitz for the GDR: 
Fragt man nach der politischen Position der Käthe Kollwitz in der Weimarer 
Republik, ist es die Wahrheit, die meine Generation aus eigenem Miterleben kennt, 
daß sie den aggressivsten Standpunkt einer getreuen Verbündeten unserer 
Kommunistischen Partei Deutschlands erreichte. Mit ihrem Wort und ihrem Werk 
setzte sie sich für die Politik ein, für die Aktionseinheit der Arbeiterklasse, gegen die 
drohende Gefahr einer faschistischen Diktatur (ibid.). 
Given his role as former Minister of Culture and Chairman of the Kollwitz Committee, it is 
not surprising that Abusch’s closing remarks, as quoted in ND, relate Kollwitz to her impact 
on art in the context of Socialist Realism:  
Wir handeln im Geiste von Käthe Kollwitz, wenn wir in unserer sozialistischen 
Republik das neue aktive Verhältnis weiter Kreise des Volkes zur Kunst entwickeln 
[…]. Unsere Kunst ist ohne diese Vorkämpferin und Vorgestalterin undenkbar. 
Unsere Kunst des sozialistischen Realismus ist heute in ihrer historischen Thematik in 
manchem über sie hinausgewachsen. Doch dieses Wachsen und Allseitigerwerden, 
nunmehr bei uns in der Fassung des neuen sozialistischen Lebens und seiner 
Perspektiven, ist die einzig mögliche Form lebendiger Aneignung selbst des Größten, 
was menschlicher Geist vor uns hervorgebracht hat (ibid.). 
Although this statement contains only an implied reference to the other Germany, the use of 
the words ‘Aneignung…des Größten’ lays an unambiguous claim to Kollwitz’s artistic 
legacy as a building block of GDR national identity.  
Complementing the ND reporting, Aufwärts, the youth newspaper of the FDGB, published its 
own tribute.74 Built around a long extract from Kollwitz’s diary, the author and Aufwärts 
editor, Hans Dohrenbusch, traces her life and explains her commitment to portray the 
working class instead of her bourgeois background. Kollwitz’s diary (no date given) is cited 
as follows:  
Ich möchte hierbei einiges sagen über die Abstempelung zur sozialen Künstlerin, die 
mich von da an [date or time unclear] begleitete […] Das eigentliche Motiv aber, 
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warum ich von jetzt an zur Darstellung fast nur das Arbeiterleben wählte, war, weil 
die aus dieser Sphäre gewählten Motive mir einfach und bedingungslos das gaben, 
was ich als schön empfand. […] Ohne jeden Reiz waren mir Menschen aus dem 
bürgerlichen Leben. Das ganze bürgerliche Leben erschien mir pedantisch. Dagegen 
einen großen Wurf hatte das Proletariat. […] Nur dies will ich noch einmal betonen, 
daß anfänglich in sehr geringem Maße Mitleid, Mitempfinden mich zur Darstellung 
des proletarischen Lebens zog, sondern, daß ich es einfach als schön empfand (ibid.). 
In contrast to the political stance of the ND’s coverage, Dohrenbusch suggests in his 
interpretation of her diary a uniqueness in Kollwitz’s personality, reflected in the extract: 
‘Das ist ein Bekenntnis. Moral und künstlerische Auffassung begegnen sich und bilden eine 
Einheit. Ihre Kunst galt im Ausdruck den Unterdrückten, Erniedrigten und Beleidigten, ihr 
Gesamtwerk gehört allen Menschen’ (ibid.). As in some of the ND contributions, 
Dohrenbusch links the significance of Kollwitz’s personal tragedies as mother and 
grandmother to her work: ‘Schwarz und Weiß sind die Farben dieser Meisterin aller 
grafischen Künste., die als Mutter die entsetzliche Not der Mütter jederzeit darstellte. Und der 
Kinder. (ibid.).’ 
In closing, Dohrenbusch’s epithet on Kollwitz and her artistic and personal provenance 
differs notably from Abusch’s official designation of Kollwitz: ‘Einzureihen in irgend eine 
Kunstrichtung ist Käthe Kollwitz nicht. Sie war selbst eine Richtung. Eingegangen ist sie in 
die Herzen der Menschen, die diese Erde wohnlicher machen wollen’ (ibid.). This divergence 
by a representative of the FDGB from the SED leadership’s emphasis on the ideological link 
between Kollwitz and Socialist Realism is important. Similar variances could be observed in 
the previous Schiller commemorations in relation to another mass organisation, the DKB. 
Once again, this may be interpreted here as a gap between an official intent to propagate a 
theory as framework for a commemoration and the subsequent reality of those involved in the 
implementation. In the case of the Kollwitz centenary it is the FDGB newspaper, through its 
comments, whose instance of Eigensinn creates this disparity. 
The tone and content of West German media coverage of Kollwitz during her 1967 centenary 
was mixed. A regional newspaper from West Berlin gave a glowing review of the November 
exhibition, although clearly uninformed about the highly selective choice of her works: ‘Das 
Jahr ihres 100. Geburtstages neigt sich schon dem Ende, da bietet es eine Ausstellung, die an 
Vollständigkeit kaum etwas zu wünschen übrig lässt, Käthe Kollwitz eine großartige, 
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verdiente Ehrung.’75 More influential West German publications however took little notice of 
the centenary events in the GDR. Der Spiegel preferred to comment on the concurrent 
‘Kollwitz-boom’ at Western international art auctions that year in its Art Market section: 
‘Der Deutsche Kunsthandel stand kopfschüttelnd überrumpelt vor diesem Phänomen’.76 Die 
Zeit focussed on these commercial aspects; but goes further and presents an approach to 
Kollwitz that stands in contrast to how it see Kollwitz being treated in the GDR. 77 The art 
historian Gottfried Sello notes in a lengthy article how Kollwitz's undisputed standing as a 
politically engaged artist had produced a contrasting reception in both East and West 
Germany before 1967:  
Man stelle sich vor, das Jubiläum wäre vor fünf Jahren fällig gewesen: Kein Hahn 
hätte (im Westen) nach der Kollwitz gekräht […]. Sie wurde zum Prototyp des 
engagierten Künstlers in unserem Jahrhundert. Das macht sie im Osten, in der DDR, 
zur persona gratissima und im Westen zu einer menschlich anrührenden Figur, die 
künstlerisch nicht in Betracht kommt (ibid.). 
Sello proposes that Kollwitz's work was already an artistic anachronism in its day – a very 
different approach to any interpretation in the GDR:  
Die Wurzeln ihrer Kunst liegen in der Tradition des 19. Jahrhunderts. Als ein 
bedeutender Beitrag zum 19. Jahrhundert ist ihr Werk aufzuwerten. Spurlos ist die 
künstlerische Revolution des 20. Jahrhunderts an ihr vorüber gegangen. Nur die 
Holzschnitte, die nach 1920 entstanden sind,…, sind ein problematischer Versuch, an 
der generellen Entwicklung zu partizipieren. Die Kollwitz ist trotz progressiver Ideen 
eine erzkonservative Künstlerin. (ibid.). 
Notwithstanding her ‘persona gratissima’ status, Sello suggests that even in the GDR 
Kollwitz may be on the verge of becoming a political as well as an artistic anachronism: 
Auch im Osten ist die Frage latent, was mit einer extrem zeitbezogenen Kunst 
geschieht, wenn ihre Zeit vorüber ist. Für die Weltsituation 1967, heißt es in einer 
Ostberliner Besprechung,78 ‘reicht freilich der Blick auf die verehrungswürdige Käthe 
Kollwitz allein, auf ihr Werk, daß sie aus dem bedrückenden Erlebnis der sozialen 
Not des Berliner Proletariats zu ihrer Zeit als ihre Aufgabe erfüllte und verwirklichte, 
nicht mehr aus. Ein großer Abstand trennt uns zum Beispiel in unserer Deutschen 
Demokratischen Republik von dem Deutschland jener Zeit. Politische und 
gesellschaftliche Problemstellungen vieler Art, nicht nur die sozialen, liegen heute in 
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vielen Ländern anders’. Das heißt, bei aller Verehrung, ihre Thematik ist antiquiert, 
ihr Werk eine historische Reminiszenz an die Jahre des Kampfes, und was dann allein 
noch zu Buche steht, ist die Gesinnung, die Ideologie (ibid.). 
By quoting from an unattributed GDR publication, Sello seems to add weight to this 
dismissal of one of the dominant Kollwitz narratives in the GDR – that of ‘Kämpferin für das 
Proletariat’. He concludes his article by discounting prevailing interpretations of Kollwitz on 
either side of the Iron Curtain: ‘Der Versuch, aus ihrem Werk parteipolitisches Kapital zu 
schlagen, ist ebenso unsinnig wie die auf unserer Seite geübte Praxis, das gesellschaftliche 
Engagement ihrer Kunst als eine blühende menschliche Geste zu verharmlosen’ (ibid.).  
Considering therefore what may otherwise have been received in the GDR at the time as 
somewhat provocative West German press coverage of Kollwitz, it is striking that GDR 
media and official speeches did not appear to react more openly, as may otherwise have been 
expected in the prevailing Cold War climate of hostility to West German media in general.79  
Finally, the AdK archives contain a transcript (source unknown) of a statement by Karl 
Hubbuch, a prominent West German artist and Professor at the Karlsruhe Academy of Fine 
Arts. In it he explicitly acknowledges the spiritual home of Kollwitz and also appears to 
emphasise her gender, in conjunction with Helene Weigel: 
Wohl kaum eine Frau (außer Helene Weigel) hat in unserem Jahrhundert, im 
deutschen Sprachraum, den Kampf für die Leidenden und Unterdrückten solche 
künstlerische Kraft geführt wie Käthe Kollwitz. […]. Die Deutsche Demokratische 
Republik kann stolz darauf sein, diesen beiden Frauen eine geistige Heimat zu sein!80 
The lack of any internal and external arguments on the legacy and other potentially 
contentious points, including the apparent commercialisation of Kollwitz noted in some of 
the West German media thus encourages the conclusion that she was silently acknowledged 
by the media and the Fine Arts communities in both Germanies as already being ‘one of us / 
them’. In other words, both sides appear to have accepted a de facto identification of the 




3.4.2. The legacy of Kollwitz’s centenary in the GDR: more of the same? 
Some contradictions emerge when attempting to evaluate to what extent the Kollwitz 
commemoration produced a noticeable change in how she was subsequently viewed in the 
GDR. A decrease in the profile of further Kollwitz related anniversaries and exhibitions 
suggests that the centenary marked a high point for Kollwitz in the GDR, and that the public 
discourse around Kollwitz thereafter was static at best (Schymura, 2014, pp.380-384). 
Evidence from a later planning document of the DKB however suggests that, at least in the 
first few years after 1967, there was an official intent to refer back to the centenary by 
intensifying Kollwitz-related cultural activities: ‘25. Todestag Käthe Kollwitz am 25. April 
1970: Für diesen Gedenktag sind keine besonderen Ehrungen vorgesehen. Wir verweisen auf 
die große Kollwitz-Ehrung zum 100. Geburtstag im Jahre 1967. Wir werden unsere Kollwitz-
Ausstellung verstärkt einsetzen und Freundeskreisen und Clubs behilflich sein bei der 
Gewinnung von geeigneten Gesprächspartnern für Ausstellungsgespräche.’81  
Kollwitz continued to be memorialised in an increased naming of public spaces in the GDR 
such as streets and squares, as well as schools and workplaces; this fact alone must be seen as 
reinforcing a sense of GDR national identity among the wider population towards her 
political and artistic legacy. Yet when it comes to a more tangible post-1967 legacy, it is 
surprising that neither the AdK, as primary champion of Kollwitz, nor any other GDR 
institution established a permanent museum and resource centre dedicated to Kollwitz. This 
omission is all the more remarkable compared to developments in West Germany, where – 
admittedly private – initiatives in Berlin and Cologne established such centres in the mid-
1980s, which still flourish today. 
One final outcome should be noted regarding the ideological framework described in this 
chapter. Official revisionism of a historical SED policy on Kollwitz may have been the result 
of her stature being actually strengthened by the centenary commemoration in 1967. In its 
1988 book, previously mentioned in the Schiller case study, the SED seeks, with hindsight, to 
delegitimise and discount attacks in the early 1950s on Kollwitz. Haase concentrates 
particularly on the anonymous critic ‘N. Orlow’, mentioned in the introduction to this case 
study: 
Er [Orlow] brachte wichtige Fragestellungen des ideologischen Klassenkampfes, wie 
sie die KPdSU in den Jahren zuvor gestellt hatte, in die Kunstdiskussion der DDR ein, 
enthielt aber gerade auch in Hinsicht auf das Problem der künstlerischen Traditionen 
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bedenkliche Überspitzungen und Irrtümer. Beispielsweise wurden bedeutende 
Leistungen von Käthe Kollwitz […] fälschlicherweise einer scharfen, 
unangemessenen Kritik unterzogen, weil nicht der politisch-geschichtliche Standort, 
sondern vorwiegend die Formgebung der Künstler zum Kriterium der Beurteilung 
gemacht wurden. (Haase, 1988, pp.203-204) 
The SED also attempts to retrospectively distance itself from its own, earlier association with 
the attacks on Kollwitz in the early 1950s. Under the wider heading, ‘Zur Problematik der 
Tradition proletarischer-revolutionärer Literatur und Kunst’ (Haase, 1988, pp.150-151), 
Haase contends:  
Äußerliche Erscheinungsformen und nicht das Wesen der Sache selbst waren also die 
Grundlage solche kritischen Urteile über Käthe Kollwitz. Demgegenüber muss 
hervorgehoben werden, daß sich weder im Referat noch in der Entschließung der 
fünften Tagung des ZK der SED, die etwa zur selben Zeit zusammen trat und 
außerordentlich kritisch zu den Fragen der Kunstentwicklung Stellung nahm, solche 
Bewertungen der großen proletarischen Künstlerin finden. Wilhelm Pieck, der 
Vorsitzende der Partei, nahm sogar demonstrativ an der Eröffnung einer umfassenden 
Käthe-Kollwitz-Ausstellung teil, die eben in jener Zeit stattfand, als auch jene 
kritischen Artikel publiziert wurden. Am gleichen Tag, an dem die 5. Tagung des ZK 
der SED eine Entschließung über den Kampf gegen den Formalismus fasste, erschien 
im Zentralorgan des ZK der SED ‘‘Neues Deutschland’’ ein Artikel von Heinz 
Lüdecke unter der Überschrift ‘‘Die Friedenskämpferin und Humanistin Käthe 
Kollwitz’’ […]’. 
The defensive reference to the venerated national icon, Pieck, and his implied gesture of 
political solidarity, encapsulate the particular emphasis placed on this passage, whilst 
downplaying the controversial involvement of the SED. The catchwords ‘proletarisch’, 
‘Friedenskämpferin’ and ‘Humanist’ used here were all components of the political narratives 
employed in 1967; their continued usage to reaffirm the ideological framing of Kollwitz 
twenty years later indicates that the centenary itself was ultimately successful in reinforcing 






Considering the apparent acceptance by West German media and intellectuals of Kollwitz’s 
spiritual links to the underlying ideological framework of the GDR’s foundation, there was 
never any need by the GDR authorities to demarcate a claim to her legacy by appropriating 
her life and work through educational and other propaganda means. Whilst less disruptive 
than during the Schiller commemorations, one might have expected a similar dysfunctionality 
between the stakeholders analysed above to have influenced the intended impact of the 
Kollwitz centenary. However, there is no evidence to support this possible outcome. More 
importantly, this case study demonstrates that each of the three proposed narratives of 
Kollwitz – artistic, socio-political and personal – received differing emphasis during the 
commemorations. Nonetheless, the evidence presented here supports a conclusion that none 
of these themes came to dominate the commemorations at the expense of the other two. In 
summary, the prevailing strength of her unassailable position in the consciousness of GDR 
society before 1967, meant that the composite Kollwitz narrative was likely to have been 
acceptable to the population at large; if anything, it served to reinforce her existing status in 
GDR culture by supporting rather than incrementally boosting national identity relating to an 
icon of German art.  
In summary, my case study analysis of the Kollwitz centenary commemoration offers more 
insights into the GDRˈs cultural and political structure at the time than how it may have 
affected national identity. We can clearly note from various primary sources that certain 
stakeholders, notably the AdK intellectuals, were able to display agency openly in their 
preference for the one or other narrative of Kollwitz, without uniformly adhering to the 
officially proclaimed ideological framework for the commemoration. Their freedom to do so, 
without apparent censure or intervention from the SED or government, may therefore 
challenge interpreting the GDR as a system always able to impose policy through a top-down 





4: THE BEETHOVEN BICENTENARY, 1970 
 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
Of the four strands represented in the case studies of this thesis, classical music is arguably 
the one most associated with German high culture, both within and outside Germany. Despite 
lacking the East German geographical lieux de memoire of major German composers such as 
Bach (Leipzig) and Handel (Halle), Beethoven appears to occupy a special place in GDR 
cultural history and its pantheon of great men and women. This is evidenced by no less than 
three anniversaries commemorated during the first twenty years of GDR history, the 125th 
and 150th anniversary of his death and, the most prominent, the bicentenary of his birth in 
1970. Echoing the pronouncement of his predecessor, Johannes R. Becher, in 1959: ‘Denn er 
ist unser: Friedrich Schiller’, Klaus Gysi, Minister for Culture, is quoted in the magazine Der 
Spiegel as proclaiming in 1970: ‘Beethoven gehört uns!’ To which the magazine replied in 
defence of an all-German perspective: ‘Schon – aber nicht auschließlich!’82 The cultural 
antagonism towards West Germany that featured so heavily in the 1959 Schiller bicentenary, 
but far less in the Kollwitz centenary in 1967, re-appears in the 1970 Beethoven bicentenary. 
A renewed linkage between appropriation of cultural heritage and demarcation towards West 
Germany may be observed. This third case-study will explore how the GDR authorities not 
only contemporised but appropriated Beethoven in order, once again, to encourage a 
heightened sense of GDR national identity – this time towards an icon of the musical world. 
As in the other case-studies, the key aims, implementation and outcomes of this high profile 
anniversary will be analysed, relying on a similar research methodology and range of primary 
archival sources. 83  
Secondary literature on the position of classical music in GDR cultural and socio-political 
history, and the Beethoven bicentenary in particular, is limited. Kelly (2014), Jungmann 
(2011) and Williams (2013) have written about various features of classical music in 
twentieth century Germany, its historical roots, and the specific significance of Beethoven. 
Applegate (1992), Silverberg (2009) go further in exploring the links between classical music 
and German identity. Dennis (1996) and Tischer (2008) in particular both briefly examine the 
1970 GDR bicentenary within their research on Beethoven’s importance in Germany 
generally as well in the GDR. It is within this broader context of existing multi-disciplinary 
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scholarship on classical music in the GDR that the related significance of Beethoven and the 
resulting impact on national identity in the GDR will be examined in this chapter. In 
analysing a far wider range of primary sources than researched hitherto in existing 
scholarship, this chapter will explore a related question which also surfaced in both previous 
case-studies. Socialist Realism aimed to remove the traditional distance between upper-class 
art, and the people’s art of workers and peasants in order to create collective socialist art. 
Could the overt appropriation of a major musical figure such as Beethoven via a large-scale 
commemoration, involving all classes of society and not only the cultural and educated elite 
actually make Beethoven more accessible to the population at large? Could such increased 
exposure to his works and to the heritage of German classical music, thus explicitly or 
implicitly enhance a distinct GDR national identity?  
This case study will suggest that all facets of the Beethoven bicentenary as commemorated in 
the GDR point collectively to a moderate evolution rather than turning point in cultural 
commemorations that aimed to influence the development of GDR national identity based on 
cultural heritage at a midpoint in GDR history, 1970. My findings indicate a marked 
similarity with the Schiller bicentenary commemorations, eleven years earlier. On the one 
hand, the commemorations overall were received in a mildly positive way by the wider GDR 
GDR public. and an important recording project may be identified as a limited legacy. 
However, once again primary sources provide substantial evidence pointing to various 
degrees of inconsistency and flaws amongst the stakeholders in their implementation of the 
commemorations. This observation applies especially to a number of prominent intellectuals 
and even within the government. As in the Schiller bicentenary the main way in which the 
Beethoven bicentenary commemorations did not meet the stated objectives was the apparent 
failure to effectively to appropriate another major icon of German cultural heritage by 
attaching and then trying to communicate a Marxist interpretation of that personality to the 
GDR citizens. Despite any increased sense of national pride in the limited, tangible legacy of 
the bicentenary celebrations, this failure suggests that the commemorations did little if 
anything to bolster the ongoing, more permanent formation of national identity based on an 
ideology-driven appropriation of cultural heritage. 
Following the methodology of the previous case studies, I will show how interrelated aims 
were developed and articulated in the planning phase of the Beethoven bicentenary. The 
implementation section will analyse the efforts to put the aims into effect in the various 
events planned for the commemoration and identify, as in the earlier commemorations, 
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weaknesses that created a meaningful gap between theory and practice. Finally, I will assess 
the outcomes of the bicentenary by evaluating whether appropriating Beethoven was 
effective in helping to shape a socialist, East German national identity based on identification 
with a universal icon of classical music heritage. 
4.1.1. Music and German nationalism: facing a complex cultural and political tradition.  
Since the mid-19th century, politics and musical culture have been essentially united within a 
German nationalist body of thought (Gedankengut); this allowed a personality cult to develop 
around famous composers who were thus elevated to heroes and icons of national identity 
(Jungmann, 2011, p. 43). Compared even to literature and other forms of German high art, 
German music became unique in the nineteenth century in its international accessibility. As 
such, classical music may be seen as ‘defining the intersection of cultural, social, and 
political history in the 19th century development of German nationalism’ (Applegate, 1992, 
p.23). Ultimately, and exploited ideologically by the Nazis with the personality cult 
surrounding Wagner, German audiences could identify vicariously with the ‘Nation’ through 
music (Jungmann, 2011, pp.36-42).  
Another, more recent musical tradition emerged after the First World War and was to become 
a socio-political theme carried on in the GDR: left-wing musicians in Germany aimed to 
remove a perceived bourgeois barrier between elitist art and the working class by forming 
workers’ orchestras and choirs, often performing at municipal and factory halls, which were 
rather more mundane venues than gilded concert palaces (Jungmann, 2011, p.42). The 
participation aspects of classical music form a key part of traditional musical culture in 
Germany. By cutting across conventional distinctions between popular and elite culture, 
playing and listening to music promoted a socially inclusive nationalism with implicit claims 
to represent the whole community (Applegate, 1992, p.30). In a similar vein, the official 
GDR policy of Socialist Realism can be arguably traced back to an older idea, that 
Kunstmusik has a particular power to elevate the individual personality and to lead the 
individual towards fulfilment in society (Jungmann, 2011, p.131). This power is noted as not 
exclusive to the GDR. It is mirrored in the West German educational mandate, 
Bildungsauftrag, at the time and still today in the official remit of West German broadcast 
media (Williams, 2013, p.18). In summary, this chapter will assess whether these themes of 
‘elevation’ and ‘participation’ enabled Beethoven’s bicentenary commemoration to produce 




This section reviews the planning process and development of aims for the commemoration, 
which were led, as in the Schiller case study, by the DKB mass organisation. The analysis is 
set against the background of a cultural policy that retains the essential features of 
appropriation and demarcation towards West Germany, despite a perceptible thaw in the Cold 
War political environment and intra-German relations. Charting how the ideological 
framework was finalised once again exposes counter-productive tensions between the various 
stakeholders and even between the government and the SED. Some of these issues will be 
seen to carry over into the subsequent implementation phase. 
4.2.1. Summary of planning process: timing lessons learned from the Schiller 
commemoration 
In comparison to the Schiller commemorations eleven years before, the planning of the 
Beethoven events and activities was initiated rather earlier. Most of the detailed discussions 
and setting of aims took place in the preceding year, 1969, and was once again led by the 
MfK. The key milestones were a formal MfK submission of plans to the Politbüro on 11 July 
who in turn issued a Politbüro resolution on 6 December; the final MfK submission was 
formally ratified by the Ministerrat (Council of Ministers) on 10 February 1970. Following 
the well-established format from previous cultural commemorations, a high-profile 
committee of stakeholders – the ‘Beethoven-Komitee für die Beethoven-Ehrung der 
Deutschen Demokratischen Republik’ (hereafter referred to as ‘Beethoven Committee’) – 
was formally constituted on 26 March 1970 to supervise the Beethoven bicentenary 
implementation. The key stakeholder for both articulating the ideological aims and then 
planning and implementing the cultural events and activities was the DKB, and its Zentrale 
Kommission Musik (hereafter referred to as ‘ZKM’) in particular. A major planning 
conference in Potsdam, from 31 October to 1 November 1969, led by the DKB, set the 
ideological framework for the commemorations. 
4.2.2. Abgrenzung and GDR cultural policy move on since the Schiller bicentenary  
Two closely inter-connected discourses, Aneignung and Abgrenzung, both highly visible in 
the 1959 Schiller bicentenary but far less so in the 1967 Kollwitz centenary, reappear in the 
1970 Beethoven bicentenary. By early 1969, West German Chancellor Willy Brandt’s 
Ostpolitik was signalling the end of the Hallstein-Doktrin84 and a de facto recognition of the 
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GDR. Yet there was no apparent evidence to suggest to the GDR authorities that West 
Germany’s government was prepared to give up their long-term goal of reunification, and 
thus accept the GDR’s concept of two separate and sovereign German nations. An 
undiminished Cold War and the long term objective of a permanent separation continued and 
even reinforced the persistent Leitmotif of Abgrenzung.  
The GDR authorities also justified the appropriation of Beethoven by distancing themselves 
from perceived anti-Beethoven attitudes that appeared at his bicentenary in West Germany. 
In their eyes Beethoven had been removed from his iconic pedestal by West Germany’s anti-
bourgeois New Left composers, notably Kagel and his colleagues in the film and soundtrack, 
‘Ludwig Van’, as well as Stockhausen’s composition, ‘Kurzwellen mit Beethoven’ (Kelly, 
2014, pp.103-105). In this context, Werner Rackwitz, Deputy Minister for Culture, demanded 
that: ‘Beethoven needs to be revoked from the ‘‘barbaric and anti-humanist imperialists’’ in 
the bourgeois sector of German societyˈ (cited in Dennis, 1996, pp.177-183). 
The role of terminology in cultural policy should be mentioned when examining the enduring 
Abgrenzung discourse in 1970. The bicentenary was generally referred to in West Germany 
as the Beethoven Jubiläum. However, apart from a few references to the year as Jubiläums-
Jahr the term almost exclusively used in official GDR documents, media coverage and 
publicity material was Beethoven-Ehrung. The use of Ehrung for this and similar major 
commemorations of historical personalities throughout GDR history suggests a notion of 
respectful acknowledgment, even idolised veneration of Beethoven in his bicentenary year, in 
contrast to the far more relaxed anniversary celebrations that year in West Germany. As an 
analysis of the implementation and media coverage of the GDR events will substantiate, this 
choice of terminology may be construed as evidence of an intent by the architects of the 
bicentenary in the GDR to differentiate their approach vis-a-vis (their portrayal of) prevailing 
musicological and cultural attitudes to Beethoven in West Germany: ‘Beethovens politisches 
Engagement für die Sache des Fortschritts, das Heroische und Heldische in seinem Musik 
wird vom "Sockel der Verehrung" herabgezerrt. (Eine neue Spielart der von Thomas Mann 




4.2.3. The DKBˈs task: determining a Marxist ideological framework for Beethoven 
Planning began with an internal meeting of the ZKM within the DKB in which the Beethoven 
bicentenary was only one of several agenda items.86 The meeting agreed the format and guest 
list for a two-day planning ‘Beethoven-Kolloquium’ at the end of October 1969, intended to 
be an internal meeting of approximately 100-120 representatives from the central ZKM and 
regional Bezirkskommissionen Musik, with a few invited guests from the URANIA, FDBG 
and FDJ mass organisations. A subsequent undated report records instead a widely publicised 
Beethoven Konferenz on 31 October to 1 November 1969, a larger scale format than was in 
the original proposal of an internal ZKM colloquium. The report begins with a reference to 
various preceding interventions by the MfK in the ZKM’s planning of the conference agenda: 
‘Nach mehreren Gesprächen und Festlegungen im Ministerium für Kultur, speziell mit 
unserem Kommissionsmitglied, dem stellvertretenden Minister Dr. Rackwitz, und dem 
Verband Deutscher Komponisten und Musikwissenschaftler […],führten Mitglieder und die 
Sekretärin der ZK Musik, Einzelgespräche mit den Referenten und den vorgesehenen 
Diskussionsrednern.’ 87 The prescriptive interventions and far wider range of participants may 
reflect how the preparations for the bicentenary were increasingly gaining senior attention 
within the government. In contrast to the restricted scope of guests for the colloquium, the 
140 attendees at the conference would thus include not only representatives of the ZKM, but 
also senior officials of the MfK, MfV, Deutsche Staatsbibliothek (Musik), TV, radio and 
press, and publishing houses.  
The report’s introduction summarises three main goals of the conference, exposing the 
priorities and concerns of the organisers and political authorities; firstly, ‘die 
Musikpropagandisten im DKB und in anderen gesellschaftlichen Organisationen und 
Institutionen mit neuen theoretischen und praktischen Problemen der schöpferischen 
Aneignung des Beethovenschen Werkes vertraut zu machen’(ibid.). These ‘problems’ are not 
elaborated on in the report as such but are dealt with in the keynote closing speech, described 
below. The foregrounding of the term Aneignung up front as a common objective for all the 
Musikpropagandisten, that is, the bicentenary’s artistic stakeholders, clearly shows it to be a 
significant policy in relation to cultural heritage in general and the Beethoven bicentenary in 
particular. The second goal of the conference sets out to clarify all of the musical 
community’s roles and responsibilities as stakeholder in the commemoration: ‘ sie [die 
Musikpropagandisten] auf ihre wesentlichen Aufgaben zu orientieren und so die Beethoven-
Ehrung 1970 zu einem wirksamen Höhepunkt im geistig-kulturellen Leben ihrer 
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Wirkungsbereiche zu gestalten.’ (ibid.). The words ‘orientieren’ and ‘wirksam’ suggest a 
concern for operational efficiency. The final goal of the conference states a general 
educational objective – aimed at workers and young people: ‘Die Schrittmacher der 
Produktion und darüber hinaus breite Schichten der Werktätigen und der Jugend für 
klassische Musik zu gewinnen’ (ibid.). Seen together, this goal creates an image of GDR 
citizens as culturally enthusiastic workers engaging with socialist passion in their particular 
musical heritage, thus enhancing their sense of national identity. Later sections of this chapter 
will assess whether and to what extent this goal was achieved.  
However, even at this early aims-setting stage of the commemoration there is evidence that 
issues surfaced which, on the face of it, threatened the consistency of the ideological 
framework – and ultimately the desired promotion of national identity. Professor Harry 
Goldschmidt, a leading musicological architect of the bicentenary, gave a speech on his 
concept for the bicentenary. In the closing section of the conference report, under the title of 
‘Kritisches’, Goldschmidt is admonished for deviating from a previously agreed ideological 
approach: 
Leider hat sich Professor Goldschmidt nicht an die in der Beratung der zentralen 
Kommission vom 5.9.1969 diskutierte Konzeption gehalten. Deshalb wurde zu 
Beginn des zweiten Konferenztages durch die Versammlungsleitung noch einmal 
betont, daß seine vorgetragenen Untergliederungen von Schiller-Texten zu 
Beethovenschen Instrumentalwerken seine persönliche Auffassung darstellen (ibid.).  
But in what may be seen as a conciliatory move with regards to Goldschmidt’s role, the 
report’s author, Helmut Neujahr, a DKB official, immediately acknowledges Goldschmidt as 
having followed the official line on the impact of Beethoven’s revolutionary credentials: 
‘Trotz dieser kritischen Bemerkungen hat Professor Goldschmidt in seinem Vortrag 
Beethovens Rezeption der französischen Revolution und die progressiven Bildungselemente, 
die seine ideologische Haltung begründeten, das politische und künstlerisch-ästhetische 
Engagement Beethovens plastisch herausgearbeitet’(ibid.).  
The final speech of the planning conference was to provide a significant ‘Leitlinie für die 
praktische Arbeit’ of the commemorations that followed. As such it provides us with a useful, 
well-articulated synopsis of the official ideological aims of the commemorations. Prof. Paul 
Michel, Leiter der Hochschule für Musik in Weimar, and a prominent GDR musicologist, 
gave the closing keynote speech at this conference. In his lengthy (twelve-page) address, he 
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sets out several ‘Leitlinien für die Arbeit des Freundeskreises Musik im Deutschen 
Kulturbund anlässlich der 200. Wiederkehr des Geburtstages Ludwig van Beethovens’.88 
Although nominally phrased as guidelines for the musical community within the DKB, the 
speech provides a useful summary of the themes and phraseology which appeared in 
subsequent bicentenary events and GDR media coverage. Michel determines that the overall 
goal of the Beethoven-Ehrung is to maximise publicity for a revised, Marxist interpretation of 
Beethoven: ‘Ziel aller Bemühungen muss es sein, das neue Marxistische Beethoven-Bild zum 
festen Besitz möglichst vieler Menschen werden zu lassen.’ (ibid., p.1). Although the 
concurrent West German approach to Beethoven is mentioned at this point, by implication 
this new ‘Beethoven-Bild’ is integral to the GDR’s distinct ideological framework. As such, 
the underlying effect of the new ‘Bild’, that is, Marxist interpretation of Beethoven, may be 
expected at least to support and even promote a GDR-specific national identity.  
Michel then sets out links between Beethoven and certain cultural movements, events, and 
individuals – all likely to be received as quintessentially important by his audience: citing the 
‘Grundideen des dialektischen und historischen Materialismus’ as context, he positions 
Beethoven as a role model for an artist committed to the progress of society: ‘[…] es kommt 
vor allem darauf an, Beethoven in Realitäten gemäß als einen für den gesellschaftlichen 
Fortschritt und den Humanismus engagierten Künstler zu kennzeichnen.’ However, instead of 
providing historical examples of such progress, Michel uses hyperbole to place Beethoven 
onto a quasi-mythical pedestal: ‘Seine Kunst hat Leitbilder geschaffen, die den um einen 
neuen realen Humanismus liegenden Menschen zu ihrer geistigen Prägung verhelfen. Sie 
kulminiert in dem prometheischen Leitbild einer schöpferischen, von Ausbeutung und 
unterdrückungsfreien Gesellschaft verantwortlicher Persönlichkeiten. (ibid., pp.1-2).’ Michel 
goes on to connect Beethoven to arguably the most iconic – for GDR ideologues – historical 
event and historical personality: 
Es gilt […], die Bezugslinien zwischen den großen gesellschaftlichen Ereignissen der 
französischen Revolution und Beethovens Schaffen heraus zu arbeiten […]. Im 
Besonderen soll aufgezeigt werden, wie Beethoven mit seinen progressiven 
Auffassungen über die Rolle des schöpferischen Menschen in der Gesellschaft die 
Schwelle zu den Lehren von Karl Marx erreichte […] Beethoven begriff sein 




Once again Michel proposes these links in general terms without specific references or 
examples. Instead he pays political homage to the coincidentally parallel 1970 centenary of 
Lenin’s birthday. With reference to how it is embedded in the overall cultural policy of the 
GDR, Michel explicitly legitimises the GDR’s claim to Beethoven as a continuation of 
Lenin’s approach to proletarian culture: 
Es wird so einer der Grundsätze unserer sozialistischen Kulturpolitik immer wieder 
über das Werk Beethovens transformiert, daß wir die großen Menschheitswerte der 
Kunst und Wissenschaft der Vergangenheit hochhalten und sie allen Menschen 
erschließen. Hier verwirklicht sich das verpflichtende Wort Lenins aus dem 
bekannten Resolutionsentwurf zur proletarischen Kultur (1920). […] Die historische 
und die moralische Legitimation, den Genius Beethoven sein eigen zu nennen, ist in 
unserer Republik mit ihrer sozialistischen Gesellschaftsordnung gegeben […]. (ibid., 
p.4). 
Michel’s subsequent attack combines the positive appropriation of Beethoven as part of 
socialist national heritage with a negative demarcation of Beethoven as ‘not West German’ 
and, by implication, therefore being ‘of the GDR’:  
Die das Werk Beethovens als kostbaren Schatz integrierende sozialistische 
Nationalkultur ist eben der Kulturdemontage in der Bundesrepublik um eine ganze 
historische Epoche voraus. Nirgendwo anders sind daher auf deutschem Boden die 
gesellschaftlichen Voraussetzungen gegeben, als geistige Heimat Beethovens zu 
gelten als in der DDR, dem antiimperialistischen deutschen Friedenstaat, der den 
Sozialismus vollendet. (ibid. p.5).  
As in other sections of the speech, the reference to a historic era is not substantiated. Instead 
Michel points bluntly to the ‘Bonner Staat der Monopolisten, Tummelplatz des Neonazismus’ 
and its ‘Streben nach Atomwaffen’ as diametrically opposed to the lofty ideals of ‘Alle 
Menschen werden Brüder’ in Beethoven’s ninth symphony setting of Schiller’s ‘Ode an die 
Freude’.89 All of the above elements culminate in a notable phrase that confirms a significant 
message to Michel’s audience and to the readers of his speech: a discernable tie between an 
active awareness of Beethoven’s cultural value and a GDR sense of national identity: ‘Nur 
durch ein solches Bewusstsein der kulturellen Werte in der Musik Beethovens wird der Stolz 




In summary, Michel crystallises a new Marxist approach to Beethoven as the single most 
important objective of the bicentenary. Positioning Beethoven as a revolutionary, Michel then 
neatly links Marx as Beethoven’s natural successor, in order to legitimise the appropriation of 
Beethoven in a twentieth century, socialist Germany, whose cultural policy is inspired by 
Lenin. The ideological conclusion of this progression is that the desired national identity can 
only be achieved by reinforcing the cultural demarcation to West Germany.  
There is no documented evidence that this speech was to become a widespread, prescriptive 
reference document in the GDR on the official approach to Beethoven as a historical 
personality. However, the President of the DKB, Prof. Burghardt, confirmed at the October 
1970 meeting of the Beethoven Committee that it had been published by the DKB in 12,000 
copies and distributed as ‘Leitlinie für die praktische Arbeit’ – presumably mostly within the 
DKB.90 Its circumstantial value as an encapsulation of the official, party line on Beethoven 
can therefore best be determined by investigating in the following sections of this chapter 
how the aims in the official concept were implemented, their reception and their longer-term 
outcome.  
4.2.4. Bicentenary aims: the appearance of public consensus from all stakeholders  
The initial planning phase of the bicentenary was concluded in March 1970 with the formal 
constituting (Konstituierung) of the Beethoven Committee. The fifty members included 
representatives of all the cultural and political constituencies mentioned earlier, who 
subsequently met from time to time throughout 1970 to review progress. The speeches at the 
inaugural establishment meeting were published in a single booklet and reproduced widely in 
the national press.91 The six speakers were selected to represent most of the prominent 
stakeholders in the bicentenary. They included a lengthy introduction by the head of the 
GDR’s government, Willi Stoph. His appointment as chairman of the Beethoven Committee 
may be seen, as with the choice of the Committee’s title, to project the particular importance 
of the bicentenary. The title differs from that of the preceding, comparable Schiller 
Committee der DDR by including the term Ehrung, inferring, as discussed earlier, a 
reverential attitude to this bicentenary (ibid., pp.5-12).  
Stoph’s keynote opening speech contains all of the themes previously articulated by Michel. 
Several additional points are noteworthy: at the outset, he expresses a wish that ‘[…] vom 
Beethoven-Komitee der DDR durch Ihrer aller Mitarbeit neue starke Impulse für das 
aufblühen unseres sozialistischen Musiklebens ausgehen werden’ (ibid.). It is unclear whether 
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Musikleben may be interpreted here as a reference to the participatory aspects of music noted 
above as an important German tradition. Appearing implicitly to acknowledge the prevailing 
political hierarchy, Stoph then quotes General Secretary of the SED and GDR leader, Walter 
Ulbricht’s speech at the annual New Year’s concert of Beethoven’s ninth symphony: ‘[…] 
alle Menschen können Brüder werden, weil das werktätige Volk sich von den Ketten 
imperialistischer Ausbeuter und Unterdrücker befreite und die Gestaltung seines Schicksals 
in die eigenen Hände nahm’ (ibid.). Stoph characterises Ulbricht’s words as the ‘[…] 
eigentliche Anliegen der Beethoven-Ehrung unserer Republik’. Repeating Michel’s reference 
at the Potsdam planning conference, this phrasing alludes to the seventh line of the first verse 
of Schiller’s ‘Ode an die Freude’ (‘Alle Menschen werden Brüder’), used by Beethoven in 
the final movement of his ninth symphony. Stoph creates a layer of political legitimacy by 
combining the allusion with the construction of the GDR having been founded as a liberation 
by the working class.92 
He then goes on to add a new dimension to the Beethoven bicentenary by associating it with 
two other anniversaries in 1970. The previous reference to a ‘legitimizing anti-fascism’ 
(Brinks, 1997, p.208) is repeated with: ‘[…] die Zerschlagung des Hitler Faschismus vor 25 
Jahren durch die ruhmreiche Sowjetarmee schuf die Voraussetzungen für eine 
gesellschaftliche Entwicklung, in der sich Kunst und Kultur bei uns zu hoher sozialistischer 
Blüte entfalten konnten’.93 Replicating Michel’s references to Lenin, Stoph expands on the 
Soviet perspective by again drawing attention to the concurrent centenary of Lenin’s birth. 
He notes a musical connection between Lenin and Beethoven: ‘[…] wir wissen um seine 
große Liebe zur Musik, um seine tiefen Beziehungen zu Beethoven, besonders zur ‘‘Sonate 
Pathéthique’’ und zur ‘‘Appassionata’’’ (ibid., pp.13-17). More importantly, according to 
Stoph, and again continuing Michel’s theme, Lenin is cited to also legitimise the 
appropriation of cultural heritage:  
Es war Lenin, der sagte, daß sich jeder Kommunist, dass sich die gesamte 
Arbeiterklasse und ihre Verbündeten alle Schätze der Weltkultur aneignen müssen. […] 
Als solches zentrales Problem stellen und lösen wir in der Deutschen Demokratischen 
Republik die Frage der schöpferischen Aneignung des künstlerischen Erbes und seine 
Einbeziehung in die sozialistische Nationalkultur.’ (ibid.). 
In closing, the issue of which German state has a valid claim on Beethoven enables Stoph to 
revert to the persistent demarcation discourse: 
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In der Westdeutschen Bundesrepublik wird eine im Prinzip volksfeindliche Kultur-und 
Kunstpolitik betrieben. Unter den dort herrschenden Verhältnissen führt der Versuch, 
Beethoven als Aushängeschild für diese Politik zu benutzen, zu keiner Legitimation, 
das Erbe des großen Komponisten anzutreten. Hier zeigt sich die durch nichts zu 
überdeckende tiefe Divergenz zwischen unserer geistig-kulturellen Entwicklung und 
derjenigen in der Bundesrepublik.’ (ibid.). 
A defensive message of legitimacy appears therefore to be the overriding argument in 
Stoph’s speech, possibly reflecting the anticipated publicity of the inauguration of the 
Beethoven Committee, both domestically and internationally.  
Immediately following Stoph, Werner Rackwitz, Deputy Minister at the MfK gave an 
overview of all the planned major cultural events listed in the next, implementation section of 
this chapter, as well as the large-scale recording project of the complete works of Beethoven. 
Three features of Rackwitz’s contribution stand out (ibid., pp.13-14). Firstly, he points to an 
innovative recording project of all Beethovenˈs works, as an opportunity to engage young 
people in the objectives of the bicentenary. Since the report on the planning conference 
reviewed above, this is a relatively rare public reference to youth in the context of the 
commemoration events: ‘Zugleich werden durch diese Gesamtausgabe – insbesondere, wenn 
die Beschäftigung mit der Schallplatte und regelmäßige Konzertbesuch einander ergänzen – 
Voraussetzungen geschaffen, daß sich die Jugend Beethoven erobert und […] sein 
revolutionärer Geist sie zur Größe im Denken und Handeln beflügelt.’94 Secondly, much 
space is given over in his speech to explaining the logistical challenges of maximising live 
and recorded performances of Beethoven. However, there is no mention of using the 
bicentenary to extend the musical participation of the masses from listening to ‘Musizieren’, 
active making of music. This omission is in line with it not being mentioned as a goal in any 
preceding bicentenary concept or major speech. As we noted in the Kollwitz case study, 
promoting such participation as a ‘Forderung nach einer Volksnähe von Kunst’ was, 
however, a key component of Socialist Realism (Jungmann, 2011, p.84). The DKB and its 
ZKM, through its umbrella structure for amateur musicians, would have been the appropriate 
bicentenary sponsor to be publicly allocated this task. Its exclusion is difficult to interpret, 
and so this concentration on passive listening reveals already a gap between the ideal of a 
national identity based on the engagement of the masses and the reality of elite-driven events.  
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Finally, in a noticeably brief, two-sentence paragraph, the DKB itself receives only the 
cursory mention of the Potsdam planning conference as having made a ‘wertvoller Beitrag 
[…] um Musikpropagandisten im Deutschen Kulturbund […] mit neuen Fragen der 
schöpferischen Aneignung des Werkes von Beethoven vertraut zu machen’.95 Given its role 
as the initiator and major sponsor of the planning process, this apparent understatement is 
amplified by the absence of any high-ranking ZKB representative as one of the six speakers 
at this central bicentenary planning event. Instead, two of the four much shorter speeches 
were made by less senior musicologists associated with the ZKB: Professor Dieter Zechlin, 
discussing the importance of Beethoven for professional musicians and the musicologist, 
Professor Alfred Brockhaus, on the plans for the Academic Beethoven conference. A 
potential explanation for this seemingly undervalued treatment being caused by tensions 
between the DKB and the MfK will be explored in the internal post-bicentenary evaluations 
discussed later in this chapter. The remaining short addresses were given by Professor Horst 
Kunze, Generaldirektor of the Deutsche Staatsbibliothek, on the publication of Beethoven’s 
Konversationshefte, and Erwin Ernst, Direktor des VEB Kombinat Pumpen und Verdichter, 
Halle. His short contribution, entitled ‘Die Ehrung Beethovens – ein Anliegen der 
Arbeiterklasse’ came third in the running order of the event after the Stoph and Rackwitz 
speeches (ibid., p.18). The placement may be viewed as demonstrating the political priority 
of the Bitterfelder Weg and its goal of bringing industrial organisations and its workers closer 
to the artistic community. This aspiration is summarised in Ernst’s closing words: ‘So 
gedenken wir unsere kulturpolitische Aufgabe im Sinne Lenins auch in Zukunft zu erfüllen, 
wonach die Kunst dem Volke gehört und ihre Wurzeln in den arbeitenden, schaffenden 
Massen haben soll.’(ibid., p.20).  
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4.2.5 Internal tensions emerge between party and government  
Compared to the 1959 Schiller bicentenary, the process described here so far suggests not 
only more timely preparation but also consistent links to the ideological framework set out by 
Michel six months earlier at the Potsdam planning conference. Superficially, Stoph’s speech 
at the Beethoven Committee inauguration in March 1970 indicates continuity with Michel’s 
address. It is important, however, to review the intervening period between the planning 
conference and the Beethoven Committee inauguration. Official archives reveal recurrent 
tensions between the stakeholders involved in the commemoration which were also recorded 
in subsequent official assessments. Both practical as well as ideological issues appeared over 
the entire period. Together they indicate that any explicit or implicit intention of the 
authorities to exploit the bicentenary in order to promote a national identity based on the 
principles of demarcation from the West and appropriation of classical heritage, may, to some 
extent, have been undermined as a result of these tensions. 
Investigating the interaction between various political officials involved in the bicentenary 
raises the question as to how ideological objectives were articulated, and whether they were 
consistent, both in content and tone. Following the principal Politbüro resolution of 9 
December 1969,96 MfK Minister Klaus Gysi’s final submission in February 1970 to the 
Ministerrat der DDR confirmed the formal establishment of the Beethoven Committee. It 
also approved a budget of 800,000 Marks for official bicentenary events, and the final 
concept for the design of the Beethoven commemoration events in December 1970.97  
The content and language of Gysi’s final submission in early 1970 on behalf of the MfK, 
reveals ideological inconsistencies when compared to his earlier correspondence with the ZK, 
Abteilung Kultur. Gysi had originally submitted an initial draft version of the ´Konzeption für 
die Beethoven-Ehrung der DDR 1970 für den Ministerrat’ in March 1969 to the ZK.98 Arno 
Hochmuth, Abteilungsleiter at the ZK had replied with a four-page statement, allowing ample 
time for Gysi and the Ministry to consider and implement any additions or corrections 
proposed.99 The importance of the correspondence is reflected in the relative seniority of 
Hochmuth as Leiter der Abteilung Kultur, directly under Kurt Hager (the Politbüro member 
responsible for culture) in the SED hierarchy. As member of both the Westkommission and of 
the Kulturkommission des Politbüros des ZK der SED, Gysi was himself a senior SED 
official. But at the same time acting as government minister, Gysi was functionally outranked 
by Hochmuth: ‘die Sekretäre und Abteilungsleiter des ZK waren gegenüber den staatlichen 
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Ministern weisungsbefugt’.100 This reality reflects the explicit leadership role of the SED, 
enshrined in Article 1 of the 1968 GDR Constitution. 
The opening paragraphs in Hochmuth’s statement are positive: The concept is noted as 
providing a ‘richtige Grundlage’ for the ‘Beethoven-Ehrung’. Yet, at the same time, this is 
qualified by ‘im Prinzip’, leaving the door open for more critical comments. The word 
‘richtig’ is repeated twice in the acknowledgement of how the Beethoven-Lenin connection is 
handled in the concept, as well as, more vaguely, in ‘wichtige Aufgaben’ for the Ehrung 
itself. Double repetition of ‘Überarbeitung und Vertiefung’ towards the end of the opening 
paragraphs may at first suggest that what follows are drafting comments. The subsequent 
seven points, however, describe what Hochmuth regards as substantive omissions or faulty 
phrasings rather than wording that requires fine-tuning. 
The first two items criticise the absence of any reference to progress in the ‘entwickelte 
sozialistische Gesellschaft’ since the previous Beethoven-Ehrung of 1952. In emphasising his 
wish for ‘…das Neue’, of a new approach to Beethoven in 1970, to be visibly recognised, 
Hochmuth wants the concept to crystallise how GDR society has moved forward in terms of 
the prominence of the ‘Arbeiterklasse’. The ‘Verwirklichung des Bitterfelder Weges’ is 
therefore specifically noted here as evidence of this raised profile, as is the need to record the 
‘Pflege’ and ‘Aneignung’ of Beethoven as major contributions towards the ‘Aufstieg der 
Arbeiterklasse zur siegreichen Klasse in der DDR’.  
Looking forward, the item goes on to imply that the concept focuses more on theory than 
practice: ‘In stärkerem Maße […] sollten jedoch praktische Maßnahmen festgelegt werden’, 
in order to facilitate the dissemination of the cultural events in the workplace. The existing 
composition of the Beethoven Committee is criticised for being too ‘kulturexklusiv’, thus 
calling for an expansion of ‘werktätiger Schichten’. Hochmuth identifies an overall weakness 
in the concept’s treatment of the working class, he recommends therefore that the concept 
first be restructured by substituting a purely historical construct with the ‘Verhältnis der 
Arbeiterklasse zu Beethoven’ as a basic premise and then introducing historic references as 
appropriate. The third item focuses on the planned ‘Beethoven-Kongress’ and all related 
‘wissenschaftliche Vorbereitungsarbeit’. The statement that ‘die Vertiefung des 
sozialistischen Beethovenbildes muß also einen aktuellen Bezug haben ‘ not only points to a 
supposedly missing contemporisation, but conspicuously insists on its inclusion in the 
concept. A further item calls for the removal of unclear ‘Verschwommenheit’ in certain 
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phrasings and terminology and (instead) advises consistent usage of ‘klare Begriffe des 
Marxismus-Leninismus und Parteibeschlüsse’. With almost a page of examples, this item 
reads as an implicit reprimand. Hochmuth alludes to ‘Parteibeschlüsse’ in his demand for 
specific terminology, such as ‘Ausbeutung’ and ‘Unterdrückung’ in preference to ‘eine 
Gesellschaft ohne Unterschied von Rang und Farbe’.101 The response closes with two further 
action points: an external, public proclamation to be made by the Beethoven Committee, and 
an internal, final confirmation of the concept by the Politbüro. The latter may well have been 
interpreted by Gysi as a reminder of the ultimate political authority in the process. 
In summary, this document demonstrates the role of Hochmuth and the ZK as the 
institutional guardian of SED ideology in influencing the implementation of cultural policy 
by the MfK at the time. Hochmuth’s key objective in this letter is to highlight the supposedly 
prominent role gained by the GDR’s working-class since the state’s inception in 1949 as a 
major feature of GDR national identity. From Hochmuth’s perspective as SED spokesperson, 
the Beethoven-Ehrung should therefore serve to solidify this identity (for example, by direct 
participation of the working classes in events). His critique also illustrates the emerging gap 
between theory and practice, that is the tension referred to earlier between an idealised 
‘Volksnähe’ and a commemoration looking more likely to be dominated by the cultural and 
political elite of the GDR. 
Hochmuth’s covering letter sets out an expectation that the points in his response ‘[…] sollten 
bei der Überarbeitung [...] Berücksichtigung finden’. This could be understood as implicitly 
prescriptive, according to a description of the euphemism code employed between the ZK 
and Ministry at the time (Bradley, 2010, pp.14-16). Hochmuth’s response may therefore have 
been understood by Gysi, notwithstanding his own senior SED role, as a list of follow-up 
points to be acted on, rather than as an advisory opinion. But neither of the references called 
for by Hochmuth to the ‘Siegreiche Arbeiterklasse’ and to the ongoing Lenin centenary 
appear in Gysi’s final submission to the Ministerrat of 10 February 1970. The final 
composition of the Beethoven Committee reveals a further deviation from Hochmuth’s letter. 
Hochmuth had set out very specific instructions: ‘Weiterhin sollte die Zusammensetzung des 
Beethoven-Komitees für die Beethoven-Ehrung der DDR erweitert werden. Es sollten 
hervorragende Vertreter der Arbeiterklasse, der Genossenschaftsbauern und anderer 
werktätiger Schichten in das Beethoven Komittee aufgenommen werden. Gegenwärtig ist das 
Beethoven-Komitee gewissermaßen zu kulturexklusiv zusammengesetzt’. But the subsequent 
list of fifty committee members reveals only three whose title seem to match Hochmuth’s 
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criteria: Herbert Braunroth, Brigadier der Komplexbrigade, ‘‘Ottmar Gerster’’, VEB 
Weimar-Kombinat, Weimar; Ursula Drenger, Landwirtschaftliche 
Produktionsgenossenschaft “Lenin”, Marzahn; and Friedrich Ries, BGL- Vorsitzender des 
VEB Kombinat Tiefbau, Berlin.102  
One might argue that all these departures from Hochmuth’s letter could be related to 
accidental slippage over the twelve months it took to complete the planning phase; more 
plausibly these substantive deviations indicate that some members of the political hierarchy 
retained a certain amount of leeway and agency in their reaction to instructions from 
nominally more senior SED authority. Already in the planning phase it is worth recording 
therefore that unanimity between the stakeholders on the aims and priorities of the Beethoven 
bicentenary was not as robust as projected in public. If these flaws were to continue into the 
implementation phase they could undermine official efforts to see the commemorations 
contributing towards the formation of national identity. 
4.3 IMPLEMENTATION  
In the following I examine how the aims and plans for the Beethoven bicentenary 
commemorations were executed by the main stakeholders. The analytical focus is specifically 
on the most relevant sections of the DKBˈs intellectual community, namely composers, 
conductors and musicologists. All of these provide examples of agency potentially 
detrimental to the aims of the commemorations. Much of the evidence reviewed here for the 
first time originates from internal, post-commemorations DKB reports; these documents 
reveal various difficulties arising during the implementation across the country. The 
challenges of communicating a Marxist interpretation of Beethoven’s personality and work to 
a wider public audience are particularly relevant to the research question. Finally, a variance 
in tone and approach will also be discussed as to how the GDR press and broadcast media 
communicated the aims of the commemorations.  
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4.3.1. Summary of activities: adhering to a tried and tested format? 
As in the other case-studies in this thesis, the broad structure of the Beethoven bicentenary 
commemorations can be split into two, partly overlapping phases. The main events, 
generating the most publicity and senior political attendance, centred around the birthday 
anniversary on 16 December. These were a Beethoven exhibition in Berlin, from 3-31 
December; a week of special concerts throughout the GDR (ˈFestwocheˈ), from 10-18 
December; an international academic conference, from 10-12 December; and an official 
Festakt on 16 December. Throughout 1970 these events were complemented by a 
comprehensive, nationwide programme of live concerts and TV/radio broadcasts, lectures, 
exhibitions and publications. In the following I will evaluate how those commemoration 
stakeholders charged with implementing the aims actually executed their tasks. The objective 
here is to gauge whether any likely effect on the formation of national identity can be 
attributed to issues surfacing in this implementation and its identifiable reception.  
4.3.2. The DKB’s role in the bicentenary: not consistently committed and engaged?  
In early 1971 the ZKM des DKB undertook a similar post-bicentenary internal evaluation to 
that of the MfK. Their report provides valuable insights into how this key mass organisation, 
charged with operating a major cultural project across the GDR, responded to the initiative. A 
questionnaire was sent to music work groups (‘Arbeitsgruppen’) within twelve regional DKB 
centres across the GDR.103 The responses were then collated into a single report104 which is 
analysed here from two perspectives. Firstly, the design of the questionnaire, and quality and 
timing of responses, in other words the evaluation process as such, gives an insight into the 
internal power structure within this mass organisation of some 200,000 members (at that 
time). Understanding the reality of the power structure is important in the context of the 
research question; it can be argued that the smoother and more efficient the ˈcommand and 
controlˈ nature of this structure, the more likely that the official aims of the commemoration 
can be achieved. Secondly, the response data provides some indications of grass root 
reception within an admittedly small sample of the population, but one that was nevertheless 
specifically targeted. This evidence is useful as an illustration of the success or failure of 
efforts to appropriate Beethoven.  
The questionnaire is phrased as a recommendation to all twelve regions of the DKB ‘nach 
einheitlichen Gesichtspunkten eine differenzierte Einschätzung unserer Arbeit im Beethoven-
Jahr zu geben’. Taken literally, this ‘recommendation’ could have been received as a non-
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mandatory request, rather than an implied, top-down instruction. The questionnaire also asks 
specifically for qualitative input about contributions from and cooperation within the DKB 
regional structure, that is ‘Ortsgruppen,’ ‘Klubs’ and the ‘Freundeskreise’. Four main 
questions are covered: communication of the Marxist approach to Beethoven; the number of 
events and participants, elaborating on worker and youth attendance plus a one to five scale 
success evaluation of event quality and activity level; the contribution of the DKB to 
performance of lesser-known works of Beethoven; and finally, conclusions for future musical 
activity in the region. The questions relating to ideology head the list: 
In welchem Maße gelang es, in unseren Veranstaltungen das Marxistische Beethoven-
Bild, – vor allem unter dem Gesichtspunkt der zur Gegenwart führenden 
Traditionslinien – zu vermitteln und erlebbar zu machen? In welchem Maße wurde 
zur Lösung dieser Aufgabe das schöpferische Gespräch zielstrebig genutzt? [emphasis 
in original] 
This question appears to be the most important for the authors, Prof. Karl Laux, Vorsitzender 
der ZKM and Gerd Haines, Bundessekretär des DKBsˈ; ‘Marxistisches Beethoven-Bild’ are 
the only words underlined throughout the three-page recommendation, demonstrating the 
overriding importance of creating a very distinct, politically-inspired image of Beethoven. 
The content and date of the subsequent report reveal that some ZKM regions were either slow 
or very late in their responses. The report begins with a remarkable self-criticism of the ZKM 
itself; ‘Die Teilnahme von Mitgliedern der ZKM an den Arbeitsgruppen-Beratungen war 
noch nicht zufriedenstellend.’105 The collated report notes that 855 events took place in the 
twelve regions, with an average of eighty-five participants per event. Many events were 
concerts, others were combined with or consisted only of lectures and/or discussions. The 
absence of a standard event format reveals that there was considerable organisational 
autonomy at local DKB level. The regions were asked to grade their assessments using a 1 to 
5 range, with frequent feedback of 4, ‘unbefriedigend’ on the ideological aspects. The report 
summarises that the Bezirke struggled to deliver the required ideological aspects of the 
bicentenary, yet acknowledge the contributions, where received, of musicologists. Linking 
the success or failure of communicating a Marxist Beethoven to the presence of a 
musicologist suggests that the Bezirke did not understand the original objective:  
Die ideologischen und inhaltlichen Fragen wurden mangelhaft und sehr allgemein 
beantwortet. Am schwersten fiel allen Bezirken die Beantwortung der Frage, in 
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welchem Maße es gelang, das marxistische Beethoven-Bild zu vermitteln und 
erlebbar zu machen. Neben einigen zu leicht gefällig genommenen Einschätzungen, 
die feststellten, daß es gelungen sei, wird bewertet, dass es am besten dort gelang, wo 
Musikwissenschaftler tätig waren. Auf alle Fälle hat es überall große Bemühungen 
gegeben, ein marxistisches Beethoven-Bild zu vermitteln.106  
Three selected returns illustrate the range of variances between regions: Berlin records 1500 
participants in twenty events (with an average of seventy-five participants per event) two-
thirds of which are categorised as youth. The overall evaluation of event quality is three 
(‘befriedigend’). The three-page response mentions that one-third of events had no lecture or 
discussion, attributed to an absence of expert support from higher levels in the DKB 
structure. The Dresden report (one and a half pages) cites forty-two events and 3,200 
participants (with an average of eighty). The ‘Marxistische Beethoven-Bild’ question is left 
unanswered, and there is no information on youth and worker participation. Finally, and in 
contrast, a five-page Magdeburg return provides detailed answers to all questions. With 3,600 
participants at fifty-five events in total (an average of sixty-five per event), reception was 
considerably higher in urban than in rural areas. Without providing any quantitative data the 
youth percentage is described as one (‘sehr gut’), and that of workers as two (‘gut’). 
As a final item, the report refers to the designated lead role and self-perceived importance of 
the DKB’s ‘Kunstpropagandistische Arbeit’ in actively promoting culture at grass root level:  
Über neue Partnerschaftsbeziehungen gibt es erfreuliche Berichte. 
- Zu Freundeskreise Literatur,  
- Zu Betrieben (Neubrandenburg, Karl-Marx-Stadt, Rostock),  
- Zu Facheinrichtungen (fast in allen Bezirken),  
- Zum Staatsapparat. Auch im Beethoven-Jahr hat sich gezeigt, daß der Kulturbund 
oft der Initiator gewesen ist: wir müssen es weiter bleiben; aber das wird uns nur 
gelingen, wenn wir ein attraktiver und zuverlässiger Partner sind.107 
Although there is no specific reference here to the commemoration events, strengthening 
cultural ties to various sections of GDR society during the anniversary year inserts a positive, 
if indirect, contribution to the overall aims of the Beethoven centenary. All the activities 
listed here may well have been received by the reader of the report as reinforcing the ZKMˈs 
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role in helping to promote an aspect of national identity linked to a distinct socio-cultural 
approach to music. 
The patchy execution of the bicentenary events within the DKB can be interpreted as a sign 
of some weakness within the overall operational organisation of the bicentenary in the GDR. 
If one reads a degree of voluntary cooperation into how those addressed responded to the 
questionnaire, then this aspect of mass organised GDR culture demonstrates the reality of a 
consensus based rather than a rigid, top-down, imposed system. Mary Fulbrook argues that 
‘the system of mass organisations in the shaping and experience of East German lives cannot 
be overestimated’. At the same time, she concedes that ‘the nature of this influence is harder 
to define clearly’. The sample evidence, researched here, of the bicentenary’s reception 
within the DKB supports her description of mass organisations as a ‘not necessarily heavily 
politicised activity’, ‘part of normal leisure’, and ‘bringing culture to the masses’ (Fulbrook, 
2005, pp.74-86). In the narrower terms of the research question and the bicentenary focus, the 
evidence shows that the mass organisations on the ground did not always understand what the 
senior functionaries meant by a Marxist Beethoven. This outcome points to an interim 
conclusion that the effort to construct identity based on the ideal of mass engagement with 
cultural heritage was only partially successful. In summary, all this evidence on the DKB as a 
significant bicentenary stakeholder complements similar findings on the gap between theory 
and reality described throughout the case studies in this thesis. 
4.3.3. Eigensinn threatens the national identity objective: the role of intellectuals in the 
implementation of bicentenary events. 
What does the bicentenary’s implementation tell us about the relationship between the SED 
party and government on the one hand, and academics, musicians, composers and 
musicologists, all referred to in the following as ‘intellectuals’? This aspect is relevant to the 
research question as the Schiller and Kollwitz commemorations each reveal a certain degree 
of independent thinking and non-compliance with explicit aims that was demonstrably 
exercised by intellectuals. This evidence in turn may be seen to have affected efforts to 
construct, in each case, a specific kind of national identity, based on a coherent and consistent 
approach to the cultural icon being commemorated.  
Two months before the main December 1970 events, the Beethoven Committee met to 
review progress of the year to date and ongoing preparations.108 Professor Rodenberg, the 
Committee’s Vice Chairman, representing the Staatsrat as senior government official, 
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summarised all educational and media activities as being on track. However, his introduction 
also contains a thinly disguised reprimand to the several prominent academics on the 
Committee: ‘Es bedarf weiterer angestrengter Arbeit der Musikwissenschaft in unserer 
Republik, um alle wissenschaftlichen Potenzen auf diese Aufgabe zu orientieren und neue 
hohe Maßstäbe zu setzen.’109 
Subsequent MfK and DKB documents offer further evidence of an apparent weakness in the 
presumed chain of authority between party, government and intellectuals. Most of the latter 
operated within the DKB, and its many affiliated organisations such as the Verband der 
Komponisten und Musikwissenschaftler der DDR. Gysi’s files include an unsigned, that is, 
anonymous document that provides insights from an initial, post-bicentenary assessment of 
all events and activities.110 Several critical comments in this thirty-one page assessment 
report expose strains in the relationships between the main participants during the course of 
the bicentenary year. A few prominent conductors are criticised for not conforming fully to 
the (inferred official) musicological portrayal of Beethoven’s works, and for being too 
subjective in their musical interpretations: ‘Die Übereinstimmung zwischen der 
wissenschaftlich-theoretischen Darstellung des Beethovenschen Schaffens und der Praxis der 
musikalischen Interpretation war nicht in allen Konzerten gleich überzeugend gegeben’ 
(ibid.). Two conductors are singled out for specific censure:  
Am differenziertesten sind die Leistungen unserer Dirigenten zu werten. Die 
Aufführung der ‘Messa Solemnis’ durch Rolf Kleinert zeigte deutlich, daß der Dirigent 
weder im geistig-konzeptionellen noch in der Beherrschung der künstlerisch-
handwerklichen Mittel dem Werk gewachsen war und daß er die glänzenden 
Instrumente, die ihm mit dem Rundfunk-Sinfonieorchester Berlin und der Solisten-
Vereinigung und dem großen Rundfunkchor gegeben waren, nicht zu handhaben 
verstand. Auch die Aufführung der dritten Symphonie, der Eroica durch Herbert Kegel 
konnte nicht überzeugen. In der eigenwilligen Auffassung wurden Bedeutung und 
Größe gerade dieses Werkes nicht erfasst; ja man muss die Frage aufwerfen, ob die 
subjektiv zugespitzten Interpretationen, ob die Absicht, unter allen Umständen neu und 
andersartig zu musizieren, nicht vom Misstrauen gegenüber dem Erbe und seine 
Wirkung auf den ‘Hörer von heute’ inspiriert ist. (ibid.). 
The negative undertones in these comments are remarkable in their reach, whilst at the same 
time differentiated. Kleinert’s basic conducting competence is questioned. But his allegedly 
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mismatched selection as conductor of high-calibre musicians may also be seen to point a 
finger at the concert arrangers. Kegel, the better-known conductor, faces a more serious 
charge of not conforming to prevailing ideology. The unnamed author of the MfK evaluation 
not only attacks him for deliberately deviating from an expected musical interpretation. He 
unambiguously faults Kegel for distancing himself from the doctrine of contemporising 
cultural heritage. Kegel’s Eroica performance also attracted negative comments in the press. 
These are all the more noticeable sitting alongside positive reviews on the same respective 
page of other Beethoven concerts conducted by Kurt Masur and Kurt Sanderling at the same 
Beethoven-Festwoche: 
Die in technischer Beziehung an sich vorzüglich ausgefeilte Wiedergabe der ‘Eroica’ 
litt unter der zu geringen Differenzierung. Vor allem betrifft diese Einschränkung die 
Ecksätze. Gewiss, gegen einen straffen interpretatorischen Zuschnitt des Kopfsatzes 
ist an sich nichts einzuwenden. Doch sollte die Binnenstruktur klar werden weil die 
Wiedergabe sonst trocken wirkt.111 
Der Höhepunkt einer Beethoven nahen ‘Eroica’ blieb leider aus, weil Kegel die vier 
Sätze zu straff durchexerzierte; das führte […] zu einer Vergröberung des Stilbildes, 
in dem bekanntlich auch Glanz und sinnliche Wärme lebt.112 
In Roloff-Momin’s biography, Sanderling, an internationally respected GDR conductor, notes 
that concert programmes throughout GDR history were always expected to include a work by 
a GDR composer, but otherwise the programme’s design was left to the conductor or musical 
director (Roloff-Momin, 2002, p.225) Yet amongst the elite of the musical community, the 
ability of composers and conductors to resist political influence in implementing all the 
bicentenary guidelines may have been more limited than Sanderling implies. A high profile 
concert, conducted by Sanderling during the Beethoven bicentenary, suggests an instance of 
successful political influence. A revised text by Johannes R. Becher was used for the 
performance of Beethoven’s Choral Fantasy in C Minor No.8 at the main December Festakt. 
This text had been written for an earlier performance at the GDR-hosted World Youth 
Festival in 1951 but was otherwise not commonly used (Naeser, 2002). A comparison of the 
last two verses with the original text by Christoph Kuffner (1808) reveals how Becher had 
replaced religious references with the theme of ‘Friede’ and the community of mankind 
(Silverberg, 2009b, p.131). FF Dabei, a Deutsche Fernsehfunk publication for the week of 
the Festakt broadcast, underlines the contemporary political dimension, noting, that ‘Becher’s 
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text bridges the humanist Beethoven to our times. Today there is one state on German soil in 
which Beethoven’s legacy of ‘‘Alle Menschen werden Brüder’’ is achieved’, an allusion 
already intoned by Ulbricht and Stoph earlier in the year (my translation, cited in Zell, 2012, 
p.16). 
There is further evidence of a gap between concept and practice in how composers and 
conductors in the GDR responded to the official bicentenary guidelines and ideological 
objectives. Rainer Bredermayer, a GDR composer, wrote a work for the bicentenary called 
Bagatellen für B. Elaine Kelly describes how in this composition Bredermayer challenged the 
accepted socialist view of Beethoven by choosing a low key, non-heroic underlying work by 
Beethoven as basis for his new composition (Kelly 2014, pp.117-127). Evaluated together 
these examples do not mean that conductors and composers as particularly important 
stakeholders – in terms of musical influence rather than numbers – were a significant obstacle 
to a successful implementation of the bicentenary. However, the evidence of artistic latitude 
corroborates other research data that substantiates an overall gap between ideological 
objectives and commemorations in reality. 
Beyond the narrow musical community of composers and conductors, the subsequent report 
criticises several other groups of intellectuals. Musicologists and DKB members who 
organised the Beethoven academic conference are criticised for not encouraging enough 
discussions after the lectures. In addition, the main Beethoven exhibition in Berlin had taken 
too long to organise: ‘Mängel in der Leitungstätigkeit des Ministeriums für Kultur waren die 
Ursache für anfängliche konzeptionelle Mehrgleisigkeit und Schwierigkeiten.’113 Various 
working groups within the Beethoven Committee are reproached: […] ‘die Arbeitsgruppen 
arbeiteten mit unterschiedlicher Qualität und Intensität. Große Anstrengungen waren nötig, 
um den anfänglichen Zeit und Tempoverlust einzuholen (Ausstellung).’114 Given the alleged 
execution issues outlined above, a small core of seven SED members within the Beethoven 
Committee, including two prominent ZK representatives, took on pro-active rather than just 
monitoring responsibilities: ‘Zur parteimäßigen Vorbereitung, zur Diskussion und 
Entscheidung aller wichtigen konzeptionellen Fragen und der Kontrolle ihrer Durchführung, 
wurde ein kleiner Leitungskopf aus sieben Genossen gebildet’.115 This small group of senior 
ZK members began to regularly monitor and intervene in the process; their task was to deal 
with academics and DKB members who were seen as being at best negligently, at worst 
deliberately, out of line with the planned execution of their respective bicentenary roles. Here 
we can observe a top-down, SED intervention similar to that observed in the Schiller 
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commemoration. Once again senior authorities identified a gap between theory and practice 
that created the need to prop up the implementation in order to enforce the integrity of the 
commemoration aims.  
4.3.4 Implementing the bicentenary and self-censorship: did the GDR press and 
broadcast media communicate differently?  
The official Beethoven bicentenary concept, subsequent documents such as progress reviews 
of the Beethoven Komittee, and the post-bicentenary MfK and DKB assessments do not 
explicitly include media objectives within the list of measures for the bicentenary. However, 
in the light of existing practice at the time, it would most likely have been unnecessary to 
issue specific directives; public statements in early 1970 by SED leaders, such as Michel’s 
speech at the Potsdam planning conference and Stoph’s speech at the first meeting of the 
Beethoven Committee, would have provided journalists with enough ideological content and 
tone to understand what they were expected to write and refer to throughout the bicentenary 
year. But senior officials were not standing idly by. Johanna Rudolph was listed in the 
Beethoven Committee’s membership as ‘Wissenschaftlicher Mitarbeiter’ at the MfK. Despite 
her modest title she is mentioned several times in the 1986 SED publication (Haase 1988, 
p.300), and lauded as ‘Johanna Rudolph, die in den sechziger Jahren als Mitarbeiterin des 
Ministeriums für Kultur auf die Politik zur Aneignung des kulturellen Erbes einen 
erheblichen Einfluss ausübte’. Rudolph delivered a detailed and positive report to the October 
1970 meeting on how the GDR press had been covering the bicentenary hitherto.116 The 
comprehensiveness and authorship of this feedback would suggest that bicentenary press 
coverage, aligned with official ideological objectives, remained very important to the regime.  
In its coverage, Neues Deutschland can be seen to demonstrate its position amongst other 
GDR media as the official voice of the SED, by underlining the superiority of the GDR’s 
ideological framework for the Beethoven bicentenary. Commenting on the Beethoven 
academic conference in December, Hans-Joachim Kynass, music editor, condemns the West 
German approach to the Beethoven bicentenary: ‘[…] die reaktionäre Bourgeoisie dagegen 
verneint den klassischen Realismus Beethovens und das humanistische Programm seiner 
Kunst. Sie betreibt die Zerstörung des klassischen Erbes’.117 These attacks on West Germany 
were repeated in a polemic article on the bicentenary programming of DFF that appeared in 
the National Zeitung.118 Hansjürgen Schäffer sets an aggressive tone with the headline 
‘Beethoven als musikalische Droge, – kapitalistische Bewußtseinsindustrie verzerrt das Bild 
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des großen Komponisten’. His commentary singles out the West German pop hit adaptation, 
‘Song of Joy’, as an example of decadent ‘Verschnulzung of Beethoven’.119 In contrast, other 
newspapers appear to concentrate more on the musical interpretation of major bicentenary 
concerts, without ignoring at least a passing reference to the official ideological framework, 
such as linking Beethoven to the French Revolution: 
Das Eröffnungskonzert der Beethoven-Festwoche bestritt die Berliner Staatskapelle 
unter Otmar Suitner […] Die glanzvolle Aufführung der siebten Sinfonie besaß vor 
allem enorme Spannung, was bereits in der Einleitung des ersten Satzes deutlich 
spürbar wurde […] während das Finale kraftvoll und ausgesprochen brillant musiziert 
wurde. Die scharfen Akzente kamen gut heraus und besonders auch der so 
charakteristische ‘éclat triomphale’, jene von der französischen Revolutionsmusik her 
kommende triumphierende Begeisterung.120  
While there is an absence of documented guidelines and objectives for the GDR press, major 
plans for TV, radio and film cultural programming feature in the concept and implementation 
agendas of the bicentenary.121 But in terms of polemical content and relative prominence, TV, 
radio and newsreel film coverage of the bicentenary’s cultural events follows different 
patterns to that of press coverage. Apart from cultural programming itself, the bicentenary 
events appeared infrequently as news items on GDR Television (Deutscher Fernsehfunk, 
hereafter referred to as ˈDFFˈ), and in cinemas. The relevant series were the main DFF 
current affairs programme, Aktuelle Kamera, and Der Augenzeuge, a fifteen-minute newsreel 
shown in GDR cinemas. The monthly cinema cultural documentary, DDR-Magazin, 
produced primarily for use abroad by the GDR foreign ministry and its embassies, also 
mentioned the bicentenary. As will be shown in the following, closer viewing of the output 
from these three programmes reveals it to be noticeably more restrained in the use of 
ideological rhetoric than much of the reporting and commentary in the GDR newspapers.  
The only event in 1970 to be covered specifically on DFF news was the main Beethoven 
Festakt of 16 December. Willi Stoph hosted a reception in the morning at the Ministerrat 
which was reported in a 39 second news item.122 The entire 69-minute official ceremony that 
day was then broadcast live that evening within an extended Aktuelle Kamera news 
programme.123 The broadcast had no added commentary. Frequent shots of younger members 
of the audience may have been received as highlighting the importance of the event for the 
younger generation. This aspect of the broadcast is in line with the youth legacy objectives 
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articulated earlier by Werner Rackwitz at the formal inauguration of the Beethoven 
Committee. In a post-bicentenary review of DFF’s Beethoven symphony cycle, Hans-Jürgen 
Schaefer points out the importance of TV production expertise in extracting the political 
message of the performances by focussing in on certain members of the audience:  
Der Zyklus wurde mit einer Übertragung der Aufführung der neunten Symphonie aus 
der deutschen Staatsoper am Neujahrstage beendet […] Programmatisch hatten sich 
hier Angehörige unserer nationalen Volksarmee, Werktätige verschiedenster Berufe mit 
Berufskünstlern zusammengefunden, um Beethovens revolutionäre Freudensbotschaft 
Klang werden zu lassen. Die Fernsehregie und die geschickte Kameraführung machten 
gerade dieses Charakteristikum der Aufführung deutlich.124 
Der Augenzeuge included the bicentenary in an April 1970 newsreel, and again in December, 
coinciding with the Beethoven week of ceremony and academic conference. The earlier item 
contained two minutes of a Beethoven chamber music performance and a very brief, factual 
mention of the bicentenary.125 The December edition was illustrated by paintings and 
drawings of Beethoven with a short comment on the events of that week, stressing – as 
phrased by the commentator – Beethoven’s universal personality and conscience, and his 
demonstration of the artist’s responsibility to society, a valid model for our times (cited in 
Zell, 2012, p,17). Finally, DDR-Magazin confined its attention to a six-minute item in its 
February 1971 edition, describing factually the highlights of the bicentenary events and 
recording output, but then defining Beethoven as revolutionary hero, accompanied by visual 
images of the French Revolution and ending in the spoken portrayal of Beethoven as 
‘Lebendiger Ausdruck sozialistischer Nationalkultur’ (ibid., p.18).This depiction, Der 
Augenzeuge’s positioning of Beethoven as a model for the GDR’s times, and the allusion to 
the French Revolution all conform to the appropriation theme in the ideological framework of 
the bicentenary, as set out by Michel.  
All available evidence of newspaper, TV and newsreel coverage of the bicentenary and its 
individual events in the GDR media reveals therefore a range of tone and content, although 
nothing seems to contradict the image painted at the start of the centenary planning, i.e., 
Beethoven as revolutionary and as precursor to socialism. By 1970, as the GDR economy had 
stabilised, and the state was on the verge of international recognition, the authorities had 
realised that too much and too frequent overt propaganda was counterproductive. Michael 
Meyen sets out the limits of how much propaganda the SED could realistically insert in the 
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GDR’s media output, especially on television: ‘Die Strukturen des täglichen Lebens und die 
daraus resultierenden Erwartungen an die Medien sowie die Alltagserfahrungen haben 
zugleich verhindert, daß die SED ihre kommunikationspolitischen Ziele erreichen konnte. 
Das DDR Fernsehen konnte die Zuschauer nur gewinnen, wenn es weitgehend auf 
publizistische Sendungen verzichtete’ (Meyen, 2003, p.10). This ‘Dominanz des Wunsches 
nach Unterhaltung’ (ibid., p.11) was reflected in official audience research. In response to the 
question: ‘Welche Sendungsarten sehen die Zuschauer im Abendprogramm zwischen 20:00 
Uhr und 21:30 Uhr am liebsten?’, only 4,7% in 1965 and 4,0 % in 1971 chose opera, classical 
ballet and classical music programmes (ibid., p.70). Prime time evening slots were kept free 
for thrillers, shows and similar popular entertainment so as to avoid alienating TV audiences. 
So in an apparently autonomous decision, DFF’s concerts of all nine Beethoven symphonies, 
recorded specially for the bicentenary, came to be broadcast on Sunday mornings, well 
outside peak viewing time, and resulting in poor viewing figures. This objectively weak 
outcome uncovers a further gap between the ideal that is the TV contribution promised in the 
bicentenary’s plans and the subsequent engagement of the mass TV audience. 
The GDR musicologist, Gerhard Müller offers a plausible explanation for this diversity of 
media coverage (cited in Zell, 2012, p.17). Firstly, there were variations in where reporting 
and commentary on the bicentenary was positioned. For example, the front pages of all GDR 
newspapers, but particularly Neues Deutschland, were reserved for political journalism, 
whilst cultural content featured usually on inner pages. The more specialised the publication 
and its readership – for instance the journal Musik und Gesellschaft – the subtler the 
ideological over- and undertones. Secondly, the two ZK sections, Abteilung Kultur and 
Abteilung Propaganda & Agitation, together with their respective Politbüro representatives, 
apparently did not always coordinate their agendas. Müller maintains that the ZK Abteilung 
Kultur continuously promoted Socialist Realism as part of a long-term ideological strategy. 
In contrast, the ZK Abteilung Propaganda & Agitation would use the media opportunistically 
to communicate whatever might serve to enhance the GDR image domestically and 
externally. Lastly, and in the context of tone of official rhetoric, Müller suggests that many in 
the GDR population were ‘nicht blöd’ at recognising overblown official language, all the 
more as most citizens were continually exposed to West German broadcast media. 
The relatively low public interest in cultural programming may explain the almost complete 
lack of bicentenary-related DFF news coverage of cultural events taking place across the 
country. Instead, DFF concentrated on broadcasting specially recorded concerts. However, it 
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is important to note that news coverage was not the sole outlet for communicating political 
messages to television audiences; DFF programme schedules reveal that bicentenary 
transmissions, such as the Beethoven concert recording of 10 December 1970, were preceded 
by a short introductory round-table discussion with two musicologists, Dr. Eberhard Rebling 
and Dr. Karl-Heinz Köhler, and the GDR’s most famous conductor, Kurt Masur.126 Tapes or 
transcripts of these programmes are no longer available. But in his review of this particular 
television programme in Neues Deutschland, Schaefer notes the ideological framing of such 
broadcasts:  
Das Bemühen, Beethovens Musik nicht nur zu spielen, sondern tiefes Verständnis für 
ihr Wesen, ihre Funktion in Geschichte und Gegenwart zu wecken war daran 
erkennbar, daß jeder Aufführung ein Rundtischgespräch vorausging, […] in dem sich 
[…] [Rebling, Köhler & Masur,][…] über das jeweils klingende Werk, seine 
Entstehungsgeschichte, seine Aussage unterhielten.127 
The key phrase here is ‘Funktion in Geschichte und Gegenwart’. Whether or not this was 
intended by the discussants, Schaefer suggests that the broadcast was enhanced by attributing 
a function and statement to the works performed – evidence of the SED as such, through its 
main newspaper, contemporising Beethoven to produce a particular understanding, 
(‘Verständnis wecken’), of the composer related to a distinct GDR identity (Zell, 2012). 
4.4 OUTCOMES 
Replicating the structure and methodology of the previous two case studies, we need to 
identify and evaluate the outcomes of the commemorations in order to assess the potential 
influence of the Beethoven bicentenary commemoration on the construction of national 
identity in the GDR. Once again, the most fruitful primary sources for this case study are to 
be found in MfK, SED and DKB files, especially within official reports and related 
correspondence. Media coverage and a limited amount of audience research data offer further 
clues to the quality and quantity of popular reception. This section will concentrate on four 
outcomes, in the ascending order of their potential value to the research question: Firstly, the 
mobilisation of interest and participation in classical music; secondly, the international 
reception of the GDR commemorations; thirdly, GDR public reception of domestic TV 




4.4.1. The call for more Musikpropaganda: evidence of a missed outcome? 
The anonymous MfK assessment of the bicentenary cited in several instances in this chapter 
ends by spelling out some generalised results and potential legacies: The bicentenary is 
judged to have created new momentum for spreading culture and mobilising the masses, as 
shown in the sheer number of bicentenary events and attendances (presumably based on DKB 
feedback). Progress is also stressed in strengthening the relationship between state and 
musical community including musicologists, but without specific evidence. Whether, as the 
report also claimed, the bicentenary increased competition and thus quality amongst musical 
performers would seem very difficult to verify as a legacy. Looking to the future after 1970, 
the three conclusions on the final page of the assessment appear to reflect the importance of 
the bicentenary for the GDR cultural-political system: 
a) auf dem Gebiete der Musikwissenschaft ist die Konzentration der Kräfte zur 
Durchsetzung und Lösung von Hauptfragen die wesentliche Aufgabe. Dabei geht es um 
die Festlegung von Projekten und um die Konzentration der Kräfte. 
b) die große emotionale Wirkung des Werkes Ludwig van Beethovens muss 
gründlicher und genauer untersucht und dem kompositorischen Gegenwartsschaffen in 
unserer Republik nutzbar gemacht werden. 
c) aus der breiten Wirksamkeit der Beethoven-Ehrung sind Lehren und Erkenntnisse für 
eine intensivere, wirksamere Musikpropaganda unter der Bevölkerung zu ziehen und zu 
verwirklichen.128 
Each of these action points may also be seen to contain implied criticism, aimed particularly 
at musicologists (in terms of their variable engagement with the commemorationˈs aims and 
implemention) and composers, such as Bredermayer and Stockhausen. The call for 
intensification of Musikpropaganda in the last conclusion might be understood as questioning 
whether the impact of the Beethoven-Ehrung was, in reality, as wide as intended. If so then 
this outcome would somewhat reduce the presumed effect on national identity in the more 




4.4.2. International recognition of the commemorations: another important objective 
unfulfilled? 
The bicentenary concept documented an aim to promote a positive image of the GDR abroad 
in the context of the continuing discourse of demarcation, and ultimately as a means of 
promoting national identity:  
[…] auch gegenüber dem Ausland darzulegen, daß in der DDR das Erbe Beethovens 
angetreten wurde und das humanistische Gedankengut seines Werkes gepflegt und in 
der sozialistischen Nationalkultur aufbewahrt wird. Es ist dabei den Bemühungen der 
westdeutschen auswärtigen Kulturpolitik entgegenzutreten, die im Sinne der 
westdeutschen Alleinvertretungsanmaßung das Werk Beethovens für die 
imperialistische Außenpolitik Westdeutschlands missbrauchen will.129 
The accusation of ‘pretension’ levelled against West Germany, Alleinvertretungsanmaßung, 
(my underlined emphasis) accentuates the weight of the GDR’s claim to be the sole 
legitimate heir to German cultural heritage, Alleinvertretungsanspruch, a term used 
repeatedly in this and previous cultural commemorations.  
There are only two short paragraphs within the MfK’s thirty-one page post-bicentenary 
assessment under the heading ‘Auslandsaktivitäten’. Following a bland opening, ‘Alle 
geplanten Vorhaben zur repräsentativen Interpretation der Musik Beethovens im Ausland 
wurden erfolgreich verwirklicht’, the report expands on two achievements. Firstly, foreign 
concert tours by GDR orchestras in several western countries, notably an open-air concert in 
Paris attended by over 50,000. This is noted as a successful competitive counter-measure to 
West German international cultural activity; ‘Diese Tatsache ist besonders bedeutungsvoll, 
weil die Auslandsaktivitäten der BRD vor allem durch ihre Goethe-Institute intensiv 
waren’.130 Secondly, the international TV coverage of the major December events by other 
countries is described rather optimistically: ‘Die Festwoche hat insgesamt ein starkes Echo in 
unserer Republik und in der Weltöffentlichkeit gefunden.’ In reality it appears that 
transmissions were only relayed by the Intervision network to socialist bloc countries and not 
to those Western countries forming the far larger Eurovision network.  
One of the measures used to assess the success of the bicentenary, set out as aim in the final 
MfK conceptualisation document on the Beethoven academic conference described above, 
was to enable a target of fifty to seventy guests from so-called capitalist countries to attend 
the Beethoven academic conference in December.131 The underlying motive was arguably to 
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bolster national pride at home by promoting a national image linked to an international 
acknowledgement of a new, ˈGDRˈ Beethoven. There were five UK guests, including the 
composers Benjamin Britten and Alan Bush, and Sir Thomas Armstrong, Director of the 
Royal Conservatory. The final list of those who actually attended records only thirteen out of 
sixty-two invited, none of whom came from major Western countries (Brockhaus, 1971, 
p.98). A short section in the MfK assessment is devoted to ‘Äußerungen ausländischer Gäste 
zur Beethoven-Ehrung der DDR’.132 However, it is unclear in the text whether the quotes 
were recorded at the academic conference, or the Festakt, where no details on foreign guests 
and attendance are to be found in the files. Several general compliments on the success of the 
events are recorded by a total of five named Austrian and Finnish academics. There is no 
evidence from which one might infer the existence of a co-ordinated political boycott by 
western intellectuals of the GDR’s bicentenary events. The historian, Christoph Kleßmann’s 
recollection of the bicentenary from the perspective of a West German academic at the time 
may help to explain the lack of foreign attendance; western academics were either hardly 
aware of, or just ignored the GDR’s Beethoven bicentenary events, even if invited to attend 
(cited in Zell, 2012, p.21). Kleßmann’s explanation is credible in the light of the low level of 
attention given in western media to the bicentenary in the GDR. The relatively small amount 
of space devoted to foreign visibility and reception in the post-bicentenary MfK report may 
thus be seen to reflect its meagre, essentially unsuccessful outcome. 
4.4.3. Audience research: a meaningful indicator of the effect of TV reception on 
national identity 
Quantative and qualitative data in the DFF archives adds a potentially more tangible 
dimension in this case study to how television coverage of the commemoration was received. 
The files contain some audience research data relating to the Beethoven bicentenary 
programming, as well as overall viewer attitudes to cultural broadcasts at the time. Around a 
thousand viewers over the age of fourteen, selected, according to the files, as a representative 
sample of GDR households, were asked in December 1970 about their preference for two 
types of programmes, drama and documentaries. ‘Das Leben großer Persönlichkeiten’ ranked 
only eighth in named popularity amongst drama subjects.133 No comparative figures are 
presented to reflect whether the Beethoven focus of the bicentenary had increased this topic’s 
popularity behind the top three of crime thrillers, adventure and comedy. Culture is named as 
second most popular subject for documentaries behind ‘the future’ and ahead of science and 
current affairs programmes. Comparative data for July 1970 show no changes in the top four 
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rankings. A section in this twelve-page report is devoted to viewer reception data on 
programming for the 1970 Lenin centenary, but there is no mention anywhere of the 
Beethoven bicentenary (Zell, 2012, pp.20-21).  
In addition to this comparative analysis exposing the relatively low profile of cultural 
programming, there is some audience research data available on the programmes related to 
the Beethoven bicentenary. This data provides a context on the wider GDR public attitudes to 
classical music. More specifically, it helps to answer the question on the effectiveness of the 
regime’s efforts to construct national identity around this seemingly prominent component of 
German culture and heritage. Ratings for the evening transmissions of Beethoven’s opera, 
‘Fidelio’, on 13 December 1970 and the New Year’s Day 1971 transmission of Beethoven’s 
ninth symphony are around twenty per cent. Although these ratings are noted as being below 
average for prime time programmes compared to popular entertainment (typically between 
thirty to fifty per cent), they received an above-average grading of 1.9 on a one (excellent) to 
five (bad) scale. This data is in line with research on viewer interests from the same report, 
showing that almost fifty per cent of GDR viewers were uninterested in classical music; only 
thirteen per cent identified themselves as enthusiasts, the remainder as occasionally 
interested. The New Year’s concert 1970/71 was an annual event (featuring Beethoven’s 
ninth symphony as Ulbricht’s favourite music), and therefore potentially an exception. It 
could be a meaningful indicator of bicentenary reception, if it were possible to see changes in 
ratings compared to previous years; unfortunately, this data is not available. Finally, Sunday 
morning transmissions of Beethoven symphony concerts on 1 November and 22 December 
1970 attracted ratings of only around three percent, reflecting the non-prime time scheduling 
explained above. In summary, there is no meaningful data to support a noticeable increase in 
viewing figures for the bicentenary events compared to customary data for similar cultural 
programming. One can only conclude therefore that the intended TV propagation of 
bicentenary events made no perceptible contribution in terms of audience engagement with 
these efforts towards the appropriation of classical heritage for the construction of a particular 
form of national identity, and therefore a further gap between theory and practice.134  
The differing messages and tone of press and broadcast media coverage of the Beethoven 
bicentenary reviewed here and in the earlier implementation section illustrate the reality of 
diminished influence by the authorities on the whole GDR media. As such it demonstrates the 
limited value of self-censorship in supporting the aims of a high-profile project such as a 
major cultural commemoration. This conclusion does not sit comfortably with a model of the 
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GDR as a rigid, top-down authoritarian society. In the context of the research question it is 
ultimately conceivable that this divergence in how the Beethoven commemoration was 
presented and its events reported to the wider GDR public may have diluted the desired effort 
to promote a consistent message that could enhance the formation of national identity relating 
to cultural heritage.  
4.4.4. The recording project’s likely impact: long-term identity or short-term pride? 
The most tangible outcome of the Beethoven bicentenary commemorations in the GDR, 
mentioned in the MfK report is the special edition of Beethoven recordings produced in the 
GDR at the time. Commissioned officially in 1969 as a bicentenary measure,135 this was the 
world’s first recording project of the entire opus of Beethoven, of which some 80 LP records 
of 250 works were produced in 1970, with the remainder over the following years. The 
recordings left an apparent legacy at more than one level. The MfK post-bicentenary 
assessment mentions total sales of some 700,000 individual LP records (not as a box set) of 
which six of the most popular symphonies and concertos account for over half.136 This would 
have been a respectable sales achievement for classical music at that time. Apart from the 
positive educational and cultural impact of including many previously unrecorded works, 
most of the recordings were made by GDR musicians. This may have been due primarily to 
the ever-present scarcity of foreign currency available to pay non-GDR musicians (Zell, 
2012, p.22). But the project is considered even by a contemporary West German musicologist 
(Tischer, 2011, pp. 474-480) to have been a significant logistical and interpretative 
achievement at the time.  
A seventeen-page booklet on Beethoven, his works and the recording project was published 
as a ‘Kompendium’ to accompany the records.137 The final paragraphs emphasise the core 
objective of the recording project as a means to an end – that is not so much as an artistic 
endeavour but as providing mass access to the new, progressive Beethoven image:  
Den konsequent marxistisch-leninistischen Grundlagen unserer Kulturpolitik, Ästhetik 
und Musikwissenschaft verdanken wir es, daß die Schallplattenindustrie der Deutschen 
Demokratischen Republik nicht zuletzt auf diesem wichtigen Sektor den 
Welthöchststand mitbestimmt. Zu den Hauptaufgaben nicht nur der historischen 
Musikwissenschaft, sondern der gesellschaftlichen Aneignung des musikalischen Erbes 
überhaupt zählt, als Gegenpol zu den Fehldeutungen und Fälschungen aus Geschichte 
und Gegenwart, der Ausbau und die massenhafte Aneignung eines von Grund auf 
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progressiven Beethoven-Bildes. Das Beethoven-Jubiläum 1970 beweist mit besonderer 
Deutlichkeit, welche der beiden deutschen Staaten einzig berufen ist, das legitime Erbe 
der großen humanistischen Traditionen unserer Nationalkultur anzutreten’.138 
Three key, connected themes of official GDR Beethoven – and cultural – ideology are thus 
captured here: appropriation of heritage, setting the GDR apart as the opposite of the West 
German approach to Beethoven, and the legitimacy of an underlying claim to be the sole 
representative. It is difficult to reconcile how these political messages can have contributed 
perceptibly to the cultural experience of listening to a music recording. So it appears unlikely 
that this artificial political dimension alone would have promoted national identity in the ears 
and minds of the listeners. Furthermore, as a cultural event, any intended perception of this 
recording project as an independent GDR achievement does not stand up fully to closer 
scrutiny. The recordings included several relatively minor works of Beethoven, that would 
otherwise not have been considered commercially viable for Western record companies. The 
unprecedented completeness of the edition was therefore arguably attractive only to 
musicologists. The main difference for GDR consumers to existing recordings of Beethoven 
works produced in the West would have been availability and price, coupled possibly with a 
recognition that the project could only have been made possible as a non-capitalist, that is 
commercially unviable venture. But given the interpretative and technical similarity, even 
sameness, of existing international recordings, the assertion of a clear demarcation from West 
Germany may have been received with scepticism by the GDR public buying the records. 
Moreover, whilst the producer, Peter Czerny, Künstlicher Direktor, VEB Deutsche 
Schallplatten - ETERNA, highlighted in a radio broadcast interview that eighty to eighty-five 
percent of the recordings involved GDR musicians, many record buyers may well have 
registered that the ten to fifteen percent of foreign involvement in the new recordings 
included high profile Western conductors and soloists such as Herbert von Karajan and the 
pianist, Claudio Arrau.139 Nevertheless, the fact remains that the complete edition was the 
first of its kind. The nature of the project was easily understandable in the GDR, both as an 
innovative achievement, as well as an accessible consumer product. As such it is may well 
have generated a meaningful amount of general national pride, at least amongst the 




How does this assessment of the outcomes and legacies relate to other scholarly 
interpretations in the context of GDR historiography and the construction of national 
identity? 
In the only published scholarship specifically devoted to the Beethoven bicentenary in the 
GDR, Matthias Tischerˈs short article identifies national education and the GDR’s 
international image (Außenwirkung) as practical outcomes (Nutzanwendung) of the 
commemorations (Tischer, 2008, p.476). The educational impact is evident in the major 
concert, lecture and media exposure given to Beethoven’s music over the year. However, 
considering the archival evidence discussed in this chapter, it is difficult to agree with Tischer 
that the commemoration made a meaningful impact on the GDR’s international image. 
Tischer makes an equally unconvincing case of the Beethoven bicentenary as an example (as 
he sees it), of the efficiency of one-party rule and Durchorganisierung in almost all sections 
of GDR society (ibid., p.476). His interpretation conforms to the theory of a pervasively ruled 
society, in other words a top-down operation with senior GDR officials consistently pulling 
all the Leninist ‘transmission levers’ of a communist system (Stalin, 1954). He goes further to 
posit that ‘Beethoven erscheint gleichsam als eine Geisel im Kalten Krieg’ (ibid.). Without 
providing additional evidence, Tischer concludes by speculating on areas where the 
bicentenary may have achieved a political legacy, such as reinforcing Walter Ulbricht’s 
retention of power, and ‘das methodische Erstarken einer marxistischen 
Kulturwissenschaft’(ibid., p.480). By stressing the political factors that influenced the 
regime’s approach to the bicentenary, Tischer arguably over-emphasises the cultural policy 
responses in the GDR as driven predominantly by West Germany’s Ostpolitik. Political 
motives are clearly an important aspect of the cultural demarcation noted in the Beethoven 
and Schiller commemorations; however, I contend that the demarcation was also significantly 
driven by perceived differences between the GDRˈs elaborately developed ideological 
framework and West German academic, media and popular culture approaches to these same 
cultural icons.  
The material reviewed in this chapter thus only supports certain superficial aspects of 
Tischer’s argument. One may conclude from available archival evidence that the overall 
concept of the bicentenary was relatively well planned – certainly compared to the 1959 
Schiller bicentenary. As a result of the process having begun much earlier than in the case of 
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the Schiller commemorations, the list of agreed measures was implemented more smoothly. 
Overall, there is little evidence to suggest any significant practical problems associated with 
any of the smaller or larger events and bicentenary initiatives. So as a logistically competent 
operation it would be fair to assess the bicentenary as being successful overall. The most 
relevant and influential SED officials can be seen to have been actively involved throughout 
the bicentenary, but this does not prove the efficiency of one party rule, that is of the GDR’s 
political system as such. The ultimate success of the bicentenary plan and the resulting 
implementation measures was clearly dependent on cooperation at the level of MfK and DKB 
officials as well as the intellectual and artistic community. Although this was sporadic and 
variable it does, in total, appear to have been more consistent than in the Schiller 
commemorations. 
Laura Silverberg (2009a, pp.506-510) takes a different approach to many scholars who argue 
that Abgrenzung was a consistently applied feature of cultural policy throughout the GDR’s 
forty-year life. Instead she contends that the regime initially established a socialist music 
culture as part of an overall cultural policy centred on promoting German heritage rather than 
a separate East German identity. Citing also Klingberg’s evidence of changes in the official 
dissemination of an autonomous ‘sozialistische Nationalkultur der DDR’ (Klingberg, 1997, 
p.65), she points plausibly to the SED’s enactment of a new GDR citizenship law in 1967 as 
a turning point in the official promotion of an East German national identity. Articulating and 
disseminating a socialist Beethoven for the 1970s as a contrast to a perceived German 
political and cultural enemy remained as much of a challenge as in the case of a socialist 
Schiller for the 1960s. But in practice, the political rhetoric in 1970 was rather more 
differentiated in tone and depth, both between the various players involved in the actual 
commemoration events as well as within all sections of the GDR media. The policy of 
demarcation to West Germany was therefore perceptibly less overt than at the Schiller 
bicentenary, eleven years earlier. This aspect was arguably less important as an aspect of 
national identity in the more mature society of 1970. In other words the focus was more on 
internal identification with the GDR – as was the case in the Kollwitz centenary 
commemorations – rather than demarcation from West Germany. 
As discussed in the above section on implementation, an analysis of one particular set of 
relationships between state and intellectuals, namely musicologists and certain musicians, 
shows that they were not consistently in agreement. Official reports of the bicentenary reveal 
that these weaknesses as well as those within the DKB created considerable tension with 
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higher echelons of political authority. The bicentenary’s planning and execution thus exposed 
cracks in the structure of political hierarchy at that time together with a degree of agency at 
different levels of party, government and mass organisations. Echoing, in summary, the 
findings of the Schiller and Kollwitz case-studies, this research result on the Beethoven case 
study adds weight to consistent ˈparticipatoryˈ and ˈconsensusˈ dictatorship models of the 
GDR, notwithstanding the eleven years elapsed since the Schiller commemorations.  
My overall analysis of the relationship between commemorations and national identity thus 
differs ultimately from that of Silverberg. She bases her interpretation of East German music 
and national identity on a top-down historiographical model of the GDR and questions to 
what extent one can even speak of an East German identity – musical or otherwise. 
Silverberg notes an underlying tension facing the regime between crystallising a 
‘Germanness’ whilst needing to acknowledge an overarching, Soviet-inspired socialist 
ideology. Based on this political versus socio-cultural model of the GDR, her hypothesis 
proposes an all-embracing role of the state, the SED and its execution of a predetermined 
cultural policy (Silverberg, 2009a, pp.503-504). The evidence revealed and analysed in this 
chapter, however, suggests that specific outcomes of the Beethoven bicentenary may be seen 
to have contributed to the construction of a separate GDR identity, despite rather than 
because of varying degrees of agency amongst participants and stakeholders of the 
commemoration events. In addition to the material success of the recordings, some of these 
longer-term legacies are less measurable but equally valid. The physical/performative 
elements of going to concerts, attending lectures, following TV and radio broadcasts may all 
be judged to have been largely positive in their domestic reception. A few specific measures, 
namely attractive commemorative stamp and coin issues, were added to the bicentenary 
measures; these were typically included in major cultural as well as political anniversary 
commemorations in the GDR. 
In contrast, the continuing, if less strident efforts – than was the case in the Schiller 
bicentenary – to demonstrate a separate approach to West Germany seem to have produced 
little evidence to suggest that the GDRˈs external image was enhanced by the 
commemorations as a potential contribution to a separate national identity. In contrast, the 
legacy of partly increasing the involvement of the working class, in response to ideological 
objectives, sits alongside comparable features and outcomes of the Schiller bicentenary as 
possibly contributing moderately to the formation of national identity within the GDR. In 
summary, although the political and social environment within and outside the GDR had 
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changed over eleven years, the comparability and similarity of both commemorations 





5: THE LUTHERJAHR QUINCENTENARY, 1983 
 
5.1. INTRODUCTION 
The final major cultural commemoration in the GDR chosen as a case study for this thesis 
differs in several respects from those researched and interpreted in the previous chapters 
focusing on Schiller, Kollwitz and Beethoven. The Lutherjahr was exceptional with regard to 
its political and cultural importance at the time, both domestically and externally. This in turn 
influenced the unprecedented scope and scale of the commemoration events, the planning 
process and the range of official GDR stakeholders. Two of these stakeholders are unique in 
terms of extensive involvement in a cultural commemoration: the Protestant church (hereafter 
referred to as the ‘church’) and, to a degree not seen in previous commemorations, the 
Ministerium für Staatssicherheit (referred to hereafter as the ‘Stasi’).  
The Lutherjahr offers an extensive amount of primary archival material for scholarly 
investigation and interpretation; as a result, the Lutherjahr presents the current researcher 
with a wider range of published scholarship than for any comparable cultural commemoration 
in GDR history. This scholarship derives from perspectives that have changed over the past 
thirty years. Contributions in the first half of this period such as volumes edited by Siegfried 
Bräuer (1983), Horst Dohle (1996), Horst Dähn and Joachim Heise (1996), as well as 
monographs by Robert Goeckel (1984) and Raina Zimmering (2000) appear to rely heavily 
on retrospective personal and third-party testimony of the Lutherjahr commemorations, and 
on providing a narrative of the planning process, notably the ideological framework. Works 
by Martin Roy (2000), and more recently, Peter Maser (2013) and Jon Berndt Olsen (2015), 
have investigated and interpreted the evolving portrayal of Luther before, during and after the 
Lutherjahr and how the outcome may have been influenced by proactive SED activity 
working through and alongside GDR historians. A further feature of the Lutherjahr to have 
been more recently researched by historians, notably Robert Walinski-Kiehl (2004), and Karl 
Cordell (2007), is the changing relationship between state and church in the GDR during this 
period and its resulting effect on the critical political role that the church was to play in the 
final years of the GDR. The specific impact of the Lutherjahr on GDR national identity has 
also been analysed in more recent scholarship, although primarily in the context of the 
explicit policy of improving the GDR’s external image that inspired certain aspects of the 
commemoration (Zimmering, Olsen).  
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Within this context this chapter will analyse official sources including Stasi records, many of 
which have not been previously researched. As in earlier chapters, the purpose is to fill a gap 
in scholarship by concentrating on the aims, implementation and outcomes of the Lutherjahr 
commemoration as a cultural and political phenomenon, measured against the state’s declared 
as well as identifiable intentions. Gaps between theory and practice, between an ideological 
framework and the compromise of event-driven reality that often emerged during previous 
commemorations can be detected much earlier in the case of the Lutherjahr. Given the 
considerably longer and more complex gestation period of the Lutherjahr, the chapter will 
also highlight key parts of the planning phase, as they will be shown to provide meaningful 
answers to the research question. In this context, and replicating the analysis in the Kollwitz 
case study, an identification of the Lutherjahr’s outcomes in terms of legacy – and its 
potential impact on GDR national identity will also take into account contemporary reception 
in German media on both sides of the Wall. 
The Lutherjahr case study posits that the SED was essentially reactive in situating the 
ideological framework in response to internal and external political pressures that then 
continued to change throughout the course of the Lutherjahr. In summary, the analysis of 
selected primary SED sources in this chapter will show a shift from the Party’s supervisory 
stance on the Lutherjahr to an increasingly reactive and hands-on intervention, driven 
primarily by growing state-church tensions. By the beginning of the commemoration events 
in 1983, a set of lofty proclamations, based on a revised Marxist-Leninist approach to Luther, 
and intended to reinforce national identity and international recognition had already 
succumbed to the reality of a visibly defensive fixation on state security, perceived as acutely 
threatened by significant elements within the church on both sides of the Iron Curtain. In 
closing, the chapter will evaluate the outcomes of the Lutherjahr, also in the light of existing 
scholarship, and assess its likely influence on the longer-term issue of GDR national identity. 
5.2. AIMS 
Although the Lutherjahr was unique in scale, concept and stakeholder composition, this case 
study replicates the basic structure of previous chapters. It begins therefore by examining in 
some detail how the commemorations were planned, its ideological objectives developed, and 
then articulated. Given the far longer duration and complexity of this pre-Lutherjahr phase 
compared to previous cultural commemorations, archival sources from the four most 
important stakeholders, namely SED, government, Stasi and the church all offer evidence that 
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illustrates tensions within and between these participants. Gaps between initial theory and 
subsequent practice already emerge in this planning stage that will ultimately affect the 
subsequent implementation and outcomes in terms of the research question. 
5.2.1. The planning timeline summarised 
The duration, complexity and scale of the commemoration project over several years 
preceding the Lutherjahr calls, as introduction, for a brief summary of the main chronological 
milestones in the planning process: the first official, documented meeting of a working group 
on the Lutherjahr took place as early as 15 December 1975, over seven years before the 
Lutherjahr. This was followed over the period 1975 to early 1979 by several further meetings 
of working groups within the church as well as various government and SED departments. 
From early 1979 onwards, the main organisational efforts evolved in parallel streams, within 
the church on the one hand and government on the other. The first official meeting of the 
Lutherkomitee of the church took place on 10 January 1979. Shortly hereafter, on 16 May 
1979, the ZK of the SED met to approve the initial structure of the Lutherjahr and to confirm 
that Honecker himself would act as patron for the whole event. Mirroring similar structures in 
earlier commemorations it was also decided to form an official body, representing all official 
Lutherjahr stakeholders including academics and the church, in order to present a unified 
approach to the outside world. This was to be known as the ‘Martin-Luther-Komittee der 
DDR’ (hereafter referred to as the ‘MLK’) and was the first such commemoration-specific 
body to be chaired by Honecker himself; the corresponding Beethoven Commitee had been 
chaired by Stoph.  
The SED was involved from the outset, and in contrast to the other three case studies in this 
thesis, a three-page planning concept of the Lutherjahr, attached to an SED 
Beschlussvorlage, is remarkably short on detail. An introductory paragraph highlights 
Luther’s contributions to German culture as foundation stone of a ‘Sozialistische 
Nationalkultur’:  
Martin Luther gab der neuzeitlichen Kultur wichtige Impulse für die Entwicklung der 
Nationalliteraturen, der neuhochdeutschen Schriftsprache, der Volksbildung, des 
Liedschaffens sowie der Moral und Ethik. Er war einer der größten Meister der 
deutschen Sprache vor Goethe, ebenso einer der bedeutendsten Ethiker vor Kant.140 
This catalogue of achievements clearly seeks to set apart Luther’s secular from his religious 
role; it is positioned as a political framework for the Lutherjahr, combining ‘kultur- und 
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wissenschaftlichpolitische, bündnis- und kirchenpolitische, internationale und 
außenpolitische Aspekte.’ (ibid.). The planning and execution of the Lutherjahr is 
consequently to be ruled by four explicit ‘politische Grundpositionen’. Firstly, a 
demonstrative continuation of cultural appropriation; the ‘Erbaneignung’ of ‘humanistische 
und progressive Kräfte der Vergangenheit’, reflected in previous GDR cultural 
commemorations, namely the 450th anniversary of the Reformation (1967), and the 
quincentenaries’ of Albrecht Dürer (1971) and Lucas Cranach d.Ä. (1972). Secondly, 
Luther’s significance in terms of being positioned here as a role-model in the ‘Weltweiten 
ideologischen Auseinandersetzung zwischen Sozialismus und Imperialismus’ (ibid.). 
Luther’s conflict in how he overcame his reactionary bourgeois background is linked to an 
emphatically phrased warning of a similar, ongoing ‘Auseinandersetzung mit reaktionären 
bürgerlichen und sozialpolitischen […] Auffassungen, […] sowie mit allen Versuchen, das 
Erbe Luthers für die imperialistische Fiktion von der ‘‘einheitlichen deutschen Kulturnation’’ 
zu missbrauchen’ (ibid.). The third Grundposition clarifies the issue underlying this warning 
by unambiguously re-asserting the Accord as a framework for the Lutherjahr. The state’s 
Konzeption must govern at all times: ‘Mit Hilfe der staatlichen Konzeption der Luther-
Ehrung und durch Koordinierung der staatlichen und kirchlichen Aktivitäten wird darauf 
Einfluss genommen, daß alle Veranstaltungen in Übereinstimmung mit der Politik des 
Friedens und des gesellschaftlichen Fortschritts unseres sozialistischen Staates durchgeführt 
werden.’ (ibid.). The final Grundposition locates the importance of the GDR’s Lutherjahr in 
an international context, both vis a vis fellow socialist states and, more importantly, the 
anticipated interest of predominantly protestant non-socialists. The GDR’s notion of 
Humanism in political life thus appears here again as a central Leitmotif of the Lutherjahr: 
‘[…] die humanistischen Grundsätze der Politik der DDR wirksam und erlebar zu 
demonstrieren’. (ibid.).  
Having laid out the four core political objectives, the 1979 Konzeption spells out the ultimate 
political goal, target audience and implementation of the Lutherjahr as all relating to national 
identity: ‘Zur weiteren Herausbildung und Festigung des sozialistischen Geschichts- und 
Nationalbewusstseins sowie zur Persönlichkeitsentwicklung der Werktätigen der DDR, 
insbesondere der Jugend, ist eine wirksame politisch-ideologische und kulturpolitisch-
propagandistische Arbeit zu entwickeln…’ (ibid.). The success of this strategy in practice 
will be evaluated in this case study, as the planning and implementation phase unfolded 
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between 1979 and the end of 1983. The SEDˈs changing role will be described later in this 
section. 
The first widely publicised inaugural meeting of the MLK was held on 13 June 1980. By that 
time the MLK had grown to 104 members, more than twice the size of the corresponding 
Beethoven bicentenary committee. The range and seniority of government, party, mass 
organisation, academic and artists selected is pointedly styled as the ‘Who is Who’ der 
besseren DDR-Gesellschaft’ (Maser, 2013, p.97), reflecting the unique political importance 
of the Lutherjahr. Following the pattern of earlier major commemorations, this body was 
only to meet in plenary session on a few occasions, essentially to publicise the project and to 
approve the preparatory work in progress. Following the format and planning process of 
previous major commemorations, a central organisational unit was set up within the MfK – 
the ‘Organisationsbüro des Martin-Luther-Komitees der DDR’ (DDR). Their primary 
purpose was to coordinate Lutherjahr activities initiated under the auspices of the MLK but 
also to liaise, and in effect supervise adherence to state policy by the church’s Lutherkomitee 
on all church-sponsored events. 
Following a separate development period described later in this chapter, the official 
ideological framework for the Lutherjahr was published on 25 September 1981 as ‘Thesen 
über Martin Luther zum 500. Geburtstag’.141 The final key date to be noted in the run-up to 
the Lutherjahr took place a year later. The Organisationsbüro published a 115-page booklet, 
containing several speeches, photos and a programme of all planned MLK sponsored 
Lutherjahr events.142 As discussed later in this chapter, the programme of events comprised 
over 70 conferences, concerts, festivals and official commemorations throughout the GDR 
territory. The church’s Lutherkomitee and the MLK nominally coordinated each other’s 
activity through representatives on each other’s working groups. However, as noted above, 
the Lutherkomitee appears to have been junior in terms of its allocated role, which was 
focused on planning local and national church events and publications for the Lutherjahr, 
especially the major church congresses (Kirchentage) in seven GDR locations. 
The MLK has been characterised in recent scholarship as an ‘Instrument des 
mythenpolitischen Monopols der politischen Elite der DDR’ (Zimmering 2000, p.261). This 
simplistic and somewhat dismissive label, however, ignores the considerable precedence of 
earlier major cultural commemorations, that all involved a very similar organisational 
structure. In line with similar formal assessments in earlier cultural commemorations, the 
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MfK files contain an eight-page report by the Organisationsbüro on its contribution to the 
Lutherjahr, signed by its head, Siegried Rakotz.143 The report will be discussed in more detail 
in the ‘outcomes’ section of this chapter. To begin with, the report repeats the three main 
aspirational objectives of the unit, picking up on similar pronouncements before and during 
the course of the Lutherjahr by senior SED and government officials. This introduction 
provides a very useful summary of the MLKˈs importance in the context of the research 
question in this thesis. Two of these objectives had been to act as a catalyst for integration of 
all sectors of GDR society involved with the Lutherjahr, and to raise the external image 
(Ausstrahlungskraft) of the GDR and its Friedenspolitik. But the first and foremost aim had 
been to ensure that the Lutherjahr would contribute to GDR national identity in the context of 
its cultural policies: ‘…die Lutherehrung als Beitrag zur Vertiefung des sozialistischen 
National- Geschichts-und Traditionsbewusstseins der Bürger der DDR zu gestalten’ […] im 
Sinne der Erbepolitik unseres Arbeiter-und Bauernstaates’. (ibid.).  
5.2.2. The GDR’s historical approach and the 1981 Thesen: a Marxist rehabilitation of 
Luther? 
The most important responsibility of the MLK within the first objective highlighted above 
was to coordinate the ideological framework for the Lutherjahr. In this context, it is helpful 
to briefly review the evolution of Luther in Marxist historiography. Thomas Brady 
distinguishes three chronological stages (Brady, 2014a, pp.195-203). The first two go back to 
the mid-nineteenth century. Marx set out a concept of Luther as a European liberal whose 
attacks on the medieval church paved the way to a bourgeois-capitalist society (ibid.). 
Twenty years later, Engels developed a more enduring representation of Luther as a German 
reactionary and traitor to the cause of the common man in the Peasants War (ibid.). GDR 
historiography at first followed the official line of Soviet historiography which maintained a 
negative stance on Luther. The GDR historian, Max Steinmetz is credited as initiating the 
rehabilitation of Luther in 1960. He recommended that the GDR should allocate, in general 
terms, Luther’s progressive achievements to the Nationalerbe of the GDR and so place 
Luther as a revolutionary precursor of the German people: ‘Luther, the trailblazer of a 
modern humanist culture in Germany.’ (ibid.).  
Even before the MLK and the Lutherkommitee had been formed, several meetings involving 
senior SED officials, historians and representatives of the church took place between 1978 
and late 1982 to further develop Steinmetz’s approach to Luther as an ideological framework 
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for the Lutherjahr. The concept for one of the main events of the Lutherjahr, an international 
academic conference in October 1983, was agreed in December 1980. It sets out what was to 
become a central agenda for defining the new approach to Luther. Key components of the 
future framework are defined as a need to clarify Luther’s position, in the context of Marxist-
Leninist theory, both in terms of class, and of his impact on subsequent revolutions:  
Wissenschaftlich-theoretisch geht es um die Weiterentwicklung des Marxistisch-
leninistischen Lutherbildes auf der Grundlage der Konzeption der frühbürgerlichen 
Revolutionen. Dies erfordert insbesondere eine exakte Bestimmung der 
Klassenposition Martin Luthers; seiner Funktion in der frühbürgerlichen Revolution; 
seiner bleibenden weiter wirkenden Leistungen für den Fortschritt und seine 
Grenzen.144 
‘Weiterentwicklung’ is a key term here as it emphasises that the revised approach should be 
received as evolutionary rather than challenging the earlier, more negative interpretation of 
Luther in the GDR. 
The official ideological framework for the Lutherjahr was published in September 1981 as a 
forty-page document, setting out fifteen Thesen. The introduction proposes an underlying 
attribute of Luther by emphasising three times the term ‘progressive’: 
Die Deutsche Demokratische Republik ist tief verwurzelt in der ganzen deutschen 
Geschichte. Als sozialistischer deutscher Staat ist sie das Ergebnis des Jahrhundert 
langen Ringens alle progressiven Kräfte des deutschen Volkes für den 
gesellschaftlichen Fortschritt. Alles, was in der deutschen Geschichte an progressivem 
hervorgebracht wurde, und alle, die es bewirkt haben, gehören zu ihrer 
unverzichtbaren, die nationale Identität prägenden Tradition…In diesem Sinne 
würdigt die DDR die historischen Leistungen Martin Luthers und pflegt das von ihm 
hinterlassene progressive Erbe.145 
Luther is firmly anchored here in the context of the twin concepts of Kulturerbe and 
Tradition within the cultural policy of Honeckerˈs GDR. As noted in the introductory 
chapter, these concepts encapsulate the differentiation between Erbe at the core of the GDR 
as Kulturnation and Tradition at the heart of the modern GDR Staatsnation. Luther is thus to 
be understood as not only one of the most important German cultural personalities but 
progressive in a contemporary sense. This statement may be read as dispelling any earlier 
official ambivalence on his status alongside other major German cultural figures: 
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‘Wegbereiter… Er gehört zu den großen Persönlichkeiten der deutschen Geschichte von 
Weltgeltung.’(ibid., p.5). 
The progressive description of Luther as a ‘Wegbereiter’ is then expanded by emphasising 
that he was an early revolutionary: 
Martin Luther löste durch seinen Kampf gegen das ‘Internationale Zentrum des 
Feudalsystems’ (Friedrich Engels) die Reformation aus. Darin liegt sein bleibendes 
historisches Verdienst. Die Reformation wurde wesentlicher Bestandteil der 
beginnenden Revolution. (…) Ihr historischer Platz (…) bestimmt den Charakter der 
Revolution als frühbürgerlich. (ibid., p.8).  
But at the same time the Thesen recognise the preceding negative image of Luther in the 
GDR, reflected in his earlier official description as ‘Fürstenknecht und Bauernverräter’. This 
historic argument relates to mainly to the perception of Luther’s class. A similarity with the 
Kollwitz centenary commemoration can be noted here, where a controversy surrounding her 
bourgeois background had also featured repeatedly. 
Martin Luther war durch seine Herkunft mit der bäuerlichen Sphäre und mit dem 
frühkapitalistischen Unternehmertum verbunden. (…) Er wurde zu einem Vertreter 
einer zumeist dem Bürgertum nahestehenden, zum Teil frühkapitalistische Interessen 
ausdrückenden, vom Territorialfürstentum und der Kirche materiell abhängigen 
Intelligenz, die letztlich in seiner bürgerlichen-gemäßigten, auf das Landesfürstentum 
orientierten Klassenposition begründet war. (ibid., p.9). 
The issue is not glossed over but dealt with; albeit the choice of a mitigating adjective, 
‘gemäßigt’, appears to be defensive. Furthermore, the Thesen also differentiate between the 
reality of his limited, local impact at the time and the longer term major outcomes of the 
Reformation that he instigated: ‘…zwischen seiner Rolle als Initiator einer breiten, alle 
oppositionellen Klassen und Schichten einbeziehenden revolutionären Bewegung und seiner 
eigenen begrenzten Zielstellung.’ (ibid. p.19). 
The Thesen also add an international dimension to Luther’s characterisation as a 
revolutionary:  
Martin Luthers Reformation übte eine nachhaltige Wirkung auf die europäischen 
Länder aus. Sie trieb die Lösung grundlegender Widersprüche der Feudalgesellschaft 
voran und wurde deshalb sehr rasch zu einer europäischen Erscheinung, die den 
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Übergang vom Feudalismus zum Kapitalismus beschleunigte […] dieser bürgerliche 
Revolutionszyklus konnte auf den Ergebnissen der Reformation aufbauen. (ibid., 
p.23-24). 
The prominence and European context of this theme thus reveals an underlying political aim, 
namely to instrumentalise the Lutherjahr in order to raise the international visibility of the 
GDR. This interpretation concurs with Zimmering’s argument that the emphasis in the 
Thesen on the European dimension of the Reformation may have been intended to reinforce a 
national identity as viewed from outside the GDR; a certain existing deficit in domestic 
national identity could thus have been compensated by an increased foreign respect and 
legitimisation of the GDR (Zimmering 2000, p.276). 
Luther’s revised interpretation in the Thesen contains a compilation of positive qualities:  
[…] vielfältige Anstöße gab Luther für die Entwicklung einer den Menschen 
dienenden Sozialethik. Er vermittelte vielen Generationen die Verpflichtung zum 
Dienst am Nächsten, die Ermutigung zu schöpferischer, sinnvoller Arbeit, die 
Ablehnung des Missbrauchs menschlicher Arbeit zu Profitzwecken, den Schutz der 
Familie und die Hochschätzung von Fleiß, Arbeit, Pflichterfüllung und Sparsamkeit 
als wesentliche Tugenden. 
These idealised epithets may have been seen at the time as reinterpreting earlier, negative 
aspects in the reception of Luther within a more recent, GDR-specific notion of humanism. 
This notion, mentioned briefly in previous chapters, was regularly emphasised in comparable 
GDR commemorations of other major cultural personalities. Erich Honecker himself uses the 
term ‘Humanist’ when depicting Luther in his introductory remarks to a working session of 
the MLK on 29 October 1982: 
Nicht wenige Bürger aus allen Schichten haben in den zurückliegenden Monaten die 
Vorbereitung des Jubiläums zu ihrer eigenen Sache gemacht. Das zeugt davon welche 
lebendige Beziehung die Menschen in der DDR mit dem fortschrittlichen Erbe 
unseres Volkes, den Idealen der bedeutenden Humanisten seine Geschichte 
verbindet.146 
The final of the fifteen Thesen explicitly positions the entire framework within a 
comprehensive claim of the GDR on Luther.147 The ideological reconciliation of the GDR 
with Luther’s work and his historical impact is highlighted: ‘Von Beginn der marxistischen 
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Geschichtswissenschaft der DDR wurde – anknüpfend an Friedrich Engels – die 
bahnbrechende Bedeutung der Reformation hoch gewürdigt und bereits Anfang der 50er 
Jahre der Begriff der frühbürgerlicher Revolution geprägt’ (ibid.). Turning to the present, the 
GDR’s commitment to implementing the constitutionally guaranteed activities of the church 
is then stressed: 
Die von Luther inspirierten und sich auf ihn berufenen protestantischen Kirchen 
haben wie alle anderen Glaubensgemeinschaften in der DDR verfassungsmäßig 
garantierte breite Möglichkeiten zu ihrer Betätigung. […] Partei und Staatsführung 
der DDR waren und sind stets offen für die humanitären Anliegen der christlichen 
Kirchen und haben immer Sorge getragen für eine Zusammenarbeit in diesem Geiste. 
(ibid.). 
At first glance this statement may appear to demonstrate an enhanced status of the church in 
the GDR as demonstrated by the upcoming Luther commemoration. But a closer look at the 
choice of words here is important: ‘breite Möglichkeiten zur Betätigung’ may be read as 
[specific] ‘activities’, rather than a general concession of independence; ‘humanitären 
Anliegen’, implies [allocated or defined] humanitarian – as opposed to wider, socio-political 
– concerns. This phrasing suggests a defensive assertion of the state’s absolute hegemony in 
the spirit of the ‘Kirche im Sozialismus’ church-state accords, rather than a genuine 
‘Zusammenarbeit’, that is cooperative relationship of state and church as independent 
components of GDR society.  
The closing paragraph of the Thesen, explaining the leading role of the MLK, contains a 
significant statement that explicitly links Lutherˈs legacy to GDR ‘national culture’: ‘Luthers 
progressives Erbe ist aufgehoben in der sozialistischen deutschen Nationalkultur’ (ibid., 
p.37). As in the aims of commemorations analysed in the first two case studies, references to 
national culture seem to confirm the regimeˈs objective of promoting national identity 
through the commemorations. In this case, the inferred appropriation of Luther can be read as 
an inward looking, positive identification, comparable with the Kollwitz commemoration 
sixteen years earlier; as such, this approach therefore contrasts with the earlier appropriations 
of Schiller and Beethoven, both of which were mainly expressed as a negative, outward 
looking demarcation versus West Germany.  
Although the historian and Luther expert, Professor Gerhard Brendler, has been identified as 
the main individual behind the official authorship of the Thesen, scholars have speculated 
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more recently on the nature of any wider involvement of GDR historians in their 
development (Roy, 2000, pp. 180-232). SED pressure for a clear consensus amongst GDR 
historians meant that even though various historians may have had somewhat different 
interpretations of Luther and the Reformation, these differences were not reflected in the 
official fifteen Thesen. In their day-to-day relationship with the SED in 1983, GDR historians 
needed to second-guess the likely reaction and support from the SED rather than create an 
interpretative framework on Luther in accordance with predetermined parameters (ibid., 
p.180). Rather than trying to substantiate an interpretation with scholarly analysis, historians 
preferred the politically safe approach of employing dubious adjectives such as bourgeois or 
intelligent, and then securing appropriate support from party officials (ibid., p.230). In other 
words, political expediency and usefulness was more important than trying to debate a 
particular scholarly approach. Roy’s interpretation corresponds to other evidence in this 
chapter on precedence given to short-term pragmatism when intellectuals were involved in 
planning and implementing the Lutherjahr.148 A decade earlier, Hartmut Lehmann, a West 
German historian, had summarised the Thesen polemically: 
[…] welch gigantische Heldengestalt wird uns hier geschildert, oder präziser: welch 
gigantisches Klischee von einem Helden! Was nicht in dieses Bild passt, ist 
wegretuschiert. […] Alle Widersprüche, die wir bei Luther finden, sind eingeebnet, 
alle Zweifel, alle Unsicherheiten, aus denen Luther selbst nie ein Hehl machte, sind 
ausgeräumt. […] Kurzum: Luthers Bild wird in den Thesen durchgängig harmonisiert 
[...] Bezweifelt werden muss, ob auch der von den 15 Thesen nicht eingefangene 
Luther dazu dient, ‘Zement’ in die Staatsfundamente der DDR zu gießen. (Lehmann, 
1990, pp.234-236) 
Lehman’s exaggerated approach was characteristic of its time. Nevertheless, his argument 
that the Thesen served to reinforce longstanding official efforts to reinforce the regimeˈs 
legitimacy may still be sustained today. However, it does not alter the reality of the Thesen as 
a political framework for the Lutherjahr. In essence, the Thesen may be best summarised as a 
new, simplistic positioning of Luther, necessary to amplify the transition to ‘Luther, the early 
modern German humanist’ – the final of the three stages of Marxist historiography according 
to Brady (Brady, 2014a, p.203). The humanist attribute here is crucial as it exemplifies a core 
component of the regimeˈs policy on constructing national identity. As Matthew Philpotts 
argues in ‘Contested Legacies: constructions of cultural heritage in the GDR’: 
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Above all, the cultural construction of these narratives, understood in the broadest 
possible sense, is one of the central planks in the formation of national identity. […] 
the SED ascribed immense significance to historical narratives as a source of self-
legitimation. […] Looking further back, the SED strove to construct a political and 
cultural heritage that could support the idea of a continuous progressive humanist 
tradition from the Enlightenment […] to this first socialist state on German soil 
(Philpotts and Rolle, 2009, p.1). 
5.2.3. Reconciling different images of Luther within state and church: progressive 
humanist and reformer of church and faith 
A highly publicised agreement, signed on 6 March 1978 (the ‘Accord’), marked a particularly 
significant milestone in the relationship between state and the church. The purpose of the 
Accord was to set out the agreed understanding on the respective roles of state and church in 
GDR society in such areas as education and social policy. More importantly, however, was 
the underlying purpose of asserting the state’s exclusive role on setting and executing from 
time to time the political agenda and thus explicitly restricting the church’s competence to 
influence domestic or international policy in any way. Since this Accord, the church was 
generally perceived as having established a modus vivendi with the state based on the 
concept of the ‘church within Socialism’. This was not ‘a church fully committed to the goals 
and praxis of the SED, but one which maintain[ed] a position of critical solidarity with the 
government’ (Cordell, 2007, p.51). The Lutherjahr provided the state with the first major 
opportunity to demonstrate the limited autonomy of the church and present a newly-won, and 
allegedly harmonious relationship between church and state. Paradoxically, this was to be 
achieved by establishing two separate committees to oversee the Lutherjahr: a state 
committee, presided over by Erich Honecker and a church committee chaired by Werner 
Leich, the Bishop of Thüringen (Walinski-Kiehl, 2004, p.52).  
The church’s conceptual ambivalence to the state’s Lutherjahr plans was noted by 
contemporary historians. Whilst understanding the benefits of cooperation, the church was 
clearly anxious as to how the official ideological framework and overall ‘embrace of Luther’ 
might influence the church’s own position on Luther (Goeckel, 1984, p.118). The extent of 
these contradictory attitudes emerges in a remarkable primary source published just before 
the Lutherjahr by Harald Schultze, a prominent theologian and church official.149 In his blunt 
introduction, Schultze appears to distance himself from the fuss surrounding the Lutherjahr: 
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‘So viel Skepsis hat es vor einem Jubiläum wohl noch nicht gegeben, wie man sie hören 
konnte, ehe das Lutherjahr 1983 noch begonnen hatte. Wem eine scharfe ironische 
Bemerkung zum Lutherrummel einfällt, darf sicher sein, in seinem Konvent Beifall zu 
bekommen.’ (ibid., p.47). However, as mitigating factor he endorses one of the main official 
concerns surrounding how the Lutherjahr was to be used to raise the GDR’s international 
profile; he concedes that the scale of events may be justified by his own perception of the 
GDR’s external image: ‘Für ein kleines Land, wie es die DDR ist, muss solch Ereignis, [the 
Lutherjahr], in der Tat zum Mittelpunkt des Jahres [1983], werden, weil mit so viel Gästen 
von außerhalb zu rechnen ist, die weder zu einer Messe noch zu einer Sportveranstaltung 
kommen.’ (ibid., p.47). 
Pointing to his perception of internal weaknesses Schultze questions the church’s ability to 
fully step up to the expected role of host: ‘Wir müssen uns nicht nur fragen, ob unsere Kräfte 
ausreichen, um in solchem Maße ein Jubiläum zu begehen. Die tiefer reichende Frage geht 
dahin, ob unsere Kirche eigentlich berechtigt sei, in solchem Rahmen als Gastgeber 
aufzutreten.’ But this pessimistic assessment also attributes the blame outside the church, 
even hinting that the church’s Lutherjahr role had been imposed: ‘Eine angefochtene, eine 
finanziell nicht einmal selbstständige Kirche, eine Kirche, […] die nicht mehr überall als 
Volkskirche lebendig ist […]. Als ob die Kirche nun doch stark genug sei, zu repräsentieren, 
einfach, weil diese Rolle von ihr erwartet wird’. The article’s title poses the question: 
‘Konzeptionen für ein Jubiläum oder: Wie begehen wir den 500. Geburtstag?’ (ibid., p.47). 
He suggests that the answer may be found in a unifying concept for the Lutherjahr: ‘Umso 
nötiger ist es, sich miteinander über die Konzeption zu verständigen, mit der wir das 
Jubiläumsjahr gestalten wollen.’ Initially, this call for Verständigung, a term that may be 
translated both as understanding as well as active agreement, appears to address an internal 
audience and process within the church. But the main section of the article goes on further to 
elaborate other aspects that the church’s Lutherjahr committee were considering in 
developing their projects. First and foremost was the avoidance of a personality cult 
surrounding Luther. Noting the church’s particular responsibility, one may read a suggestion 
that others, that is the state, may be going astray: ‘Wir bauen heute nicht gern Denkmäler, wir 
fürchten jeden Personenkult, in der Kirche noch mehr als anderswo. Und wir wissen, daß 
Personenkult gegenüber Luther ganz falsch am Platze wäre. […]. Wer Luther heroisiert, hat 
von seinen Schriften nichts begriffen’. Schultze demands transparency about Luther’s 
weaknesses, in apparent contrast to the absence of such negatives in the official Thesen. With 
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the headline ‘Offenes Gespräch über Fehlentscheidungen’, Schulze singles out Luther’s 
uncompromisingly hostile position to peasants at the end of the Bauernkrieg, his persecution 
of the Anabaptists and his antisemitic sermons (ibid., p.48). 
Turning specifically to the official Thesen, Schultze adopts an apparently conciliatory tone, 
describing the dialogue with Marxist research on Luther as a ‘Bereicherung für die Kirche’. 
However, his phrasing seeks ambitiously to position the church in an ongoing process as an 
equal partner to the state-appointed historians: ‘Gegenwärtig ist auf beiden Seiten die 
Gesprächsbereitschaft und Offenheit für die Ergebnisse des anderen größer geworden. Das 
Gespräch über die präzise begründeten, weiterführenden Thesen der Akademie der 
Wissenschaften der DDR zu Martin Luther ist daher in vollem Gang.’ (ibid., p.48). This 
notable effort to assert the church’s autonomy is reinforced by specific reference to differing 
methodology and historical analysis, inferring optimistically that they were politically equally 
valid: ‘Andere methodische Voraussetzungen und unterschiedliche Bewertungen des 
historischen Kontextes haben zu einem vielfach unterschiedlichen Lutherbild geführt.’ (ibid., 
p.48).  
The subsequent report on the Lutherjahr by the MLKˈs Organisationsbüro, referred to 
earlier, includes a wide-ranging reference to the MLK’s relationship with the church’s 
Lutherkomittee:  
Die sachbezogene Förderung der vertrauensvollen Zusammenarbeit mit dem 
Lutherkomitee der evangelischen Kirchen in der DDR im Rahmen der 
Jubiläumsfeierlichkeiten als aktiven Beitrag zur Verwirklichung der Bündnispolitik 
unseres sozialistischen Staates und der weiteren Vertiefung der politisch-moralischen 
Einheit unseres Volkes und der Gestaltung der Beziehungen zwischen Staat und 
Kirche.150 
The desired improvement of the church-state relationship is easier to understand here than 
the vague-sounding appeal for ‘political-moral unity’. ˈSachbezogenˈ is an unambiguous 
reference to want the relationship to focus on concrete, even operational matters rather than 
wide-ranging, politically sensitive issues, such as the peace movement. Bündnispolitik, 
defined as the fundamental alliance of the SED as lead entity in the GDR society with all 
non-communist parties and mass organisations in the GDR (Tempel, 1987, p.221), is an 
underlying common denominator of all the commemorations in this thesis. Pronouncing here 
explicitly on using the Lutherjahr as a means to the end of strengthening the Bündnispolitik 
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marks an important difference to the other commemorations. The aim of improving the 
church-state relationship appears here to take precedence over strengthening the involvement 
of the working class, which received so much emphasis in those previous commemorations. 
The subsequent reality of a discrepancy between the theory and practice of complementary 
ideological concepts, related political tensions and resulting operational weaknesses in the 
relationship between the state and the church will be examined later in this chapter.  
5.2.4. An increasingly nervous SED makes its presence felt  
Horst Dohle, a senior SED official and assistant to Klaus Gysi, comments retrospectively on 
the relationship between the state and church Lutherjahr committees by presenting an 
engaging analysis, supported by evidence of growing disagreement within the SED during 
1983 (Dohle, 1996, pp.56-93). Factions within the party, backed up by internal evaluations 
from the Stasi, were becoming concerned that the church was strengthening its position, 
given the popular reception of individual events such as the church congresses. This is seen 
as the primary reason for unexpected cutbacks in the scale of events towards the end of the 
year; that is that the more conservative SED members were getting the upper hand in 
lowering the public profile of the events organised by the church.151 The following section 
examines several documents from the SED’s files that shed more light on the Party’s growing 
involvement in the Lutherjahr, both before and during 1983. 
In the aftermath of the 6 March 1978 Accord, the SED’s two highest organs, the Politbüro 
and the Sekretariat des ZK, administered Kirchenpolitik within a similar process of 
Beschlussvorlagen to other areas of GDR life. The Politbüro set policy on objectives and 
strategy whereas tactical, short-term decisions were delegated to the Sekretariat des ZK 
(Dohle, 1995, pp.404-405). As noted above, the relative importance of the Lutherjahr 
compared to similar major cultural commemorations in the GDR in the past may be seen in 
its far longer gestation process that began four years before, in early 1979. However, the 
hitherto unmatched significance of the Lutherjahr was not reflected in any exception to the 
standard SED discussion and approval process for such commemorations, even allowing for 
Erich Honecker’s designated chairmanship of the Luther committee. The appropriate 
Beschlussvorlage of 1979 mentioned at the beginning of this section, was thus effectively 
rubber-stamped rather than deliberated by the Sekretariat des ZK.152 There is no evidence in 
this document of any discussions of the Lutherjahr’s impact and relevance to larger, ongoing 
issues relating to the church in the GDR. These might have included the church’s increasing 
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association with the emerging GDR peace movement, as well as related, unauthorised public 
readings by GDR authors at church venues. As described later in the chapter, this type of 
activity was increasingly viewed by the Stasi at the time as threatening state security. As a 
result, the Stasi was to become comprehensively involved in the planning and subsequent 
surveillance of all major Lutherjahr events; this had not been the case in previous cultural 
commemorations (Dohle 1995, p.394).  
Three further SED records over that period reveal key milestones in the evolution of how the 
most senior party organs approached and handled the planning stage of the Lutherjahr. The 
transition from nodding through the original Konzeption in 1979 to hands-on immersion in 
planning and execution by 1983 represents a gap between the original concept and the 
subsequent reality of the Lutherjahr. Eighteen months after the Lutherjahr concept had been 
approved by the highest SED organs, Gisela Glenda, recorded here as being ‘Leiterin des 
Büros des Politbüros’, issued a strongly worded internal, i.e. confidential, status report on the 
relationship between church and state.153 This update was addressed and circulated to all 
regional and local SED offices as well as to all departments of the ZK. The document 
highlights several ongoing developments that, in Glenda’s view, contradict the spirit and 
content of the 6 March 1978 Accord. Specific reactionary sections of the church are accused 
of being receptive to external influence and pressures particularly from the (Protestant) 
church in West Germany seeking to interfere in various aspects of GDR policy including 
defence and education. For example: ‘In letzter Zeit versuchte man die Eigenständigkeit der 
Kirchen der DDR auch unter dem Vorwand gemeinsamer Verantwortung für den Frieden zu 
betreiben’ (ibid.). The key point here is the contradiction to the clear separation of the 
church’s responsibilities from that of the state as articulated in the 1978 Accord. Furthermore 
the memorandum notes several initiatives by both West German media and the West German 
church to declare ongoing events involving citizens from both German states as constituting 
an ˈall-Germanˈ activity, which according to official SED policy was illegal:  
Seit einiger Zeit interessieren sich Vertreter westlicher Massenmedien verstärkt für 
kirchliche Tagungen, für Synoden u.a. […]. Die sogenannten 
Partnerschaftsbeziehungen von Kirchgemeinden in der DDR zu solchen in der BRD 
sowie zwischen den Leitungen und Synoden der Kirchen wurden weiter ausgebaut 
und intensiviert. Gemeinsame Treffen fanden zuweilen unter Verletzung der Gesetze 
der DDR statt. (ibid.).  
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The memorandum goes on to allude to the principle of emphasising the total organisational 
separation of the GDR’s (Lutheran) church from its counterpart, the West German church – a 
fundamental policy embodying a cornerstone of GDR sovereignty and national identity: 
‘Auch Vertreter der Kirchen müssen veranlasst werden, Staatsbewusstsein zu beweisen und 
im Ausland als Staatsbürger der DDR aufzutreten. Sie müssen erkennen, daß sie in einem 
souveränen sozialistischen Staat, der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik, leben und danach 
handeln.’(ibid.). But this reminder means in practice that the SED addresses the need to 
become more educationally proactive in their respective relationships with the church: ‘Das 
ist eine große politisch-ideologische Aufgabe in der Arbeit unter kirchlichen Kreisen.’ 
Finally, the acute nervousness that permeates this memorandum translates to a renewed call 
for proactive pressure by the party on the church. This may be found in the closing demand 
for the Party to exercise stronger control including, by implication, Stasi surveillance: 
Angesichts der Tatsache, daß die Feinde der DDR ihre Tätigkeit auf die Störung der 
Staat/Kirche-Beziehungen der DDR konzentrieren und mit großem Aufwand 
versuchen, Verwirrung besonders in kirchlichen Kreisen der DDR zu stiften, ist es 
erforderlich, die politische und ideologische Wachsamkeit zu gewährleisten, 
Erscheinungen gegnerischer Einflüsse auf kirchliche Kreise schnell zu analysieren 
und die Informationstätigkeit weiter zu verbessern. (ibid.). 
A second document, minutes of a high-level SED meeting in September 1982, shows how the 
most senior levels within the SED had moved to a detailed involvement in the latter stages of 
the Lutherjahr planning, partly as a reaction to continuing tensions with the church.154 
Superficially, the seventh appendix to the minutes suggests an orderly progress from the 
concept approved in 1979 through the establishment of the MLK in March 1980 to the more 
recent establishment of an internal SED working group, ‘… zur parteimäßigen Koordinierung 
und Kontrolle der politischen Aktivitäten zur Martin-Luther-Ehrung der DDR 1983’ (ibid.). 
The document notes the specific tasks of the church’s separate Lutherkomitee. However, any 
potential interpretation of equality between the two committees is eliminated by a reference 
to ‘Übertragung’ in the sense of ‘delegation’ rather than ‘transfer’, and ‘Abstimmung’ in the 
sense of ‘approval’ rather than ‘co-ordination’. Moreover, the longstanding tensions between 
the church and state are not glossed over but rather seen as reduced by this co-operation, 
described also as thriving (‘Gedeihliche Zusammenarbeit’):  
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Die Planung und Koordinierung aller kirchlichen Veranstaltungen aus Anlass des 
Lutherjubiläums 1983 wurde kirchlicherseits dem kirchlichen Lutherkomitee 
übertragen, das die Schwerpunktveranstaltungen mit dem Lutherkomitee der DDR 
und den zuständigen staatlichen Stellen abgestimmt hat. Die Zusammenarbeit beider 
Lutherkomitees hat sich in der zurückliegenden Zeit als ein stabilisierender Faktor für 
die kirchenpolitische Entwicklung in unserem Land erwiesen. (ibid.). 
The status report in this section concludes with a negative political risk assessment, under the 
heading: ‘Bisher bekannte Einflüsse des Gegners.’ Without citing specific evidence, unnamed 
entities and the Western mass media are accused of attributing a negative ‘marxistisch-
leninistisches Lutherbild’ to the SED party and GDR state: ‘Gegnerische Kräfte suggerieren 
die Meinung, daß Partei und Staat in der DDR eine ungerechtfertigte, gegen die Kirchen und 
die Interessen gläubiger Bürger gerichtete missbräuchliche Vereinnahmung Luthers 
betreiben, gegen die sich Kirchen und Christen zur Wehr setzen müssten.’ (ibid.). But the 
arguably more existential issue noted as facing the SED here refers to a major concern about 
the perennial issue of demarcation from West Germany. Any visible promotion of bilateral 
East-West contacts between church individuals and communities would, the document 
suggests, be posited by the West as demonstrating the ‘gesamtdeutscher Charakter’ of the 
Lutherjahr, thus implicitly threatening the fundamental identity of the GDR as a separate 
sovereign state.  
These minutes of the meeting in September 1982 contain a final appendix listing several 
‘Schlussfolgerungen’ for a set of new, ad-hoc SED working groups. These units are to be set 
up in the regions containing the seven towns selected by the church to host Lutherjahr-related 
‘Kirchentage’: Erfurt, Rostock, Eisleben, Frankfurt/Oder, Magdeburg, Dresden and 
Wittenberg. The ‘command and control’ nature of these mandatory action steps contradicts 
any sense of a friendly, collegiate collaboration between the church and state that might have 
been read into the previous status report: ‘Die Tätigkeit der Arbeitsgruppen zur 
Einflussnahme auf kirchliche Aktivitäten zum Lutherjubiläum 1983 ist vor allem darauf zu 
richten, eine mit den Interessen unseres Staates übereinstimmende, seine Politik 
unterstützende und von Störungen freie Durchführung der kirchlichen Luther-Ehrung zu 
gewährleisten.’ (ibid.). Beyond ‘exerting influence’, party officials are instructed to ensure 
total adherence by the church to state policies when processing approvals for all major church 
events. The fear of public demonstrations in the context of the expected ‘beachtenswerter 
internationaler Beteiligung’ is amplified by an explicit instruction, that reads here as a veiled 
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threat, to remind church officials of their ‘Mitverantwortung für Ordnung und einen 
störungsfreien Verlauf geplanter Veranstaltungen’.  
The optimistic status report, issued towards the end of the planning phase and three months 
before the commencement of the Lutherjahr, submits that a highly successful Lutherjahr will 
emanate from a harmonious church-state relationship. But this theory sits uncomfortably with 
the reality of actual events and perceived threats that dominate the proposed concrete action 
steps. Paul Verner, the senior Politbüro member chairing the SED’s central Lutherjahr 
working group at the meeting in September 1982, delivered a speech on ‘Kirchenpolitik’ 
seven months later (the full text of the speech is included as an appendix in Maser, 2013, 
pp.455-461). This address sets out even more starkly how the SED was now concentrating on 
instrumentalising the Lutherjahr during 1983 itself (Dohle, 1995, pp.404-405), in order to 
maximise SED hegemony over the church. Instead of any reference to the content of the 
Lutherjahr events as representing a welcome contribution to an innovative Kirchenpolitik, 
several phrases are repeated by Verner in the speech which clearly characterise a control 
objective for the Lutherjahr: ‘störungsfreier Verlauf’ of events, the avoidance of 
‘Provokationen’, the maintenance of ‘Gesetzlichkeit’, and the elimination of 
‘antisozialistischer Machenschaften von feindlich negativen Kräften’. As far as Verner, 
representing the SED Politbüro and addressing fellow SED members, is concerned, the 
GDR’s Friedenspolitik appears to become the crucial political framework and indicator for a 
successful Lutherjahr: 
In allem was wir tun, liebe Genossen, in allem was wir mit den kirchlichen 
Gesprächspartnern beraten, sollte stets gegenwärtig sein, daß der 500. Geburtstag 
Martin Luthers auch mit dem Zieltermin der USA und der NATO für die Aufstellung 
neuer atomarer Mittelstreckenraketen in Westeuropa zusammenfällt. Wenn wir am 
Ende dieses Jahres 1983 unsere Arbeit für die Luther-Ehrungen abrechnen, dann wird 
sie vor allem daran gemessen werden, inwieweit es uns gelungen ist, die Luther-
Ehrungen 1983 so zu gestalten, daß sie auf größtmögliche Weise die Friedenspolitik 
der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik unterstützt haben. (Maser, 2013, pp.455-
461).  
Thus, the political actuality of 1983 had overtaken earlier theoretical frameworks; 
comparatively short-term political agendas had become more important as the primary 
mission statement for the Lutherjahr than long-term ‘kultur- und wissenschaftlichpolitische 
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[…] Aspekte’ set out in the 1979 Konzeption and in the 1981 Thesen. Furthermore, 
mobilising the church as a means to this end had gained paramount importance for the SED: 
Alle kirchlichen Veranstaltungen im Jahre der Luther-Ehrungen, und ich habe dabei 
besonders die kirchlichen im Blick, verlaufen dann sinnvoll, wenn sie einen 
wirkungsvollen Beitrag leisten zur weiteren Einbeziehung, Formierung und 
Aktivierung religiöser Kräfte für den Kampf gegen die Realisierung der 
Raketenbeschlüsse der NATO. (ibid.). 
In closing, and in contrast to his earlier reference to a ‘nicht ungünstig verlaufende 
Kirchenpolitische Entwicklung’, Verner dwells at some length on ‘feindlich-negative Kräfte’ 
within the church, which may be read to mean the independent peace movement that had 
partly grown up within the church at the time. These ‘hinlänglich bekannte reaktionäre Kräfte 
aus Kreisen der evangelischen Kirchen’ represent more than a just a short-term threat to a 
‘störungsfreie Verlauf der Luther-Ehrungen’. Elsewhere in the speech, Verner observes that, 
looking back to 1978, the church-state relationship had managed to resolve differences 
without any overtly public disputes: ‘Ein wichtiges Ergebnis unserer Politik in dieser Periode 
war, daß erforderliche Auseinandersetzungen unterhalb der Schwelle der Konfrontation 
zwischen Staat und Kirche ausgetragen werden konnten. Das muss so bleiben.’ (ibid.). As in 
the SED documents reviewed earlier, one can once again detect in this speech an 
unmistakeable tone of intimidation for the immediate future. Going even further, Verner goes 
as far as stating that the very existence of the church is at stake should it not manage its own 
affairs according to the state’s expectations: ‘…erforderliche Auseinandersetzungen… 
[müssen]… in zunehmendem Maße innerkirchlich ausgetragen werden. Diese Entwicklung 
muss weiter gefördert werden, wenn die Kirchen Kirchen bleiben wollen.’ (ibid.).  
5.2.5. The Stasi reacts to SED and government anxieties: security becomes a top priority 
On a scale without precedent for a cultural commemoration, the Stasi became actively 
involved in the Lutherjahr from the beginning of 1980 onwards. This appears to have been 
mainly triggered by reports received from the relevant government department, the 
Staatssekretariat für Kirchenfragen, headed by Klaus Gysi. As Staatsekretär, Gysi was as 
senior in the government structure as other government ministers, reporting to the Council of 
Ministers (Ministerrat); Paul Verner, responsible for security matters, was the senior ZK 
member with SED responsibility (Zimmerman, 1985, pp.1299-1300). Verner’s role and 
Honecker’s frequent interventions underline the sensitivity of church policy in the GDR at 
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that time. Shortly before the first meeting in June 1980 of the MLK, a Stasi report on a 
meeting of church bishops noted how certain elements within the church were being openly 
critical of state preparations for the Lutherjahr. 
Anschließend kam es zu einem Meinungsaustausch über die Lutherehrungen in der 
DDR. Die Kirchenvertreter äußerten Bedenken, ob sie die Lutherkonzeption der DDR 
unterstützen können. […] Leider habe man Fehlinterpretationen erlebt und wolle nun 
nicht in die Situation kommen, gegen bestimmte staatliche Positionen angehen zu 
müssen.155  
Later that month, a further report from the Stasi quotes sources in Magdeburg at a clerical 
retreat, commenting on the newly established MLK and seeming to challenge the official 
theoretical framework for the Lutherjahr:156 
Akzeptiert wurde, dass Genosse Honecker den Vorsitz führt. Die evangelische 
Pfarrerschaft schätzt dazu ein, daß der Staat dieses Luther-Jubiläum durchführen muss 
um ein Geschichtsbewusstsein darzulegen […] Bedenken gibt es kirchlicherseits, daß 
der Staat vielleicht die gleichen Fehler macht, wie in der wilhelminischen Ära und 
Luther für sich vereinnahmen wird. Ähnlich der Jubiläen in den sechziger Jahren 
waren die Vertreter des Auslands schockiert und fanden es lächerlich, wie kirchliche 
Leute vom Staat vereinnahmt werden. Luther war und ist Theologe und Geistlicher.  
(ibid.). 
From that time on the Stasi developed a comprehensive, military-style strategy to gather 
advance information and prepare detailed surveillance and monitoring plans for the 
Lutherjahr on all official and church events across the GDR. In practice this meant 
concentrating on preventing any kind of disruption or ‘Provokation’, such as political 
demonstrations at the seven ‘Kirchentag’ locations and other major commemoration places. 
One such district was ‘Bezirk’ Halle, within which were two of the most important 
commemoration towns, Wittenberg and Eisleben. An eighteen-page plan covered twenty 
Lutherjahr events between February and November, many of which were over more than one 
day, and involving several hundred visitors.157 The introduction summarises the core Stasi 
mission statement: ‘Ein ständig hohes Niveau der politisch-ideologischen und politisch-
operativen Arbeit, Einsatzbereitschaft und des Kampfes zu allseitigen Aufklärung und 
vorbeugenden Verhinderung feindlicher Pläne und Absichten zur Störung der Luther-Ehrung 
in der DDR.’ (ibid.). In this and similar plans for other areas a substantial number of officials 
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at all levels within the church hierarchy were singled out, as were suspected peace movement 
activists amongst the GDR population. Additionally, foreign individuals, foreign journalists 
attending events and other foreign visitors from the non-socialist countries who were 
suspected of seeking to contact GDR citizens were all targeted for monitoring during their 
attendance at events. Western media registered Stasi involvement even in in the context of 
tourist guides:  
Sorgen bereiten die Luther-Touristen auch der Wittenberger Stasi […]. Vorsorglich 
haben die örtlichen Aufpasser des Ministeriums für Staatssicherheit schon mal die 
Stadtbilderklärer ausgetauscht: die älteren Stadtführer waren den Zensoren bei ihren 
Führungen durch die Vergangenheit zu kirchen-fromm und zu wenig revolutionär.158 
Understandably for a news organisation, Der Spiegel did not disclose its sources for this 
report at the time. A status report from January 1983, now accessible in the Stasi files, 
confirms this as well as several large scale preparatory measures, all designed to ‘safeguard’ 
the events in Wittenberg:159  
[…] Es kann eingeschätzt werden, daß positive Ergebnisse in Vorbereitung der 
Sicherung der Luther-Ehrung erreicht werden konnten. Dabei handelt es sich um 
solche politisch-operativen Maßnahmen wie die Schaffung von Schlüsselpositionen 
und deren Besetzung mit zuverlässigen und teils inoffiziellen Kräften, die Schaffung 
von Beobachtungsstützpunkten entlang der Protokollstrecke, die Schaffung eines 
neuen Systems der Stadtbilderklärer, Betreuer von Reisegruppen sowie Journalisten 
aus dem nichtsozialistischen Ausland. […] Im Rahmen der Neuorganisierung des 
Systems der Stadtbilderklärer wurden 35 Personen für ihren Einsatz bestätigt, 
insgesamt ist ein Bestand von 50 Stadtbilderklärer vorgesehen, zum Teil mit 
Fremdsprachenkenntnissen. Im Ergebnis der Neuorganisierung der Stadtbilderklärer 
konnte erreicht werden, dass unzuverlässige Personen herausgelöst wurden und im 
engen Zusammenwirken mit dem Rat der Stadt nur zuverlässige Personen bestätigt 
werden. (ibid.). 
A subsequent status report from the same Stasi unit provides a brief but telling insight into 
the gap between the aim of publicising and framing the Lutherjahr commemoration 
beforehand, and non-socialist bloc reception of those efforts invested. In a section listing the 
1,873 tourists from those countries registered in the first three months of 1983 (of which just 
over 1,000 from West Germany), a Stasi witness reports that: ‘[…] während der Führung 
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einer Reisegruppe gab es eine Meinungsäußerung dahingehend, daß man beim Stadtrundgang 
wenig von Luther sieht, dafür jedoch sehr viel Plakate, die sich auf das Karl-Marx-Jahr 
[concurrent 1983 centenary of his death] beziehen.’160  
Reflecting the ongoing apprehension articulated at the highest SED levels, the entire Stasi 
effort was thus directed towards a basic ‘störungsfreier Verlauf der Luther-Ehrung’, rather 
than to support overtly any of the cultural and political objectives set out in the previously 
disseminated theoretical framework and objectives for the Lutherjahr. Stasi records indicate 
evidence that the urgent commitment in late 1982 to massive Stasi involvement was based on 
real as well as perceived threats. A top-secret three page Stasi memo, based on specific 
intelligence, and circulated to only eight senior SED officials including Honecker and Gysi, 
lays out a detailed scenario of potential (in the eyes of the Stasi and readers) troublemaking 
activities by individuals on both sides of the German-German border: 161  
Der Stasi bisher vorliegenden ersten internen und offiziellen Hinweisen zufolge 
beabsichtigen gegnerische Kräfte, im Zusammenwirken mit reaktionären kirchlichen 
Personenkreis in der DDR, das Luther-Jubiläum 1983 und damit im Zusammenhang 
stehende kirchliche Veranstaltungen und andere kirchliche Vorhaben für ihre 
antisozialistischen, gegen die DDR gerichteten Ziele zu missbrauchen. (ibid.). 
Citing also several comments in the West German press, such activities were expected to 
include an unacceptable promotion of personal contacts, particularly between the churches 
and communities in East and West Germany, intended to demonstrate the ‘Gesamtdeutscher 
Charakter, die Zusammengehörigkeit und Gemeinsamkeiten der Kirchen beider Deutscher 
Staaten’. Another crucial aspect highlighted in the memo that would have contributed to 
raising official anxiety levels even further was the sheer scale of anticipated visitors from the 
West, totalling over 34,000 individuals who had already applied for visas by August 1982. 
Overall attendance from East and West at the seven ‘Kirchentage’ was expected to be up to 
100,000 for each event. As the apparent originator of the regime’s decision to designate 
security as number one Lutherjahr priority, it is difficult to assess whether the Stasi may have 
been pursuing its own socio-political agenda at the time, despite the Stasi responding 
officially to the SED. However, it is likely that the ubiquitous presence of the Stasi during the 
key large-scale gatherings, in many cases clearly visible as an intimidating enforcer of the 
state (as seen in the Spiegel article cited above), may have devalued the desired sense of pride 
and therefore national identity amongst the population witnessing these high profile events, 
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whether in person or on television. If so, then it is equally plausible that the political need to 
involve the Stasi may have inadvertently contributed to a gap between theory and practice in 
the planning and execution of the Lutherjahr. 
5.3. IMPLEMENTATION 
This section will evaluate in summary form how the main events and activities of the 
Lutherjahr were completed, before examining in greater detail the involvement of television, 
and the major Martin Luther film in particular. This high profile feature of the Lutherjahr 
offers valuable insights into whether, and if so how the aims of the Lutherjahr were translated 
through its development and execution stages. Moreover, the filmˈs reception at home and 
abroad provides meaningful pointers to whether and how national identity may have been 
influenced by this cultural contribution.  
5.3.1. The main events: partly formulaic, partly original 
The wide-ranging Lutherjahr events and activities can be separated into three broad 
categories: academic, religious and state-sponsored, with a fourth strand, media, interwoven 
throughout. Between February and October 1983 nine academic conferences, mostly 
organised by the DKB and the AdK, were held on various aspects of Luther’s life and work 
(Maser, 2013, p.8). During the entire year, a number of major exhibitions were staged 
throughout the GDR, including a travelling poster exhibition outside of the GDR. Five, newly 
renovated Luther-related houses in Wittenberg, Erfurt, Eisleben and the Wartburg were 
reopened. The outstanding media event was a five-part film on episodes from Martin Lutherˈs 
life and work, produced by DEFA for prime time transmission on DFF state television. The 
religious celebrations consisted firstly of small-scale events in churches and communities 
across the GDR. But the main church activities were seven large-scale Kirchentage. These 
commemorative congresses were held between May and September in Thüringen (Erfurt, 
Gotha and Weimar), Rostock, Eisleben, Frankfurt/Oder, Magdeburg, Dresden, and 
Wittenberg. They are said to have attracted a total of over 200,000 participants including 
some 45,000 Western and 26,000 West German registered visitors (Olsen, 2015, p.159).  
Whereas the MLK’s Arbeitstagung of 29 October 1982 had identified sixteen Lutherjahr 
events, conferences and exhibitions as ‘Höhepunkte’,162 four events stand out retrospectively 
in relation to senior government and party attendance as well as media publicity: the state-
sponsored re-opening of the Wartburg castle on 21 April, a church-led ecumenical ceremony 
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commemorating Luther entering the Wartburg on 4 May, the Festakt at the East Berlin 
Staatsoper on 9 November and the final ‘Abschlussfeier’ ceremony in Eisleben on Luther’s 
birthday, 10 November. Within the overall Lutherjahr agenda, it is the final two November 
ceremonies that were designed to mark the culmination of the stateˈs and the churchˈs 
respective commemorations.  
The Festakt followed ‘the usual ritualistic pattern adopted by the GDR leadership for large 
commemorations’ (Maser, 2013, p.305). The GDR-CDU Chairman, Gerald Götting, in his 
role as Deputy Chairman of the MLK, gave the main speech, discussed in the later, 
‘outcomes’ section of this chapter. The remainder of the ceremony was devoted to 
performances of Mendelsohn’s ‘Reformation-Sinfonie’, which includes the choral tune ‘Ein 
feste Burg ist unser Gott’ by Luther. After the interval, during which Honecker was 
introduced to VIP guests, including the Archbishop of Canterbury, Robert Runcie, the 
ceremony closed with Beethoven’s ninth symphony (Maser, 2013, p.310).  
The Abschlussfeier on the following day in Eisleben, the town where Luther was both born and 
died, was an altogether unique event. It was conceived by the church as an elaborate set of 
ceremonies structured, to begin with, around concurrent services in four churches with sermons 
by local and visiting Protestant as well as ecumenical personalities. The guest list numbered 
over 200 from 70 churches in 36 countries on both sides of the Iron Curtain. The festive day 
was designed to be a showpiece for the church, climaxing in a 65-minute closing ceremony on 
the market square of Eisleben, broadcast live on the DFF, West German ZDF, and television 
networks in East and West (Maser, 2013, pp.314-316). Landesbischof Dr. Leich, a leading 
church representative and member of both the MLK and the Lutherkomitee, gave the welcome 
address and Dr. Philip Potter, General Secretary of the International Ecumenical Council of 
Churches in Geneva the main speech.163 This was followed by short readings from Lutherˈs 
works by young Christians from the GDR, Netherlands and Sweden, the laying of wreaths at 
the Luther monument and a final mass prayer.164 
Both the attendance as well as absence of certain senior GDR officials and lower-ranking 
foreign dignitaries (ambassadors and foreign religious leaders) at the final November events 
attracted western media speculation at the time and subsequent academic debate. West 
German President Karl Carstens and Chancellor Helmut Kohl decided not to attend both the 
Festakt and the Eisleben closing ceremonies; the invited heads of state of five, 
overwhelmingly Protestant, Nordic countries (like the GDR) i.e., Finland, Sweden, Norway, 
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Denmark and Iceland, were absent as well. The most senior, ˈhigh profileˈ foreign attendee 
was arguably Runcie. Despite Honeckerˈs attendance, Götting replaced him at the last minute 
as main speaker at the Festakt. Immediate western media comment interpreted Honecker’s 
decision as a direct, unhappy response to the non-attendance by foreign dignitaries. Without 
speculating on other reasons such as illness, Maser refers to substantive evidence that 
disproves this linkage. He points to several documents in official GDR files going back to 
May 1983 that anticipate the intentions of the Swedish and Norwegian Kings, and the Queen 
of Denmark not to attend. President Carstens informed the GDR foreign ministry on 24 
August 1983 that he would not be attending, citing ‘Terminliche Gründe’ as the reason 
(Maser, 2013, p.265). Chancellor Helmut Kohl excused himself from the ceremonies in 
writing at the same time, without giving any reasons. This is interpreted convincingly by 
Maser as compounding Carstens’s absence. The negative effect of Honecker subsequently 
stepping back from both November events, including the Eisleben closing ceremony, whether 
coincidental or not, is discussed later in the evaluation of the Lutherjahr’s outcomes.  
Despite wide GDR media coverage and a faultless execution, as a contribution to the 
Lutherjahr’s aim of promoting national identity it seems unlikely that the predictable and 
elitist quality of the Festakt would have resonated amongst the population more than the very 
similar Festakte in previous cultural commemorations. In contrast, the Eisleben 
Abschlussfeier registered both success and setbacks. The whole staging and the large 
participation of the public at the market square ceremony, visible on the recording of the live 
television broadcast, is impressive.165 But despite months of careful planning the actual day 
and its overall reception, as described by Maser, was somewhat impaired. Thick fog in the 
Eisleben area on the day and a serious car accident involving Götting on his way from Berlin 
to once again stand in for Honecker as main speaker in the evening, were unavoidable. 
However, the smooth implementation of the day’s events was also affected by over-zealous 
security imposing roadblocks in a 30 km. radius of Eisleben, allowing only authorised 
members of the public from further away to join the festivities. Coincidentally or possibly 
partly as a result, public participation at the afternoon events, as recorded in Stasi reports, did 
not live up to the predicted numbers; all four churches were each filled to less than half of 
their capacity (cited in Maser, 2013, p.324). In summary, both of the main events of the 
Lutherjahr were, on the face of it, successfully implemented. But their potential to contribute 
to a longer term national identity was diminished. At the same time, it can be argued that the 
far more visible participation of the general public at the Abschlussfeier must have made an 
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impact. Combined with the notable active involvement of representatives from non-socialist 
countries in the actual ceremonies this may well have heightened a sense of national pride 
amongst participants, television viewers and readers of the printed media reports.  
5.3.2. Film and Television at the Lutherjahr: reporting, educating and entertaining in 
equal measure?  
Compared to other major cultural commemorations reviewed in this thesis, the scale of 
Lutherjahr related media activity in the GDR was unprecedented in terms of variety and 
depth of television and film content produced for domestic consumption and external 
distribution. Both specific as well as general audiences at home and abroad were targeted. To 
begin with, DEFA produced in early 1981 a 31-minute documentary film, Martin Luther, on 
behalf of the GDR foreign ministry. This was specifically aimed at foreign viewers and was 
shown to representatives of the foreign diplomatic corps in the GDR as well as at some 130 
events held in foreign GDR embassies and cultural venues between May and October 1983. 
Although focusing on the touristic attractions of the various Luther-related venues in the 
GDR, this film also contains excerpts from Erich Honecker’s address at the initial meeting of 
the MLK, on 30 June 1980, as discussed above, thus ensuring that the SED’s key political 
and cultural messages were appropriately publicised (Simons, 1996, p.99).  
Comprehensive television content for domestic GDR viewers consisted of niche and general 
audience productions. A short outline of the range of productions is noteworthy, as it 
illustrates the scale of output that markedly exceeds that of the cultural commemorations 
analysed in the preceding case studies. Three 30-minute documentaries on Luther’s life and a 
series of several 15- to 25-minute programmes on various theological aspects of Luther’s 
works were produced jointly with the church. A general domestic audience was addressed 
with brief Lutherjahr news items within the main daily Aktuelle Kamera programme, 
totalling some 63 minutes over the year (Simons, 1996, pp.99-103). The most important news 
coverage, however, was reserved for four major live outside broadcasts: the Festakt on 9 
November and the three other major events throughout the year, namely the opening 
ceremony on 21 April, the religious service at the Wartburg on 4 May and the final event in 
Eisleben on 10 November. A viewing of recordings of the DFF news coverage of the Festakt 
and the Eisleben Abschlussfeier reveals similarities and differences in terms of production. 
Both live broadcasts were of similar length – the Festakt at 70’ 55” and the Abschlussfeier at 
65’17”. The Festakt broadcast has no commentary other than a short introduction 
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summarising the political messages – another reflection of the ˈroutineˈ features of this 
commemoration component.166 Reflecting the organisational ownership of the event, a church 
representative provides an intermittent religious commentary at the Abschlussfeier broadcast 
and there is a noticeable lack of any polemics. However, at the DFF production level there is 
a visible similarity from the perspective of the broadcast director. As in the TV broadcast of 
the Festakt at the Beethoven commemoration, the camerawork at all these events focuses 
several times on younger members of the audience. This may well have been intentional as it 
would match one of the official aims of the Lutherjahr (and the Beethoven Jubiläum), 
namely targeting youth involvement. Finally, the production set-up for the broadcasts of the 4 
May and 10 November, church-sponsored events was based on a close technical 
collaboration between DFF and West German, Austrian and Dutch television authorities 
(Maser, 2013, p.184). It is plausible that this large-scale, apparently unprecedented – for the 
DFF – technical collaboration in itself gained foreign recognition for the GDR, thus partly 
achieving one of the aims for the Lutherjahr, noted earlier in this chapter. 
5.3.3. The Luther film: a contentious gestation exposes differing approaches to the 
ideological agenda  
All this output was dwarfed in terms of length as well as positive domestic and foreign 
critical reception by the five-part film, Martin Luther. In the main section of the edited 
volume, Luther und die DDR: Der Reformator und das DDR-Fernsehen (Dähn and Heise, 
1996), Rotraut Simons presents a comprehensive description of all television and film 
activity in the GDR surrounding the Lutherjahr, focussing primarily on the television film, 
(Simons, 1996, pp.99-185). Her account of several complex political interventions in the 
making of the Luther film, together with a summary of subsequent audience reception data, is 
almost entirely descriptive. However, it cites valuable primary sources at length; these in turn 
provide a useful access point for analytical research in this chapter. In the following I will 
concentrate on the relevance of the film’s gestation, content and reception to the formation of 
national identity linked to this Lutherjahr ‘event’. 
The extensive scale of the production and the timing of the film’s broadcast raises it to a 
highlight of overall Lutherjahr commemorative activity in the GDR. DFF took the initiative 
of commissioning a major film production which was created by DEFA, partly in 
collaboration with a state Czech film studio between 1981 and 1983.167 With a total running 
time of 7:25 hours, the film remains to this day the longest ever produced on Martin Luther.  
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Unlike similar film projects in comparable preceding commemorations, there was a 
particularly long, and uneven development phase for the Luther film (Simons, 1996, pp.104-
126). A rough outline of the overall project was first initiated in mid-1978 within DFF itself, 
rather than as an instruction from higher political levels. The film was designated as a drama 
production in order to make it more attractive for a wide GDR audience as well as for foreign 
television broadcasters. This meant avoiding it being designed and received as an educational 
documentary and instead employing dramatic entertainment and visually attractive 
production values. At first, ‘Die Rebellen von Wittenberg’ by Hans Lorbeer, a popular, 
mostly fictional novel about Luther, was selected as a potential basis for a screenplay. 
However, the scope and importance of the film meant that over time the screenplay was to 
become less of an adaptation than a stand-alone script, drawing on certain fictional figures 
from Lorbeer’s work as inspiration (Simons, 1996, p.106). Perhaps anticipating subsequent 
political obstacles in the process of developing a screenplay, the DFF took the fortuitous step 
at the end of 1978 of appointing Gerhard Brendler, noted above as the subsequent main 
author of the Thesen, as historical adviser to the project. Brendler was able to work with the 
screenplay team of writers in reconciling a small number of fictional characters, included by 
the writers for dramatic purposes, with underlying historical facts. 
However, even early on potential political issues emerged on how best to portray Luther’s 
historically controversial attitude towards the Peasants’ War and especially the role of 
Thomas Müntzer, a radical theologian, contemporary of Luther, and consistently valued 
socialist role model, even before Lutherˈs official rehabilitation. Müntzer was the religious 
leader of the peasantˈs uprising in 1515 but the revolt ˈplaced him [Luther] in a difficult spot. 
On the one hand he [Luther] pronounced the grievances of the common folk to be just, but, 
on the other, he rejected the violence employed by them to achieve their goalsˈ(Hendrix, 
2010, p.27). The first complete draft of the film’s screenplay was approved by the production 
team on 7 August 1981. Following completion of a subsequent revised draft, the responsible 
DFF dramatist, Heide Hess, produced a written appraisal of the film script on 22 December 
1981. In it she concludes that the lead screenplay writer, Hans Kohlus, had delivered an 
impressive and cinematographically effective approach to depicting Luther. In this context 
Luther was to be positioned as: ‘[…] große widersprüchliche Renaissancefigur’ and ‘seine 
Leistung, seine Tragik, seine Größe, und seine Grenzen’ needed to be recognised 
(‘Einschätzung’, cited in Simons, 1996. p.111). 
173 
 
Brendler issued an equally positive expert opinion on the screenplay on 14 January 1982, in 
which he concurred with Hess, noting positively the dramatic intentions of the screenplay: 
‘Der Film ist kein gebildetes Lehrbuch, und das ist gut so. Die Spannung steigert sich von 
Folge zu Folge’ ‘Gutachten von Gerhard Brendler vom 14.1.1982 zum Szenarium ‘‘Martin 
Luther’’’, cited in Simons 1996 pp.111-112). More important, as it would later turn out to be, 
was his approval of compliance with the Lutherjahr’s ideological framework, which he 
himself had authored: ‘Ich glaube, daß der Film hinsichtlich der Aussage und des beim 
Publikum hervorzurufenden Eindrucks durchaus dem Anliegen der Thesen entspricht.’ 
(ibid.). But going further, he then singles out an aspect of the screenplay, which was to create, 
in the lead-up to the final approval of the screenplay, high level controversy, namely the 
reappraisal of Luther’s bourgeois involvement as containing revolutionary elements:  
Das Novum, dem sich dieser Film stellt, besteht darin, auch das bürgerlich-gemäßigte 
Lager in seiner Qualität als Bestandteil der Revolution anzuerkennen. […] Wir 
identifizieren uns nicht mit der theologischen und historischen Position Luthers, auch 
nicht mit der Müntzers oder Karstadts. Wohl aber nehmen wir diese unterschiedlichen 
und gegensätzlichen Positionen zur Kenntnis und würdigen sie in ihrer je eigenen 
situationbezogenen Raison. Früher haben wir dies vornehmlich für jene Kräfte getan, 
die sozusagen “links” von Luther standen. […] Heute tun wir dies auch für die 
Position Luthers. Darin zeigt sich die Erweiterung der Erberezeption. (ibid.)  
Three months before these two official reports, various senior officials outside the immediate 
DFF production team and outside the DFF itself were already becoming drawn into the 
process. In doing so they revealed an organisational dysfunctionality and apparent mistrust 
both within the DFF and, later on, within the SED apparatus, echoing internal dissonances 
that had surfaced during previous cultural commemorations (Simons, 1996, pp.112-114). In 
September 1981, Erich Selbmann, ‘Bereichsleiter Dramatische Kunst’ at the DFF, sent Klaus 
Gysi the first draft of the screenplay, requesting that the screenplay writers should not be 
notified of the disclosure. Selbmann raised two potentially controversial issues regarding the 
screenplay: how would the Protestant and Catholic churches, but particularly the former, 
react to the film, and were there any potential minefields to be addressed regarding the often 
stormy relationship between Luther and Müntzer [Luther was very much opposed to 
Müntzer’s endorsement of violence, which ultimately led to Müntzer’s arrest and execution]. 
On the first question Gysi’s initial reaction was that he did not anticipate any negative 
reactions as such. However, the phrasing of his statement on the expected reaction indicates 
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some inconsistency: despite suggesting his overall acceptance, at the same time he appears to 
refer to fears exhibited by other SED officials (as described in the planning stage section of 
this chapter) on potential exploitation by certain ‘negative’ elements within the church. Gysi 
also concedes that the official rehabilitation of Luther might inevitably be seen to threaten – 
or even diminish – the traditionally positive depiction of Müntzer, creating the need for 
internal debate and clarification within the Party:  
Wenn wir auch nichts von den großen Idealen Müntzers preisgeben, kommt es uns 
doch vor allem darauf an, der Figur Luthers die richtige geschichtliche Bewertung zu 
geben und sie in die Vorgeschichte der DDR einzuordnen, weil wir nur so erreichen, 
dass sich alle Klassen und Schichten unseres Volkes, unter Führung der 
Arbeiterklasse, mit unserem Staat als der konsequenten Fortsetzung alles Progressiven 
unserer Geschichte identifizieren. Die Diskussion in der Partei ist also unumgänglich 
(‘Aktennotiz’, cited in Simons 1996, p.113). 
Gysi was not the only recipient of a confidential advance draft of the screenplay; Hanfried 
Müller, theologian and publisher of the ‘Weißenseer Blätter’ (rigidly socialist, according to 
Simons) had also obtained a copy of the first draft screenplay in August 1981. He then 
submitted his own written evaluation to Gysi (Simons, 1996, pp.114-119). This sixteen-page 
memo disagrees fundamentally with Brendler’s positive assessment without mentioning him 
by name and served as basis for Gysi’s own official report on the script, dated 17 December 
1981, Müller condemns the use of modern colloquial language adopted in much of the script, 
a point largely accepted and subsequently referred to by Gysi as ‘unsere abgeschliffene 
Alltagssprache’, (‘Gutachten’, cited in Simons, 1996, p.115). However, Müller’s main 
criticism is directed towards the screenplay’s overall portrayal of Luther, which he sees as too 
similar to Luther’s nineteenth century depiction as a conservative counter-revolutionary. In 
this sense, he contends that Luther appears too opportunistic, and acts as a ‘top-down’ 
reformer rather than a revolutionary. 
 Although Müller held no senior government or SED position, his criticism was largely 
adopted by Gysi in his own official appraisal of the screenplay. The production team at DFF 
was thus faced with the dilemma of being urged to produce a screenplay focused more on the 
theology of Luther than dramatising and thus popularising his challenges and relationships as 
they reacted to his theology. This threatened to create precisely the type of educational film 
that DFF had been trying to avoid all along (Simons, 1996 p.124). The situation was finally 
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resolved on 25 February 1982, when DFF escalated the controversy within the SED 
apparatus. The production team as well as Selbmann referred the whole matter up the DFF 
reporting line to Wolfgang Schnedelbach, within the ‘Abteilung Agitation des ZK der SED’ 
(Simons, 1996 p.125). This senior official, responsible specifically for 
‘Geschichtspropaganda’, took a far more positive view of the screenplay than Gysi: 
Überflüssiges Fachgespräch muss entfernt werden, denn der normale Zuschauer, für 
den wir das machen, hat keine Spezialkenntnisse. Der Luther-Film ist kein 
Dokumentarfilm, kein Film für Theologen sondern ein Spielfilm für Werktätige, wenn 
auch einer, von dem in entsprechend entscheidendem Maße das auszuprägende 
Luther-Bild der DDR-Bürger abhängt. (ibid.).  
Schnedelbach’s approach is particularly noteworthy in that he clearly views the whole project 
very much from a reception perspective. His intervention not only exposes the reality of the 
power hierarchy within the SED; it may further be seen as evidence that the SED wanted to 
reinforce national identity by means of the ‘working class’, that is the ‘man on the street’ 
viewer in the GDR identifying with a certain image of Luther created by the film.168 
The film’s shooting program was largely completed in February 1983 but was subsequently 
subject to several revisions, cuts and even new shooting, before it was finally approved for 
transmission at the end of September 1983. Reports on the reception of successive viewings 
by senior DFF and ‘Abteilung Agitation des ZK der SED’ officials over a six-month period 
in 1983 reveal considerable differences even within the ZK (Simons, 1996 pp.130-36). Much 
of this centred on the recurring issue of the film’s treatment of Müntzer, and whether he was 
given sufficient recognition as an undisputed GDR role model as compared to Luther. One of 
the interventions during this time displays the nervousness of senior party officials that the 
film might not fully conform with the full extent of the official ideological framework for the 
Lutherjahr. On 27 April 1983 the DFF production team’s main dramatist, Manfred 
Seidowsky was instructed by Heinz Adameck, ‘Vorsitzender des Komitees für Fernsehen’ 
and DFF’s most senior SED and ZK member, to review the entire script, word by word and 
provide a listing of all corrections. The purpose of this review was to ensure the screenplay’s 
conformity with the Thesen as well as with Honecker’s speech at the opening meeting of the 
MLK on 13 June 1980 (Simons, 1996 p.134). The film was finally broadcast in prime-time 
slots over five evenings between 9 and 13 October 1983 and subsequently on West German 
television as well.  
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5.3.4. The Luther film: well crafted and ideologically within the Lutherjahrˈs official 
aims 
Luther lived from 1483 to 1546; however, the film is a dramatisation of selected events in his 
life between 1515 and 1525. This period begins shortly before, and continues after the start of 
the Reformation, marked in 1517 by the publication of Lutherˈs Ninety-Five Theses, also 
known as the ˈThesensanschlag von Wittenbergˈ. The film was broadcast in prime-time slots 
over five evenings between 9 and 13 October 1983, and on various West German channels in 
1985 and 1986.169 The episodes carry the titles ‘Der Protest’, ‘Der Sohn der Bosheit’, ‘Die 
Geheimnisse des Antichrist’, ‘Hier stehe ich…’ and ‘Das Gewissen’. However, the film 
version reviewed for this case study is continuous and there are no obvious breaks indicating 
where the episodes were divided. 
In the following, I will comment specifically on the film’s visual and spoken content and its 
often intricate handling of several themes that can be associated with the ideological 
framework of the Lutherjahr. Within this perspective, I will evaluate the likely reception of 
the viewer and to what extent the film may have encouraged her or him to identify with the 
GDR as a nation based on the values ascribed to this major religious and cultural figure. 
Although the five episode titles carry no overtly ideological undertones, the opening 
sequence shows an extract from the gigantic Bauernkrieg panorama painting by Professor 
Werner Tübke – ‘Frühbürgerliche Revolution in Deutschlandpain’ – specifically a parade of 
peasants being trodden down by a cardinal on a horse. This painting, executed between 1976 
and 1987, sets the tone from the outset as being a socio-political representation of Luther, 
rather than a predominantly theological one. 
The first two hours are devoted to the build-up to the Thesenschlag and the subsequent 
hearing before Cardinal Cajetan in Augsburg. The emphasis appears to be more on the abuse 
of indulgences by the Catholic Church than on Luther’s wish to reform much of Catholic 
ritual including the use of the Latin language. The apparent dominance of Lutherˈs anti-
corruption campaign could be viewed as an emblematic reference to socialism standing up to 
the excesses of modern capitalism, a theme that is broadly in line with Lutherˈs overall 
depiction in the 1981 Lutherjahr Thesen. However, as noted above, the same Thesen position 
Luther as a ˈVertreter einer zumeist dem Bürgertum nahestehenden, zum Teil 
frühkapitalistische Interessen ausdrückenden, vom Territorialfürstentum und der Kirche 
materiell abhängigen Intelligenzˈ. This image appears to diverge from the anti-capitalist 
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narrative that appears in Lutherˈs passionate attacks on the banking practices of the Fugger 
family in Augsburg (2:32:32).  
The variance is, however, tempered by a second narrative that defines Luther as a man of the 
people, for the people. The corruption of the Catholic Church is expressed in how he attacks 
the Church for collecting money that should have gone to the poor. A third theme running 
throughout the film concerns continuing tensions between both the Catholic and evolving 
Protestant churches on the one hand and the state at different levels and different times: the 
regional community, e.g. Wittenberg, the regional ruler e.g. the Elector of Saxony and the 
ultimate, supra-regional Emperor. The state is always presented as dominating the power 
structure. Moreover, the state, (Saxony), protects Luther by providing safe physical passage 
at various times in the film, including his supporter-enforced exile from Wittenberg to the 
Wartburg fortress. His confidante and backer Georg Spalatin, who also acts as intermediary 
between Luther and Frederick, Elector of Saxony (Hendrix, 2010, p.119), appears throughout 
the film as symbolising the moderate yet omnipresent state. This representation of the 
enduring hegemony of the state sits well with the official aspiration of the state-church 
relationship in the GDR. 
Two further interlinked themes that project certain attributes of Luther can be identified in the 
film. Firstly, three examples of Luther, the socially engaged revolutionary: in a striking 
dialogue with his father, Luther complains: 
Weltliche Macht soll die Schuldigen strafen, auch Päpste, Bischöfe, Priester. Warum 
hält das geistliche Recht ihre Freiheit so hoch, gerade als wären Schuster, Steinmetz, 
Zimmermann nicht auch so gute Christen wie sie? Wird ein Priester erschlagen, so 
liegt das Land im Bann. Warum nicht auch wenn ein Bauer erschlagen wird? Woher 
kommt solch ein großer Unterschied zwischen gleichem Christen? (4:14:22). 
In a letter to his co-reformer, Philip Melanchton, Luther writes: ˈWenn Kurfürst Friedrich 
seine allerheiligen Stifte abschaffte mit den Schätzen, wie viele arme Leute könnte man 
davon in Sachsen ernähren?ˈ (5:05:50). And a peasant tells a disguised Luther during his stay 
at the Wartburg:  
Der Wald gehört uns nach altem Recht. [Der Burgherr] hat es uns einfach 
weggenommen. Den Luther haben sie uns auch genommen, weil er verkündigte, ein 
Christ ist frei, und niemandem Untertan. Aber das kommt, Holz und Wald und Fisch 
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und Vogel fallen wieder der ganzen Gemeinde zu. Das ist die rechte christliche 
Freiheit. 
Luther is portrayed as a pacifist in the latter stages of the film, particularly in his troubled 
relationship with Müntzer. This attribute fits in well with the demarcation of the churchˈs role 
in the GDR when Luther maintains that ˈdie Welt kann nicht mit dem Evangelium regiert 
werdenˈ (5:58:35). In a final speech to his wife at the end of the film, delivered with 
considerable pathos, Luther says:  
So lange ich lebe will ich Gott drum bitten, Deutschland soll durch Krieg keine Not 
haben. Vom Frieden haben wir Leib und Leben, Leib und Kind, Haus und Hof […]. 
Alle Gesundheit und Freiheit. Der Friede kann dir helfen daß dir ein gewisses 
trockenes Brot wie Zucker schmeckt, und ein Trunk Wasser wie der beste Wein. Es 
ist ein halbes Himmelreich wo Friede ist (7:20:30).  
Placing a closing statement that is highly relevant to the internal and international political 
environment at the time may be taken to imply its top priority amongst all the messages that 
the film sets out to communicate. All of the themes identified so far in the film conform with 
the official aims of the Lutherjahr, and the Thesen on Luther in particular. They also reflect 
the result one may have expected from film’s detailed, protracted and uneven gestation.  
A final theme worth mentioning surfaces noticeably at various points in the film. Luther’s 
German identity and even East German roots are alluded to repeatedly. This aspect is 
fortuitously supported – despite the brief interlude in Augsburg – by the historically accurate 
storyline being set and partly filmed in the GDR locations of Wittenberg, Leipzig and 
Eisenach (the Wartburg). This ˈGermannessˈ appears, for example, in Luther’s sermon in 
Wittenberg (3:04:00) which he closes for the first time with the Lord’s prayer in German. 
Shortly afterwards the state of Saxony is highlighted as being a bastion of good politics and a 
staunch defender of Luther and his work (3:17:00). Luther says at one point: ‘Lasset mich 
Deutsch reden!’ (3:36:00) Later, Luther refuses to repudiate his theses in front of the 
Emperor, attacking Rome – ‘der Besitz der Deutschen Nation wird verschlungen durch diese 
unglaubliche Tyranneiˈ – and reasserting his specific duty to protect Germany (4:42:40). His 
single-minded dedication is again revealed when, after some persuasion, he agrees to 
translate the Bible stating: ‘Für meine Deutschen bin Ich geboren, Ihnen will Ich dienen.’ 
(5:23:15). Any appropriation of Luther (versus West Germany) as an official aim of the 
commemoration is far less explicit in this compared to the earlier case studies; however, the 
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repeated emphasis on ˈGermanˈ, together with the strong historical links to GDR locations, 
may have arguably served to associate Luther with a new, German and socialist national 
identity even more than the other themes described above.  
Viewed as a whole, it is not immediately apparent whether the underlying aim of this 
Lutherjahr project to communicate Luther as a suitable role model for a cultural icon in the 
GDR was achieved, given the complexity and number of themes introduced into the script. 
The film is on balance a largely successful combination of entertainment and education, 
despite certain weaknesses. Given its broadcast allocation of prime-time viewing, it does not 
give the impression of being easily accessible to the general public as it demands a 
reasonably good knowledge of 16th century German history. This is exacerbated by a lack of 
introduction to the key personalities, no dates being mentioned until approximately one and 
half hours into the film, and there is little sense of a timeline – only three dates are mentioned 
in the remaining five hours. Furthermore, the language spoken often sounds archaic. In an 
interview conducted in 1996, Erich Selbman, the DFF’s Head of Drama at the time, explains 
that a large part of the script, used by Ulrich Thein as Luther, was taken from original Luther 
texts (cited in Simons,1996, p.149). The film fails to mention this and it is doubtful whether 
the authenticity would have enhanced the film’s ease of understanding for the average 
viewer, particularly given the complexity of the indulgence issues. 
On the positive side, the film works moderately well as entertainment; although it is heavy in 
terms of dialogue and light on action, the scenes are kept short and well dramatised. The 
soundtrack is evocative and includes music attributed to Luther, and the overall production 
values, including the cinematography, are in keeping with international standards. The 
strongest feature of the production is the uniformly high quality of acting headed by a 
charismatic Ulrich Thein in the lead role. In short, the film’s critical reception by GDR and 
foreign media, discussed below, may be attributed to all of these positive factors with the 
weaknesses explaining the relatively poor viewing figures, as will be seen in the next section.  
 
5.4. OUTCOMES  
5.4.1. A positive reception of the film in East and West, but a differing emphasis on 
ideology and artistic values  
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As already demonstrated in the Beethoven bicentenary case study, official audience research 
reports in the GDR after 1970 provide a potentially valuable primary source for gauging both 
the quantitative interest and the qualitative reaction of the viewers, that is, the GDR 
population at large, to commemoration-related programming. As such they represent one of 
the few sources for assessing popular reception of commemoration activity. This assumes 
that the data-gathering methodology was statistically sound and that, even with the reports 
being classified as confidential, the data, as presented, was undistorted. Simons points out 
correctly that the reports must also be interpreted through the perspective of competitive 
programming at the time of broadcast. Even if the Luther film episodes were broadcast in 
prime-time, registered viewer interest may have been diminished if less demanding, popular 
entertainment such as a thriller or a comedy was being broadcast simultaneously on the other 
GDR channel – let alone on a West German television channel (Simons, 1996, pp.150-151).  
Audience research reports for the month of October show viewing percentages for the five 
Luther film episodes ranging between 8.4% and 9.6% (Simons, 1996, pp.151-152). Just over 
one million viewers were estimated to have seen all five episodes and another 2.3 million at 
least one episode. In total, this meant approximately 3.4 million viewers of the Luther film. 
Other scholars have estimated a total audience of three million (Maser 2013, p.184) To put 
this into context, only five to eight cinema films per annum reached more than 1 million 
viewers in the GDR at that time. The impact of competitive programming may be observed in 
the fact that whilst the first episode attracted 8.4% of viewers, a British film from the ‘Carry 
on…’ series, broadcast on the second GDR channel, registered 35.5% viewing; a Woody 
Allen film was also being broadcast that evening on the second West German television 
channel (Simons, 1996, p.182). 
As was the case for audience research related to the Beethoven commemorations, qualitative 
feedback was measured on a 1(best) to 5 scale; the average mark awarded by viewers for the 
five Luther film episodes ranged between 2.5 and 3.1. In contrast to the simpler methodology 
employed in 1970, the data also breaks down into demographic and age groups and 
geographical locations. Viewing figures for older segments, that is over 46 and particularly 
over 65 was higher than for younger viewers. The same pronounced disparity may be 
identified between viewers with higher education and manual workers. This outcome was 
substantiated by the findings of a one-off, additional piece of audience research carried out 
amongst 134 individuals, largely young and ‘working class’, in eight large workplaces on 14 
October 1983 (cited in Simons, 1996 p.154). Despite uniformly positive feedback on the 
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acting quality, the film was judged as ‘schwer’ and the viewing experience as ‘erzieherisch’ 
rather than ‘artistisch’. In summary, one may assume that both youth and the wider working 
class would have been considered prime target sections of the population for purposes of 
communicating a revised image of Luther that matched the one intended by those in the SED 
planning the Lutherjahr. In terms of thereby promoting national identity as a legacy of the 
Lutherjahr, the reality of this result alone may be seen as missing an important objective of 
the commemoration. 
The mild reservations expressed by viewers were not replicated in politicised reviews in the 
GDR press. Neues Deutschland praised the film’s Marxist approach to Luther170: 
… Wie sorgsam und dialektisch Luther als Initiator einer großen revolutionären 
Bewegung in den Klassenkämpfen seinerzeit gestaltet wurde: als ein gläubiger 
Mensch, der sich aus christlicher und humanistischer Gewissensentscheidung gegen 
die Doktrinen einer erstarrten Gesellschaft wandte und für eine bessere Welt eintrat.  
In contrast, the main (GDR) CDU newspaper appears to downplay contemporary as opposed 
to historical political aspects of the film:  
Ein Lutherbild für unsere Zeit, […] die Sicht auf Luther und seine Zeitgenossen ist 
zwar durchaus von heutigen gesellschaftlich-historischen Einsichten und 
Erkenntnissen über die Reformation als Teil der frühbürgerlichen Revolution in 
Deutschland bestimmt, aber sie schreibt ihm und ihnen nicht gesellschaftlich-
historische und dann auch politische Motive zu, die sie nicht haben konnten. Er war 
alles andere denn ein Revolutionär in heutigem Verständnis […]. Und gerade darin 
besteht denn auch eine große, in dieser Lutherdeutung vollbrachte Leistung, daß sie 
Luther nicht vordergründig politisiert und vergegenwärtigt.171 
West German press comments immediately following the broadcasts were generally positive: 
‘Ein künstlerisches Ereignis’172 and ‘Ein bemerkenswerter Film, der in der Bundesrepublik, 
wo die Missachtung der eigenen Geschichte jahrelang gerade zur Modesache wurde, 
nachdenklich stimmen sollte’.173 Compared to the more hostile tone of the earlier Der Spiegel 
article (quoted above) which reported on the apparent overall politicisation of the Lutherjahr, 
West German press reviews of the Luther film seem more benign: ‘Die Ostberliner Führung 
hat das Luther-Jahr vor allem durch die fünfteilige Fernsehserie dazu genutzt, der 
Bevölkerung der DDR eine im wesentlichen objektives Bild vom Reformator zu präsentieren, 
dabei aber stets die ideologische Komponente eines Geschichtsbildes des "sozialistischen 
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Vaterlandes" im Auge behalten’.174 Yet, while noting Luther’s revised stature as being 
positioned in its historical context, Der Tagespiegel refers explicitly to the contemporisation 
aspects of Luther that forms the basis of this thesis; the relationship between cultural 
appropriation and national identity: ‘Luther wird rehabilitiert: der Volksvertreter von damals 
ist heute ein frühbürgerlicher Revolutionär. Der Film unterließ es, ihm anstelle der 
theologischen politische Motive unterzuschieben. Das hatte er auch nicht mehr nötig. Mit 
diesem Film hat die DDR Luther für sich vereinnahmt – er soll Teil des nationalen 
Selbstbewusstseins sein.’175 
The West German media reception of the film is reminiscent of the generally positive West 
German media reaction to the Kollwitz commemorations sixteen years earlier - with the 
proviso that unlike with Kollwitz, there is no insinuation that the GDR is Luther’s spiritual 
home. Whilst Der Tagespiegelˈs tone may be interpreted as sarcastic, it may be also taken at 
face value as evidencing not only acceptance but even respect for the GDR’s unexpectedly 
light touch in politicising Luther. At the same time the GDR’s ongoing appropriation of 
Luther as a contribution to a separate national identity is accepted without reservation as a 
logical outcome of the film. This last aspect is possibly the most interesting as it is likely to 
have been especially welcomed by the few readers in the GDR with access to West German 
printed media and receptive to this apparent endorsement. The article spells out and thereby 
in itself validates a sometimes hidden yet always present objective of the Lutherjahr and the 
earlier cultural commemorations. Finally, the ultimate positive reception of the film suggests 
a noteworthy parallel between the film and the 1970 Beethoven recordings in achieving a 
degree of enduring international legacy. 
5.4.2. Mixed messages in government assessments  
A further responsibility of the Organisationsbüro of the MLK mentioned in their post 
mortem report is the self-monitoring of the unit throughout the year as a means of developing 
best practice for the future: ‘Die kontinuierliche Aktualisierung des Standes der Vorbereitung 
und Durchführung der Martin-Luther-Ehrung 1983 der DDR, verbunden mit der 
Verallgemeinerung bester Erfahrungen’.176 This is a noteworthy novelty in the context of 
previous, similar organisational units described in earlier chapters. The report goes on to list 
all the many tasks carried out, but without measuring their effectiveness and impact against 
the three targets. Even more surprising for a post mortem is the apparent absence of any 
negative outcomes over the entire planning and implementation period. The only adverse 
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experience mentioned is the unit’s involvement in the actual production and distribution of 
publicity material and souvenirs. 
The closing section of the report, headed: ‘Zu einigen Erfahrungen und Schlussfolgerungen’, 
elicits several comments: in contrast to comparable post mortems in the past, the author 
specifically mentions learning from the past as an important success factor: ‘Zur politisch-
wirksamen Verwirklichung der Beschlüsse […], hat sich die frühzeitige Einrichtung eines 
Büros bewährt, wobei verstärkt auf die Erfahrungen bei der Vorbereitung und Durchführung 
früherer Jubiläen aufzubauen ist.’ A further success factor for the unit’s apparent 
effectiveness was the manner in which it had supposedly collaborated with the church’s 
‘Lutherkomittee’. Two fundamental terms appear here: a focus on factual issues – 
‘Sachfragen’, therefore by implication excluding personality problems, and trust – 
‘vertrauensvolle Zusammenarbeit’. In comparison with similar reports in the past, this report 
is remarkably free of any specific negative experiences or conclusions. This observation may 
be linked to repeated references in the report that credit the unit’s success to having enjoyed 
a long gestation period. The report’s overall value as a primary source, that also marks it as a 
further step in the evolution of similar commemorations, is that it looks both backwards as 
well as forwards, characteristics missing from previous reports of this kind. Its main 
deficiency is that the overall content and tone seems rather too positive and self-
congratulatory to serve as realistic evidence that the unit was actually able to deliver on its 
goals and theory-based aspirations. Rakotz suggests in a post-1989 interview that his report 
had been a pro-forma exercise. It was thus able to justify his and the unit’s Lutherjahr work, 
as basis for the unit continuing to be responsible on a permanent basis for organising 
subsequent cultural commemorations. Whilst of little immediate relevance to the 
Lutherjahrˈs contribution to national identity, this outcome marks an evolution of how 
cultural commemorations planned for the last six years of the GDR were to be better 
organised – a subject for further research. 
Unmittelbar danach hat keiner von der Luther-Ehrung mehr etwas wissen wollen, 
keiner. Die ganze Luther-Ehrung ist sang-und klanglos abgehakt worden. Nicht 
einmal meinen Abschluss-Bericht wollte jemand lesen. Das war nicht mehr 
interessant. […] Das Büro, das ich leitete, hat danach die 750-Jahrfeier der Stadt 
Berlin, die Münzer-Ehrung und anderes vorbereitet (cited in Roy 2000, p.271). 
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The minutes of a subsequent review meeting with church policy officials chaired by Gysi 
offer different perspectives on the Lutherjahr, compared to the more operations-centred MLK 
report. The meeting concentrated mainly on detailed implications of the Lutherjahr for 
church policy. The introduction contains a significant summary of the ‘Bedeutung und 
Ergebnis’ of the Lutherjahr in the context of the research question in this thesis. The first 
sentence states definitively: ‘Den Bürgern wurde in breitem Maße die nationale Identität 
bewusst gemacht, das Bewusstsein der nationalen Identität wurde neu entwickelt’.177 The 
introduction elaborates this outcome with references to the historical legitimacy of [the 
GDR’s] society. This claim, is followed in the closing sentence by praise for the contribution 
of GDR historians, phrased as bullet items:  
Dieses Ergebnis wurde möglich durch die hohen Leistungen der Historiker – zu 
Luther wurde keine Vereinnahmung vorgenommen wie im Westen – sondern das 
reale Bild seiner Bedeutung heraus erarbeitet – fand im Ausland weiteres Interesse – 
aber auch die theologische Literatur besaß hohes Niveau – durch die geistige 
Auseinandersetzung mit Luther wurde Gewaltiges für die DDR geleistet. (ibid.). 
The assertion of ‘historische Legitimität der Gesellschaft und des Staates’ beforehand sits 
uncomfortably with the subsequent claim of no ‘Vereinahmung’. That term rather than the 
more commonly used Aneignung had appeared repeatedly as an accusation in West German 
media coverage of the GDR’s approach to the Lutherjahr, as discussed below. Gysi’s 
unproven reference here to West German appropriation looks like a defensive response in the 
spirit of demarcation as used in preceding cultural commemorations, rather than a well-
founded criticism of West Germany.  
5.4.3. West German press coverage as complementary source of the Lutherjahrˈs 
reception in the GDR 
Given the scarcity of evidence originating in the GDR, it is helpful to consider how GDR 
reception was interpreted through the lens of the West German press. Early in 1983, Der 
Spiegel devoted five pages to the ongoing Lutherjahr commemorations. The piece describes 
in some detail the fifteen Thesen and the overall ideological positioning of the year’s events 
by the SED. Particular attention is given to the revised depiction of Luther in the context of 
Erberezeption, some of the planned major events, and the money being spent to restore 
historical locations such as the Wartburg and reportingWittenberg: ‘Denn die DDR 
beschränkt ihre Luther-Rezeption keinewegs nur auf Reden und Denken. Sie läßt es sich eine 
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Menge kosten, auch den letzten DDR-Fleck aufzuhellen, in den Martin Luther seinen Fuß 
gesetzt hat’.178 The article includes a significant item of evidence on East German critical 
reception of the Lutherjahr, not available in primary sources from the GDR: the East Berlin 
based cabaret, Die Distel, is recorded as having included the following verse in one of their 
shows: ‘Wer immer noch glaubt / der Martin sei für unser Geschehn / philosophisch gesehn / 
nicht ganz legitim / der Genosse Erich steht hinter ihm!’ (ibid.). This satirical rhyme is all the 
more remarkable as it exposes an overtly cynical reception of both Luther’s apparent 
rehabilitation and Honecker’s high profile involvement.  
In the immediate aftermath of the Lutherjahr, a West German academic journal reviewed the 
final Festakt, and its keynote speech in particular. As mentioned earlier in this chapter, the 
article notes that the one-hour speech was delivered by Gerald Götting, instead of, as 
expected, by Honecker, himself. The author points out that about a quarter of the speech was 
devoted to the theme, ‘Luther und der Frieden’ and he remarks persuasively on the far-
fetched use of Luther quotes:179  
Allerdings machte der Redner den Versuch, Luther mit der Fähigkeit (der DDR), den 
Frieden mit ‘bewaffneten Mitteln zu schützen, die dem Grad der Friedensbedrohung 
angemessen sind’, in Einklang zu bringen, und zwar mit Luther-Zitaten über das den 
Frieden (und die Ordnung im Innern) sichernde ‘Schwert’ (ibid.). 
In short, the tone and content of this overall reception hints at a potential credibility gap both 
within the GDR and externally. No explicit primary evidence came to light in researching this 
case study that the organisers of the Lutherjahr referred back to earlier cultural 
commemorations when planning and executing the Lutherjahr. Nevertheless, the reception 
gives the impression that efforts were made to project an image of Luther that was arguably 
less fixated on ideology and negative demarcation to West Germany than previous 
commemorations.  
In short, this evidence of West German media reception presented here as an outcome is 
sometimes contradictory. Overall it does too little to endorse Roy’s assessment, that the 
foreign reception created a bigger impression on the GDR population than any Lutherjahr-




5.4.4. Conclusion: was the Lutherjahr’s overall impact more important for church 
policy in the GDR than for national identity? 
Defining the benefits and positive outcomes of the Lutherjahr has proved to be a challenge 
for historians and theologians alike. Writing in the immediate aftermath of the Lutherjahr, 
Siegfried Braüer, a leading GDR theologian and church official highlights the tangible 
benefits to the church of state spending on restoration of church property under the sub-
heading ‘Möglicher Ertrag des Luther-Jubiläums’. Without any meaningful evidence he also 
proposes an intangible increase in awareness of Luther amongst the population (Bräuer, 1985, 
pp.54-56). Stefan Wolle adds more recently but equally unpersuasively this prosaic 
observation: ‘Die Jubiläumssucht der SED-Führung hatte auch ihre guten Seiten. […] Die 
direkt oder indirekt Beteiligten sagten sich: immer noch besser ein ‘‘Luther-Jahr’’ als ein 
‘‘Lenin-Jahr’’, so wie es 1970 zum 100. Geburtstag des sowjetischen Staatsgründers 
erbarmungslos über die DDR hinweggerollt war. Jedes Jubiläum diente dazu, vorsichtig die 
ideologischen Grenzen auszuweiten und von den knappen Baumaterialien und-Kapazitäten 
etwas für die Restaurierung alter Bauwerke abzuzweigen.’ (Wolle, 2013, p.215).  
Two further conflicting approaches illustrate the challenge facing the scholar drawing 
conclusions on the Lutherjahr: Olsen summarises his assessment of the Lutherjahr correctly, 
if simplistically, as ‘illustrating a case where the state attempted to appropriate a memory and 
tradition that had been kept alive by the Evangelical Church and tried to subsume [Luther’s] 
image into the heritage and traditions of the GDR state’ (Olsen, 2015, pp.141-142). As 
alluded to in the Schiller bicentenary chapter, Olsen’s interpretation here is again 
considerably weakened when he positions the Lutherjahr as an ‘example of rehabilitation and 
commemoration’ within a specific, all-encompassing and deliberate SED ‘memory-work 
agenda’, (ibid.). In this sense it can be held that, like Zimmering and Roy before him, Olsen 
sees a top-down structure on display by the GDR’s ruling party and government planning and 
executing the Lutherjahr. As we have seen in examples such as the modest international 
recognition of the formal events, the gestation of the Luther film, but above all the churchˈs 
ambivalent support for the state’s ideological framework, this approach is not supported by 
much of the gap between the Lutherjahrˈs official aims and outcomes. 
In contrast to the intentionalist interpretations of Roy, Zimmering and Olsen, Peter Maser, a 
prominent theologian and Kirchenhistoriker, takes a moderate, functionalist approach that 
supports the srgument of this thesis. Written in anticipation of the 2017 Reformation 
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quincentenary, Maser’s substantial work contains strong documentary evidence of 
repercussions of the Lutherjahr on the SED and its subsequent cultural and educational 
policies. In short, he determines persuasively that the multi-faceted Lutherjahr not only 
reflects the political, cultural and social status of the GDR in 1983; in itself the Lutherjahr 
may be considered to have provoked subsequent internal processes regarding the role of the 
church in the GDR, that played a major part in the ultimate fall of the regime in 1989. My 
analysis of primary sources on the Lutherjahr, conducted mainly through the prism of the 
commemorationsˈ likely impact on national identity, concurs with Maserˈs functionalist 
approach – in itself an important endorsement of the participatory dictatorship 
historiographical model of the GDR. 
Each major cultural commemoration in the GDR also needs to be appraised in the context of 
its time and wider issues prevailing in the political environment. The Lutherjahr presents the 
scholar with unique features and outcomes, compared to the ones reviewed in the previous 
chapters of this thesis. Unlike the other three case studies in this thesis, the so-called 
‘planning stage’ was so long and complex that much of it constituted memory-work in its 
own right. This is particularly the case for the Luther film. Better coordinated, more thorough 
and timelier organisation than was the case in earlier commemorations, boosted during the 
Lutherjahr by unprecedented and visible Stasi involvement, may have secured a smooth, 
ostensibly successful Lutherjahr. This apparent outcome was materially improved by the 
additional benefits of much needed foreign exchange inflows, estimated at between DM 140-
200 million (Goeckel, 1984, p.129), as well as the above-mentioned expenditure on 
restoration of Luther-related property. 
Yet the Lutherjahr did not fully achieve its designated secondary objective of gaining 
additional external respect. This aim, as already illustrated in the previous case-studies, was 
meant to strengthen a particular type of national identity, namely by removing residual 
external doubts regarding the GDRˈs legitimacy. As described above, the aim was not 
uniformly met by western media coverage of events. In its simplest form, and again mirroring 
similar outcomes at the Beethoven commemorations, external recognition also fell short 
when it came to attendance by most foreign non-ecumenical guests at the two most important 
events – the Festakt and the Eisleben closing ceremony. This external attitude is corroborated 
by the apparent views of the West German government registered at the time. The senior 
resident West German diplomat in East Berlin, Hans-Otto Bräutigam, discussed his 
assessment of the Lutherjahr in a meeting with foreign journalists on the eve of the Festakt. 
188 
 
A Stasi report based on their secret recording of the meeting reveals that the West German 
government was focusing on the same underlying motive for this (and previous similar 
commemorations?) that the research question addresses: ‘…die Vertretung der BRD in der 
DDR habe die Ansicht, daß der künstliche Staat DDR in letzter Zeit versuche, seine eigene 
national-kommunistische Identität zu finden. Damit soll das Land attraktiver gemacht 
werden’ (cited in Maser, 2013, p.309).  
The widely published ideological framework provides an important example of how the 
reality of the Lutherjahr differed from the initial theory and declared aims. This framework 
was based, as in comparable major commemorations, on appropriating a major German 
historical personality. The calendar-driven anniversary of Lutherˈs quincentenary provided, 
on the face of it, an opportunity of advancing GDR national identity based on identification 
with a Marxist depiction of Luther within the larger ambit of Erbepolitik. But as the reality of 
subsequent interventions – even in the making of the Luther film – was to illustrate, the 
Lutherjahr commemoration was essentially about reacting to the unresolved challenges of the 
GDR’s Kirchenpolitik. By 1983 and thirty-four years of growing external acceptance of the 
GDRˈs existence and sovereignty, prioritising the promotion of a positive national identity, 
had become less essential than countering perceived and real internal opposition that was 
growing within the church, and into wider sections of GDR society via the peace movement. 
The prospect of revising a hitherto ambivalent approach to Luther in the GDR was seized on 
to underpin and publicly demonstrate a recently won, seemingly harmonious collaboration 
with the church, whilst intending all along to end up solidifying the church’s unquestioning 
acceptance of state hegemony. This underlying core objective represents another yardstick of 
gauging to what extent the Lutherjahr was a success and whether there is a closer match to be 
found between theory and reality in the Lutherjahr than in other previous cultural 
commemorations. Given the resulting legacy of ever-increasing political and social dissent 
after 1983, spearheaded by elements within the church, the overall outcome of the Lutherjahr 






The research question asks whether the commemorations of major German cultural figures 
contributed to the construction of a national identity in the GDR, based on those figures and 
their historical legacy in German culture. If so, what do the efforts and the outcomes tell us 
about the kind of society the GDR was? My findings suggest that it is problematic to 
conclude that commemorative activities made any long-lasting contribution to national 
identity. The underlying appropriation and Marxist re-positioning of Schiller, Beethoven, and 
Luther does not appear to have been well communicated, let alone accepted by GDR citizens; 
the same process was arguably unnecessary to begin with for the Kollwitz centenary. But the 
manifest reasons why the ideological frameworks, as articulated in the aims of the 
commemorations, were not met, in themselves offer new perspectives on the GDR as an 
evolving political entity within a twenty-four year period. These insights add weight to the 
consensus- and participatory dictatorship models of the GDR.  
This concluding chapter first considers the issues involved in attempting to measure national 
identity. The case studies are then compared and contrasted in order to draw generalised 
conclusions about the political and cultural value of commemorations in an authoritarian state 
such as the GDR. The broader implications of how the main themes of Abgrenzung and 
Aneignung evolved over the course of this central period in GDR history is summarised in 
relation to national identity. Finally, these conclusions are discussed in the context of the two 
broad theoretical frameworks set out in the Introduction chapter.  
6.1. INITIAL LIMITATIONS TO ASSESSING THE RECEPTION OF 
COMMEMORATIONS 
The case studies in this thesis analyse a range of primary sources on each of the three key 
stages shared by the case studies, that is, aims, implementation, and outcomes. When 
examining the commemoration activities and their outcomes it soon becomes problematic to 
identify, let alone appraise the effect on national identity. This applies to the Festakt and 
similar ‘ritualised’ events, such as the official launch of the organising committees. All of 
these appear to have been performed in a seemingly formulaic and repetitive manner. 
Tangible evidence of how other commemoration activities may have been received is mainly 
to be found in attendance records from events that were accessible to the general public, such 
as exhibitions and cultural performances, as well as some quantitative and qualitative data of 
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audience reception regarding broadcast output. The relevance of all this data for purposes of 
the research question assumes that it was not adjusted for political purposes and is therefore 
accurate. Similarly, and as noted in the Beethoven case study, domestic printed media 
coverage was subject throughout this period and almost all of GDR history to the constraints 
of prevailing press guidelines and potential short-term propaganda directives – all of which 
must be taken into account when assessing how they can be used for specific purposes in this 
thesis. West German media reporting of GDR commemorations was more differentiated than 
its GDR counterparts, yet also exhibited Cold War-related political bias, particularly during 
the Schiller, Kollwitz, and Beethoven commemorations. Nevertheless, on occasion, West 
German media comment was also in line with correspondingly positive GDR media 
reception, particularly in the case of the Luther television film. In summary, if reception of 
the commemorations cannot supply the necessary evidence, we must investigate the 
interaction between aims, implementation and ultimate outcomes as an alternative tool to 
gauge the likelihood of any impact on national identity. 
6.2. CASE STUDIES COMPARED: THEORY VERSUS PRACTICE 
The findings of the four case studies reveal parallels as well as differences between them; 
when combined they enable the potential relevance of these commemorations to national 
identity formation to be estimated. The four commemorations are similar in how the aims 
were developed, despite differences in timing. This may have been caused by lack of much 
prior experience, as in the case of the Schiller bicentenary, or by the different scale of the 
commemorations in the other three case studies. The basic format of the commemorations 
was clearly comparable, comprising the articulation of an ideological framework, the 
establishment of a high profile, official organising committee, the staging of an academic 
conference, with all commemoration activities culminating in a Festakt ceremony on the 
birthdate anniversary. Given their primary remit, the MfK was involved in all four 
commemorations, which may help to explain the likeness in concept and design of the basic 
commemoration programme. But this uniform approach offers no further insight other than of 
appearing static and unimaginative. Although there is little documented evidence of 
deliberate cross-reference between commemorations, we can observe an overall improvement 
in the actual execution of the events, which suggests that some lessons have been learned 
from previous commemorations. In this connection one might assume that the subsequent 
assessment reports had helped, supported by the continuity of certain MfK staff involved in 
the working groups. 
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As far as a potential impact on the construction of national identity is concerned, the second 
apparent similarity between the four commemorations concerns the evident gap between 
aims, implementations and outcomes, in other words between theory and practice. The case 
studies demonstrate clearly that the implementation and outcomes were unable always to live 
up to the aims as declared in the ideological frameworks. This applies in part to how the 
official and main cultural and academic events were executed but above all to how a revised, 
Marxist interpretation of Schiller, Beethoven and Luther was not uniformly and successfully 
communicated. Several incidents of organisational muddle, mixed narratives and recurring 
SED intervention in how these commemorations were implemented can only have amplified 
the weak impact of unrealistic ideological aims in each case. Tensions in the internal 
relationships between the party, the government and the mass organisations can be detected 
in all case studies, another factor aggravating the reality gap. Even in the least challenging – 
in terms of promoting the GDRˈs claim on the personality being commemorated – Kollwitz 
commemoration, underlying insecurity amongst official organisers may be detected in the 
manipulative editing of her diaries in the documentary script, most likely to reinforce an 
already existing perception of Kollwitz in line with her official depiction. 
A significant common denominator in all commemorations appears to be evidence of ever-
present agency, displayed by many of the key individuals, notably the intellectuals, 
participating in the planning as well as the execution of the commemorations. However 
organisational issues and even the communication of ideological messages were not the only 
problems, particularly as the former tended to become less apparent over the timeline of the 
four commemorations. In its place, the more dominant theme to emerge was that the 
commemorations were influenced, even during their planning phase by political reactions to 
external developments and internal challenges, such as the church-state relationship in the 
Lutherjahr. A final, unhelpful (for purposes of national identity formation) gap between 
theory and practice was the absence of large scale, active participation of the general public 
in commemorations activities, with the exception of the mass involvement in church events at 
the Lutherjahr commemorations. This particular disparity between aims and implementation 
reflected an ostensible divergence between the core aim of exemplifying, in the spirit of the 
Bitterfelder Weg, the prominent participation of the working class in each commemoration, 
and the reality of an elite driven implementation.  
Given all these interwoven impediments, attempting to measure impact on national identity 
becomes an unrealistic challenge. Instead we can only make reasonable assumptions about 
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what the commemorations may have achieved. It seems appropriate to conjecture that the 
promotion of the personalities and their works by means of a marked increase in cultural 
events and output (publications, performances etc) during their anniversary year must have at 
least heightened awareness amongst the public at large. But to argue that such an awareness 
may have created national pride in the fact that the GDR was able to stage such elaborate 
commemorations, particularly in comparison to more modest commemorations in West 
Germany, is already more speculative. Conversely, it seems more plausible to conclude that 
this consciousness may have been short-term in nature. In short, it is challenging to build a 
convincing case that it promoted an incremental intensification in the more tenuous concept 
of GDR national identity. What the gap between theory and practice thus signifies is a 
disparity between official attempts to propagandise the GDRˈs claim on the four German 
cultural icons and the subsequent outcomes in terms of any evident difference in how GDR 
citizens may have identified with those icons after their anniversary year. 
6.3. ABGRENZUNG & ANEIGNUNG: TWO SIDES OF THE SAME COIN? 
The twin themes of demarcation and appropriation were marked in all four commemorations 
and yet they could be seen to evolve during the underlying twenty-four-year period from the 
end of the 1950s to the early 1980s. In essence they represented opposite perspectives derived 
from the political reality of two German states. Abgrenzung took an essentially negative 
approach of cultural antagonism by focussing on the ˈotherˈ (West Germany), or ‘what we 
are not’. Aneignung was the positive counterpart, emphasising the self, ˈwhat we areˈ thus 
justifying the GDRˈs claim on the figure as identifying him/her with the new, humanist and 
socialist Germany. Both themes appeared side by side in all commemorations, but 
demarcation was more explicit and dominant in the Schiller and Beethoven commemorations 
than in the commemorations of Kollwitz and Luther. Lacking international recognition of its 
sovereignty outside of the Soviet bloc until the early 1970s, demarcation reflected the 
defensiveness and insecurity of the GDR regarding its legitimacy, both internally and 
externally. This sense of having to endure ‘second-class’ status as a political and cultural 
entity was amplified by West Germany’s official name for the GDR in 1959 – the ‘Soviet 
Occupied Zone’; even in 1970 the name was still the ‘so-called GDR’. But by the time of the 
Lutherjahr in 1983, both German states had become essentially equal in terms of full 
international recognition of their respective sovereignty; demarcation was less of a concern 
for the GDR authorities although the FRG never renounced its claim to be the sole legitimate 
German state. Erbe-Aneignung became an ever more important component of GDR cultural 
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policy in the Honecker era of the 1970s and 1980s. As a consequence, the later 
commemorations also show that reducing the demarcation narrative and its strident rhetoric 
did not mean less emphasis on an overt appropriation of German cultural heritage – which 
remained a consistent and central feature of the ideological frameworks in the 
commemorations. Even so, the continued manifestation of Aneignung as the core component 
of ideological aims cannot be judged to have made a deeper impression on the Lutherjahr in 
terms of likely national identity formation, than when demarcation dominated such aims in 
earlier commemorations.  
6.4. NATIONAL IDENTITY AND COMMEMORATIONS: A CONVINCING 
INSTRUMENT OF CULTURAL MEMORY? 
Standing back and examining the ritualised, repetitive facets of the four commemorations as a 
whole sheds new light on the role that commemorations play within the wider concepts of 
national identity and cultural memory. The case studies appear to confirm Benedict 
Anderson’s concept of ‘official nationalism’ propagating a self-protective policy, comparable 
to that of several nineteenth- and early twentieth-century nations. The GDR regime 
throughout understood the political need for interlinked concepts of national pride, patriotism 
and national identity to be encouraged wherever possible. Mindful of the above-mentioned 
limitations on measuring national identity, it is nonetheless plausible to conclude that the 
commemorations had the potential to affect national pride and national identity positively and 
to a small degree. However, it can be argued that this was not necessarily a result of the 
citizens accepting, even understanding the regime’s appropriation ideology focused on the 
personalities themselves. Instead, one may classify positive outcomes noted in each case 
study, such as a modicum of new cultural awareness and participation, film, book and 
recording output, as incidental side-effects of the commemorations. This means that beyond 
these ‘by-products’, it may be appropriate to re-evaluate the main, repetitive elements of the 
GDR’s cultural commemorations, in relation to Aleida and Jan Assmann’s concept of cultural 
memory performance. This applies principally to the recurring format of ritualised 
ceremonies and events described above. It should be emphasised that the limitations of 
ceremonies, as analysed here, are dependent on the context; in other words my findings relate 
specifically to the GDR and its cultural commemorations. The success of the 2012 Olympic 
Games opening ceremony in the UK is an example of a ceremony, repeated at all Olympic 
Games, that was arguably successful in terms of impact on national pride and identity in the 
UK. Based on the findings of this thesis, I contend that the repetitive aspects of cultural 
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commemorations in the GDR seem to question the effectiveness of political actors 
performing ‘narrativizing acts of remembrance’, as described by Anne Rigney. In summary 
therefore, although Jan Assmann asserts that ‘collective identity needs ceremony’, it does not 
always follow that ceremony will produce any measurable results, including the construction 
of national identity. 
6.5. AGENCY AND CONCEPTUALISATION OF THE GDR 
The relative ineffectiveness of ideological frameworks in the case studies that can be ascribed 
to many examples of agency (Eigensinn) adds new empirical weight to defining what sort of 
society the GDR was. It would be wrong to generalise that all the relevant individuals, 
admittedly pigeonholed here as ‘intellectuals’, displayed the same type and degree of agency. 
Some of the literature experts involved in the Schiller bicentenary, who still may have felt 
connected to the 1955 commemoration and its ‘All-German’ aspects, seem to have been 
uncomfortable with the more rigorous demarcation approach emanating from the authorities. 
Intellectuals from the realms of education and theatre were also inconsistent in their 
responsiveness to commemoration aims. The art historians and related intellectuals in the 
AdK were able to differ in the narratives that they felt should be highlighted when marking 
the Kollwitz centenary. This example of agency may also be a result of a comparatively 
relaxed attitude by the authorities to the need to appropriate Kollwitz in ideological terms. 
Compared to the other three commemorations, it was probably the intellectuals participating 
in the Beethoven bicentenary who exhibited the strongest examples of agency. The 
professional musicians such as composers and conductors stand out here, but also to some 
extent some of the musicologists and music-focussed intellectuals within the DKB. Lastly, 
the Lutherjahr reveals a different side of agency in respect of theologians concerned with the 
church-state relationship rather than historians repositioning a Marxist interpretation and 
rehabilitation of Luther. Despite all these variations, the consistent evidence of agency 
throughout all commemorations is a significant finding of this thesis. In itself it was arguably 
the most important factor contributing to the theory versus reality gap described earlier. It 
follows that the evidence of agency yielded here was the main reason in each case for the 
GDR regime state to be unable to impose a top-down ideological, as compared to 
organisational implementation of its aims; the fact that this outcome was only marginally 
improved by repeated SED intervention may be noted during all the commemorations. Rather 
than relying on being able to command and control, the regime was heavily dependent on the 
mass organisations and other stakeholders in the four commemorations cooperating internally 
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and with each other, so as to ensure that at least the organisational aspects were achieved. In 
summary, abundant examples of the reality of the GDR power structure across its core 
period, as analysed here, substantially endorse ˈbottom- upˈ models of the GDR; both 
ˈconsensus dictatorshipˈ and ˈparticipatory dictatorshipˈ concepts are equally validated and 
enhanced by this new perspective on cultural commemorations and national identity. 
The scope and comparative case study methodology chosen for my thesis is thus upheld by a 
meaningful pattern of valuable findings from selected samples of cultural genres, set against a 
selected time line of GDR history. The revealing research conclusions point to opportunities 
for further investigation into the relationship between cultural commemorations and the 
construction of national identity. An alternative case study research of West German versus 
East German commemorations of the same major cultural figures might offer new insights on 
the comparative impact on national identity across different political and socio-cultural 
systems. In a purely GDR context, further primary sources could include samples of cultural 
commemorations before 1959 and after 1983 as well as the additional dimension of oral 
history testimony from former GDR citizens participating in, or especially exposed to 
commemoration activity.  
Understanding what East German identity was before 1989 and may still be today remains 
topical. A long-term project in Saxony, described recently by a regional broadcaster based in 
the former GDR, represents a good example of on-going research. This longitudinal study 
had been following one hundred young people since 1987, observing that the majority retain 
an identification with the GDR whilst also embracing a new Bundesbürger identity.180 This 
present-day example of popular history demonstrates why an understanding of the many 
factors affecting national identity is one of the potentially more rewarding pathways to a 
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51 ‘Beschluß üb r die Käthe-Kollwitz-Ehrung 1967’, BArch-SAPMO, DC20/7482. 
52 BArch-SAPMO, DC20/7482. 
53 ‘Brief’, dated 18.4.1967, AdK-O, 720 BL313-4. 
54 ‘Einladung’, AdK-O, 720.7 BL607. 
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62 ‘Beschlußprotokoll üb r die Arbeitstagung des Käthe-Kollwitz-Komitees am 14.6.1967’, BArch-SAPMO, 
DC20/7487. 
63 ‘Aktennotiz Fachgruppe Bildende Kunst’, dated 22.6.1967, AdK-O, 348. 
64 ‘Beschlußprotokoll (appendix) vom 26/6/1967 über die Arbeitstagung des Käthe-Kollwitz-Komitees am 
14.6.1967’, BArch-SAPMO, DC20/7482. 
65 Wilhelm Meister Lehrjahre, Book 7, Chapter 9 (Reference provided in Schymura, 2014). 
66 Neues Deutschland, 9th July, 1967. 
209 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
67 ‘Brief’ from Gerhard Heilmann [ADK] adressed to ‘Herr Wrede, Direktor des DEFA Studios fü  
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127 Hansjü gen Schaefer, ‘Beethoven fü  Millionen: Über die Sendungen der neun Sinfonien im Fernsehfunk,’ 
Neues Deutschland, 19.9.1971, DRA Babelsberg, M07032. 
128 ‘Bericht zur Einschätzung der Beethoven-Ehrung in der DDR’, dated 15.1.71, BArch-SAPMO, 
DR1/15100/1, p.16. 
129 ‘Vorlage an das Politbü o des ZK der SED vom 11/7/1969: Beschluss über die Beethoven-Ehrung’, Anlage 
1, AdK-O, ZAA 792, Sitzungen der Sektion Musik 1969, Bl.1. 
130 ‘Bericht zur Einschätzung der Beethoven-Ehrung in der DDR’ dated 15.1.1971, BArch-SAPMO, 
DR1/15100/1, p.24. 
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der Universität Erlangen-Nürnberg – IGW, Nr.3-1983, BArch-Bibliothek AFG 88/2672. 
180 ‘Die zwei Identitäten der Ostdeutschen’, Stable URL: 
http://www.mdr.de/nachrichten/politik/inland/ostdeutsche-sachsen-studie-langzeit-einheit-100.html  
[last accessed 4.10.2017] 
